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ABSTRACT
The advent of e-commerce has impacted the retail industry, as retail firms have in-
novated in response to customers increasingly preferring to purchase products online.
This dissertation studies operational problems that accompany such retail innovations,
and provides tractable heuristic solutions developed using stochastic and robust opti-
mization methods. In particular, the first two chapters focus on the value of fulfillment
flexibility – online orders can be fulfilled from any node in the firm’s fulfillment net-
work. The first chapter is devoted to omnichannel retailing, where e-commerce demand
is integrated with the physical network of stores through ship-from-store fulfillment.
For a retailer with a network of physical stores and fulfillment centers facing two de-
mands (online and in-store), we consider the following interlinked decisions – how much
inventory to keep at each location and where to fulfill each online order from. We show
that the value of considering fulfillment flexibility in inventory planning is highest when
there is a moderate mix of online and in-store demands, and develop computationally
fast heuristics with promising asymptotic performance for large scale networks, which
are shown to improve upon traditional strategies.
The second chapter considers a pure play e-commerce fulfillment network, and
studies the inventory placement decision. As e-commerce demands are volatile due
to a variety of factors (price-matching, recommendation engines, etc.), we consider
a distributionally robust setting, where the objective is to minimize the worst-case
expected cost under given mean and covariance matrices of the underlying demand
distribution. For this NP-hard problem, we develop computationally tractable heuristic
in the form of a semi-definite program, with dimension quadratic in the size of the
ix
network. In the face of distribution uncertainty, we show that the robust heuristic
outperforms inventory solutions that assume incorrect distributions.
The final chapter offers a new take on a classic problem in retail – customer returns,
which has grown to be an important issue in recent times with firms competing to pro-
vide lenient and convenient return policies to boost their e-commerce sales. However,
several customers take advantage of such policies, which can lead to loss in revenue and
increase in inventory costs. We study different return policies that a firm can employ
depending on the information about customers’ return behavior that is available to the
firm. We derive the structure of the optimal return policies and show that personal-
izing return policies based on customers’ historical data can significantly improve the




Internet has changed how humans interact and transact with businesses. Customers are
increasingly preferring to conduct their shopping online, which provides new challenges
to retail firms to reinvent supply chain strategies in the digital era.
There are several operational problems that need to be addressed by firms which
face online demands – inventory placement (where to position inventory in the net-
work), fulfillment decisions (where to fulfill an incoming online order), assortment (on-
line and in-store, online recommendations), pricing (dynamic pricing, price-matching
with competitors, differentiation between online and in-store), returns (free returns or
partial returns, leniency in return window), etc. While most of these problems have
been studied in literature in the context of brick-and-mortar retail, e-commerce de-
mand introduces additional flexibility and challenges. In particular, from the point of
view of the online shopper, policies (pricing, assortment, return policy, etc.) can now
be personalized based on a customer’s historical data collected by the firm; from the
point of view of the firm, online orders can be fulfilled from any node (stores, fulfill-
ment centers, etc.) in the network, which can be used as a strategic lever to manage
operations across the network.
In this thesis, we look at three such important problems faced by modern retail
firms. The first two chapters deal with inventory and fulfillment decisions that are
brought about by the fulfillment flexibility in dealing with online demand – an online
order can be fulfilled from any node in the fulfillment network. The third chapter fo-
cuses on the value of personalizing return policies for customers based on their historical
return behavior.
In the first chapter, we study the problem of inventory and fulfillment optimization
for omnichannel retail firms. Omnichannel refers to the seamless integration of a re-
tailer’s sales channels, such as in-store and online. While this integration is motivated
by giving flexibility to customers, it leads to pooling of demands within and across
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locations. Thus, such integration can lead to reduction in cost that can be achieved
through efficient inventory management. To this end, we consider a retailer with a
network of physical stores and fulfillment centers facing two demands (online and in-
store), where online demand can be fulfilled from any location with available inventory.
We model the setting as a stochastic optimization problem, by considering order-up-to
policies for a general multi-period model with multiple locations and zero lead time,
and online orders fulfilled multiple times in each period. We develop a simple, scalable
heuristic for the multi-location problem based on analysis from the two-store problem,
for the special case where online orders are only fulfilled at the end of a period. For
the case where fulfillment is done dynamically, we develop a simple threshold-based
policy which reserves inventory at stores for future in-store demand. We then employ
a realistic numerical study to analyze the benefits of using the combined inventory and
fulfillment heuristic over traditional decentralized and myopic strategies.
In the second chapter, we consider the inventory placement problem in e-commerce
fulfillment centers through a distributionally robust approach. In network inventory
planning, the joint distribution of the random demands is needed to optimize inventory
levels at each node in the network. However, in the case of e-commerce demands, the
exact distribution may be inaccessible due to high volatility in online customer behav-
ior arising from factors such as competition, the use of dynamic price-matching strate-
gies and flash promotions, recommendation engines that manipulate click-streams, etc.
Assuming that the firm knows only the mean and covariance matrices, we solve a
distributionally robust multi-location newsvendor model for network inventory opti-
mization. The objective is to minimize the worst-case expected cost over the set of
demand distributions satisfying the known mean and covariance information. For the
special case of two homogeneous customer locations with correlated demands, we show
that a six-point distribution achieves the worst-case expected cost, and derive a closed-
form expression for the optimal inventory decision. The general multi-location problem
can be shown to be NP-hard. We develop a computationally tractable upper bound
through the solution of a semidefinite program (SDP), which also yields heuristic in-
ventory levels, for a special class of fulfillment cost structures, namely nested fulfillment
structures. We also develop an algorithm to convert any general distance-based fulfill-
ment cost structure into a nested fulfillment structure which tightly approximates the
expected total fulfillment cost.
In the third chapter, we consider the important problem of managing customer
return policies. With lenient return policies growing popular in recent times, several
customers take advantage of such policies. Retail firms keep track of customer return
2
behavior through the data they collect themselves or through third-party companies –
recently, Amazon has banned several customers who were considered to be fraudulent
returners. We study how the firm can use information about customers’ return behavior
to tailor personalized return policies. For heterogeneous customers who differ in their
perceived hassle cost of returns (which can be thought of as a proxy for return rates
under lenient return policies), we derive the firm’s optimal return policy, which consists
of two components: 1) a return window (short or long), and 2) a refund fee. The firm
benefits from a shorter return window, as returned items are less likely to be damaged
and more likely to be resold during the selling season (modeled by a higher salvage
price), whereas customers are inconvenienced by shorter windows (modeled by increase
in their return hassle). When the firm offers full refunds to returning customers,
consistent with Amazon’s practice, we show that low-hassle customers must be banned
from returning. However, when the firm is allowed to personalized return fees, we show
that the firm benefits from selling to these low-hassle customers under strict return
policies (short window and high return fees). Identifying and targeting customers
based on their historical return behavior can lead to significant increase in profits,
however, we show that customer surplus is wiped out. This provides implications for
customers’ privacy in retail settings, and the value of consumer behavior data.
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CHAPTER 2
Joint Inventory and Fulfillment Decisions
for Omnichannel Retail Networks
2.1 Abstract
With e-commerce growing at a rapid pace compared to traditional retail, many brick-
and-mortar firms are supporting their online growth through an integrated omnichan-
nel approach. Such integration can lead to reduction in cost that can be achieved
through efficient inventory management. A retailer with a network of physical stores
and fulfillment centers facing two demands (online and in-store) has to make impor-
tant, interlinked decisions – how much inventory to keep at each location and where to
fulfill each online order from, as online demand can be fulfilled from any location. We
consider order-up-to policies for a general multi-period model with multiple locations
and zero lead time, and online orders fulfilled multiple times in each period. We first
focus on the case where fulfillment decisions are made at the end of each period, which
allows separate focus on the inventory decision. We develop a simple, scalable heuristic
for the multi-location problem based on analysis from the two-store case, and prove
its asymptotic near-optimality for large number of omnichannel stores under certain
conditions. We extend this to the case where fulfillment can be done multiple times
within a period and combine it with a simple, threshold-based fulfillment policy which
reserves inventory at stores for future in-store demand. With the help of a realistic
numerical study based on a fictitious retail network embedded in mainland USA, we
show that the combined heuristic outperforms a myopic, decentralized planning strat-
egy under a variety of problem parameters, especially when there is an adequate mix
of online and in-store demands. Extensions to positive lead times are discussed.
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2.2 Introduction
By the end of 2016, e-commerce sales accounted for around 9% of the total retail sales
in the United States (U.S. Census Bureau, 2016). Although this is a small portion of
the total sales, online sales have been increasing at a rapid growth rate of around 16%
each year (Zaroban, 2018), and projected to account for 17% of all retail sales within
the next five years (Lindner, 2017). In comparison, the growth in traditional retail has
dwindled to around 2% in recent years. With customers increasingly favoring the online
channel, traditional brick-and-mortar (B&M) firms are compelled to develop their e-
commerce capabilities to remain competitive against pure play e-commerce firms like
Amazon (Leiser, 2016), which alone accounted for 53% of the e-commerce sales growth
in 2016 (Kim, 2017). In order to improve efficiency and flexibility, retailers resort to
an omnichannel approach to integrate the online channel with their physical stores.
Omnichannel refers to the seamless integration of a retailer’s sales channels, such
as in-store and online. Customers can purchase an item in different ways, including
placing an order through the online store (websites), through mobile devices (mobile
apps), as well as through the traditional practice of walking into physical stores. In
addition, customers placing orders online can also choose how they receive the item,
which has led to various omnichannel initiatives: they can pick up their items from
a nearby physical store (in-store pickup) or from designated self-service kiosks like
Amazon Lockers, or simply have the item shipped directly to their homes (ship-to-
customer).
Providing an omnichannel customer experience is regarded as a brand differentiator
by many retailers, and integrating the online channel with the physical stores increases
revenue, reduces shipping costs and improves customer satisfaction (Forrester, 2014).
Hence, there is an industry-wide shift to omnichannel retailing, with onetime B&M
firms like Macy’s and Walmart leveraging their existing network of retail stores in
their integration of the online channel (Nash, 2015). Amazon has also joined these
firms through the acquisition of a network of physical stores across the US by means
of its purchase of Whole Foods Market. This allows Amazon to not only operate an
omnichannel grocery chain, but also absorb the stores into its distribution network to
reduce logistic costs.
One of the key aspects of this channel integration is store fulfillment, which is
the use of physical stores to fulfill online orders. Store fulfillment has now become
indispensable for firms like Walmart and Macy’s, that rely on a network of physical
stores close to population centers to offer same day and next-day delivery options to
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customers (Giannopoulos, 2014). Dedicated floor space and store staff are required to
fulfill online orders from stores.
In spite of potential benefits, many firms have struggled in their implementation of
channel integration: from 2010 to 2014, even as retail and online sales increased, inven-
tory turnover decreased (Kurt Salmon, 2016). One possible cause for this inefficiency
could be insufficient planning in inventory management. While firms have traditionally
managed inventory levels at stores based on demands in the corresponding locations,
such a decentralized approach ceases be optimal in an integrated system.
The optimal inventory decisions depends on the fulfillment policy followed, and
there does not seem to be a standard approach to online fulfillment across the industry.
Some firms primarily fulfill from online fulfillment centers (FCs), and resort to store
fulfillment in case the online FC runs out of stock. Some firms fulfill online orders from
stores, but are agnostic to store inventory levels, while others do not fulfill from stores
running low on inventory.
In this paper, we study the problem of an omnichannel firm with a network of
physical stores and online FCs facing online (ship-to-customer) and in-store demands,
by means of a general multi-period, multi-location model. We consider a dynamic
setting, where we allow online fulfillment decisions to be made multiple times within
each period. Online orders can be routed to any store or online FC in the network, and
items are picked off the shelves, packed, labeled and shipped to the customers’ homes.
This has several advantages over the dedicated use of online FCs including reduced
shipping costs, quicker deliveries and efficient use of store inventory (UPS Compass,
2014).
Our goal is to optimize inventory levels and fulfillment decisions for a single product.
The decisions have to be made based on the network as a whole as opposed to a
decentralized approach, in order to take into account demand pooling of online demands
across the network, in addition to demand pooling of in-store and online demands in
each region.
The firms’s problem is described as follows. A retail firm owns a network of stores
and online FCs, and has integrated the online channel into the physical stores through
store fulfillment. Following a periodic review inventory model, each store orders up
to a certain level at the beginning of each review period, to fulfill in-store demand
(customers walking into physical stores) and online demand (customers ordering online,
expecting items to be shipped directly to them) during the course of the period. The
in-store demand at a store is fulfilled as it arrives, until that store runs out of inventory.
Unlike in-store demand, online demand can be fulfilled from any location in the
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network, and there is typically a delay between the time an order is placed and when
items are picked off the shelf. Firms may delay fulfillment decisions due to various
reasons:
 for strategic reasons, orders from the same customer or region can be consol-
idated to lower shipping costs (Xu, Allgor, and Graves, 2009; Wei, Jasin, and
Kapuscinski, 2017),
 or for practical reasons, as the timing of orders fulfilled from stores is affected by
store staffing schedules and pick-up times of third-party carriers like UPS.
To model this dynamic, a review period is further divided into T fulfillment epochs,
where in-store demands are fulfilled as they arrive, and online fulfillment decisions
(assigning online orders to fulfillment locations) are made at the end of each epoch
after observing the demands during the epoch, with unmet demands being lost. The
inventory and fulfillment decisions are made centrally by the firm to minimize holding,
penalty and shipping costs. For the sake of clarity, the two units of time are described
below:
 a review period is the amount of time between two consecutive inventory replen-
ishments. For stores that are replenished daily, the review period is a single
day.
 a fulfillment epoch is the time between two fulfillment decisions. Over the course
of an epoch, online orders are aggregated, and fulfillment decisions are made
at the end of each epoch. For stores replenished daily, the length of an epoch
can range from a whole day (e.g. Macy’s stores fulfill online orders once a day
through UPS (Lewis, 2013)) to a few minutes (e.g. firms like Amazon make more
frequent fulfillment decisions).
As described, the definition of a fulfillment epoch carries flexibility, and by choosing
large enough values for T , we can closely approximate the continuous time setting,
where firms make fulfillment decisions as online orders arrive.
The online fulfillment decisions are similar to transshipment decisions for online
demand, except that instead of items being shipped between stores, they are shipped
directly to the customer. The setting can thus be cast as planning of order-up-to levels
in a transshipment problem with a replenishment leadtime of T − 1 periods, with a
planning horizon of T periods. This makes the problem hard, as it has been shown
that optimal transshipment decisions are intractable, let alone joint optimization of
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initial inventory levels and transshipment decisions, even for two locations (Tagaras
and Cohen, 1992).
The general structure of the problem is also subject to complications from other
sources - multiple locations, multiple fulfillment epochs, and two non-identical classes
of demands. Our main contribution is a combined inventory and fulfillment heuristic
for omnichannel retailing, which we derive from a general multi-location, multi-period
model shown to be mathematically intractable due to the various generalizations in-
volved. Specifically, the inventory heuristic calculates the stocking levels at each loca-
tion based on the demands in the network, rather than individually at that location,
and the fulfillment heuristic provides location-specific, time-varying inventory thresh-
olds which dictate the rationing between in-store and online demands.
The strength of our combined heuristic lies in the ease of computation and compre-
hension, and we show by means of a realistic numerical study that our heuristic creates
value by planning for virtual pooling of online demands across locations, and diligently
reserving inventory at stores for future demands. Our solutions are generalizable, and
offer a framework to build further complexities on, which can yield valuable decision
support tools for firms.
The approach we take to address this problem is as follows. We model the general
problem in Section 2.4, and describe the complexities involved. To obtain a heuristic
solution to this problem, we first decouple the inventory and fulfillment decisions by
considering the case with a single fulfillment epoch (T = 1) in Section 2.5. When
there is no leadtime, a myopic fulfillment policy would be optimal in this case - fulfill
online demand as much as possible with the available inventory in each review period.
Given this fulfillment policy, we discuss the optimal inventory solution for the two-
store case, and develop a simple, asymptotically near-optimal inventory heuristic for
the multi-location case.
In Section 2.6, we extend this inventory heuristic to the general problem where
online orders are fulfilled multiple times within each review period (T > 1), and develop
a simple threshold fulfillment policy in each fulfillment epoch, where stores fulfill online
orders only when the inventory levels are above a certain threshold.
In Section 2.7, by means of a realistic numerical study on a network of stores and
online FCs embedded in mainland USA, we show that our combined inventory and
fulfillment heuristic improves greatly upon a benchmark solution which naively sets
inventory levels in a decentralized fashion and fulfills online orders myopically. We test
the relative performance of our heuristic over a variety of problem parameters such
as shipping costs, online market share, network size, etc. Finally, we conclude with
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Section 2.8 by discussing further generalizations including non-identical leadtimes and
costs, and areas for future research.
2.3 Literature Review
Omnichannel retailing is a relatively new area in operations management literature,
and has been gaining traction in recent years. Readers are referred to Rigby (2011)
and Brynjolfsson et al. (2013) for comprehensive reviews of the topic. Existing papers
in this area focus on the impact of online channel integration: Gao and Su (2017) study
the impact of implementing store pickup on store operations, and Gallino et al. (2017)
focus on sales dispersion from implementing store pickup. Other papers study the
impact from the customers’ point of view: Bell et al. (2017); Ansari et al. (2008), and
Gallino and Moreno (2014) study customer migration due to product information, and
Gao and Su (2016) analyze the effect of information provided to strategic omnichannel
customers on store operations.
When there is no in-store demand, the problem is analogous to the pure play
e-commerce setting, which has enjoyed recent attention in literature: Acimovic and
Graves (2017) study the optimal allocation of replenishment to fulfillment centers to
reduce shipping costs and mitigate costly spillovers, Lei et al. (2018) consider the
joint pricing and fulfillment strategy to maximize the expected profits (revenue minus
shipping costs), and Acimovic and Graves (2014) focus on fulfillment strategies to
minimize outbound shipping costs.
There have been some studies which discuss integration of online demand to physical
stores by means of a separate online fulfillment center, as this was the primary mode
of fulfillment in the e-commerce channel in its nascent stages. Seifert et al. (2006)
consider the inventory management of a system where an online warehouse handles
online orders, and in case of stockouts, stores can fill these orders. Chen et al. (2011)
consider a three location system consisting of two stores and an etailer, with a hierarchy
to fulfillment - the etailer can fulfill online orders with the least cost, followed by store
1 and then store 2.
We consider a generalized setting representing the current retailing situation
wherein physical stores are the primary ports of online fulfillment. To the best of our
knowledge, the study closest to ours in emulating the problem setting, where online
demand is integrated with the physical stores through store fulfillment is by Jalilipour
Alishah et al. (2015). They consider a single store with online and in-store demands,
and analyze decisions at three levels — fulfillment structure, inventory optimization
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and inventory rationing. They show that the optimal rationing policy between in-
store and online demands is threshold-based, but their results do not extend to the
multi-store case due to the complexity involved in an additional rationing decision -
online orders from other regions. This setting is rather important in the context of
e-commerce, and falls under the purview of the transshipment literature, where it has
been shown to be an intractable problem to solve.
The key feature that online demands can be fulfilled from any store in the system
is analogous to a reactive transshipment setting with zero transshipment lead time, as
pointed out by Yang and Qin (2007), who called this ’virtual lateral transshipment’. In
addition, our problem has multiple demand classes (online and in-store), where some
classes of demand (in-store) cannot be subject to transshipment. For an extensive
review of the transshipment literature, the readers are referred to Paterson et al. (2011).
The fact the the problem in question can be related to the transshipment literature
offers little solace. Transshipment problems are infamously hard to solve, and ana-
lytical approaches can be done only for simplified cases with zero replenishment and
transshipment leadtimes and two locations (Tagaras, 1989) or identical shipping costs
across locations (Dong and Rudi, 2004). Tagaras and Cohen (1992) show that when
there is positive replenishment leadtime, the problem becomes intractable even for two
locations, as obtaining the optimal transshipment policy is mathematically complex
due to its interdependence on demands during the leadtime, on-hand inventory and
in-transit inventory.
Obtaining optimal order-up-to policies are by extension intractable as well, as they
need to be calculated based on the optimal transshipment policy. Yao et al. (2016)
have recently considered the optimal joint initial stocking and transshipment decisions
for the two-store case, where stocking is done once at the beginning of a selling season,
and transshipment is done multiple times during the season. Their analysis is limited
to two stores, as key mathematical properties like submodularity do not extend to
multiple locations.
Characterization of optimal policies in periodic review systems are especially diffi-
cult for lost-sales (see Bijvank and Vis 2011 for a review). However, Huh et al. (2009)
find that optimal inventory levels assuming backordering provide a reasonable approxi-
mation to the lost-sales case when the penalty costs are very high compared to holding
costs.
Due to the various complexities involved such as multiple stores, multiple epochs
and periods, lost sales and joint optimization of inventory and fulfillment, one cannot
hope to obtain a provably tight bound for a problem of this stature, let alone ana-
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lytically finding the optimal solutions. We will instead develop simple, tractable and
scalable heuristics, which perform well compared to naive strategies in most cases, with
help from techniques used in literature.
Finally in the zero leadtime case, when online demand is fulfilled only once at the
end of each review period, we show that the problem is analogous to a newsvendor net-
work, with virtual lateral transshipment as a ‘discretionary policy’ (van Mieghem and
Rudi, 2002). Newsvendor networks have been analyzed in great detail by van Mieghem
and Rudi (2002) and van Mieghem (2003), building up from the multi-dimensional
newsvendor models proposed by Harrison and van Mieghem (1999). However, as we
shall show later, the canonical approach to optimizing inventory levels is difficult even
for two stores due to the number of random demands involved, and is intractable for
the multi-store case.
2.4 The General Problem - Model and Assump-
tions
Consider a system composed of a firm which owns N facilities R1, R2, . . . , RN in dif-
ferent customer regions, selling a single product. Considering multiple products intro-
duces complex combinatorial features to the fulfillment problem as a multi-item order
can be fulfilled in different ways (Jasin and Sinha, 2015); we disregard this in our anal-
ysis to better study the interplay between inventory and fulfillment decisions. There
are two classes of demand originating in each region i, modeled by non-negative and
continuous random variables with well-behaved density functions.
1. the in-store demand (Dis) consists of customers picking items off the shelves (all
the inventory is available on the shelf), with unmet demand lost immediately
2. the online (ship-to-customer) demand (Dio), consisting of customers ordering
through the website or mobile app, with items delivered directly to their homes.
For orders fulfilled from stores, the store staff pick up the item from the shelf,
followed by packing and labeling in the store backroom, and shipping to the
customer. A sale is lost when there is no available inventory for fulfillment at
any location.
The demands are exogenous and are temporally independent, but can have any
general channel or location correlation structure, while we require that the total de-
mands in each region and across the system have continuous and well-defined density
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Ss - Traditional B&M Stores Sso - Omnichannel Stores So - Online FCs
In-store Customers - Dis
Online Customers - Dio
Figure 2.1: Three types of facilities in a fulfillment network a) Traditional brick-and-
mortar stores (Ss), b) Omnichannel stores (Sso), and c) Online Fulfillment Centers
(So).
functions.
A typical retail fulfillment network is shown in Figure 2.1, where dashed lines
represent customers visiting physical stores and solid lines represent items shipped
to customers’ homes. We consider three different types of facilities described by the
following sets:
 Ss - physical stores which handle only in-store demand.
 So - online fulfillment centers (OFCs) which handle only online orders.
 Sso - omnichannel physical stores which handle both online and in-store demands.
Since traditional B&M stores plan for inventory independent of other facilities in
the network, we exclude them from our analysis. We are hence interested in locations
involved in online fulfillment, namely the omnichannel stores and online fulfillment
centers, denoted by the set of facilities S = So ∪ Sso, and the number of such facilities
is N = |S|.
An important feature to be noted in the omnichannel problem is that unfulfilled
in-store demand at one region cannot be fulfilled by stores in other regions. Any facility
with available inventory can fulfill an online order, and hence there is pooling of online
demands across regions in addition to pooling of in-store and online demands within
each region.
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2.4.1 Periodic Review Setup
We consider a periodic review model, where an order is placed by each facility at
the start of each review period, and received with zero replenishment leadtime. The
demands are realized during the course of the period based on the facility considered.
We are interested in an optimum from the class of order-up-to policies, due to ease of
implementation and practical relevance, and the order-up-to levels in each period are
y1, . . . , yN .
Based on conversations with industry executives, there are certain situations in the
context of omnichannel stores where the leadtime is effectively negligible: in major
cities like New York, store replenishment can only be done at night-time due to traffic
restrictions. Such stores handle high volumes of sales, and are usually replenished
daily from warehouses in nearby cities. An order placed in the afternoon can often be
replenished before the following day. Positive leadtimes can significantly complicate
analyses, and we discuss extending our heuristics to the case of non-identical leadtimes
across locations in Section 2.8.
We assume that online orders are fulfilled in multiple batches in each review period,
which we model by dividing a review period into T fulfillment epochs: in each epoch,
in-store demand is fulfilled as it arrives, whereas online fulfillment decisions are made at
the end of the epoch after observing demand, and orders are fulfilled with the available
inventory.
The assumption reflects practical constraints in store operations: fulfillment ac-
tivities in stores are usually done by store personnel, who in most cases also share
additional store responsibilities. In such situations, it is better to fulfill online orders
in batches, as opposed to having store staff picking items every time an online order is
received.
2.4.2 Cost Parameters
We consider a per-unit service cost sij for online demand from region j fulfilled by Ri,
which encapsulates the cost of picking the item off the shelf, packing and labelling, as
well as the shipping cost for delivery. We have sij > sii,∀j 6= i, as it is costlier to ship
an item over longer distances. We will refer to the service costs sii (within the same
region) as shipping costs, and sij (across regions) as cross-shipping costs.
In practice, the handling (pick-pack-and-label) component of the service cost is
higher for stores fulfilling online demand, as it involves human labor, than for OFCs
where the process can be automated and streamlined. The shipping component of the
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service cost can be higher for the OFCs which are usually located farther away from
population centers.
We have identical costs at each location, including shipping costs sii = s, ∀i. At
the end of a fulfillment epoch, each unit of unused inventory incurs an overage cost
h, and each unit of unfulfilled in-store and online demands incur penalty costs ps and
po respectively. We assume that ps > po − s > 0, as in-store demand is fulfilled first
and costlier to lose, and cross-shipping always leads to a myopic reduction in cost:
sij (= sji) < h+ po, ∀i, j. We ignore the purchasing cost of inventory, but this can be
incorporated through linear terms.
2.4.3 Stochastic Programming Formulation
We are now ready to write the total expected per period cost function for the case
where online demand is fulfilled over T fulfillment epochs in each review period. We
focus on the single period to obtain order-up-to levels, which we show in Section 2.5.2
to be optimal in a multi-period setting in the case of negligible replenishment leadtimes.
In each fulfillment epoch t, let the starting inventory levels be denoted by xt =
(xti)i, and D̃
t = (Dtis, D
t
io)i denotes the demands. From location Ri, let z
t
i be the
amount of inventory used to fulfill the in-store demand, and Ztij be the amount of
inventory shipped to fulfill online demand from region j, denoted in vector form as
zt,Zt respectively.
We have a T -stage stochastic program, with the cost-to-go function in epoch t,
Ct(x
t, D̃t) is given by:
Ct(x
t, D̃t) = min
zt,Zt∈∆
[
P (xt, D̃t, zt,Zt) + ECt+1
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where P (xt, D̃t, zt,Zt) is the total cost in fulfillment epoch t, given by:












































Ztij ≤ xti, ∀i ∈ [N ],∀t ∈ [T ]
zti ≤ Dtis, ∀i ∈ [N ],∀t ∈ [T ]
n∑
i=1
Ztij ≤ Dtjo, ∀j ∈ [N ],∀t ∈ [T ]
zt,Zt ≥ 0, ∀t ∈ [T ]
(2.3)
The first inequality in ∆ represents the supply constraint, and the second and third
inequalities model the fulfillment constraints. Note that the online demand in one
region can be fulfilled from any facility in the network, as seen in the third inequality
in (2.3).
The goal is to obtain the initial stocking level y = (yi)i. The single period, T -epoch
problem can thus be stated as follows: min
y≥0
E[C1(y, D̃)]. This is a convex minimization
problem, as we will later show in Section 2.6, but it is intractable to solve. The
fulfillment decisions are similar to optimal transshipment decisions with non-negligible
lead time, as decisions in any fulfillment epoch depend on future demands in that
review period. As pointed out by Tagaras and Cohen (1992) for the two-store case in
traditional transshipment, while the optimal fulfillment policy may be threshold-based,
the optimization becomes intractable due to the complexity of the decision space in
the dynamic programming formulation.
We cannot hope to solve this problem to optimality, and we resort to heuristic
solutions that perform well compared to simple, naive strategies and hindsight optimal
lower bounds. Note that a heuristic solution specifies both the initial stocking level
and fulfillment policy.
We first develop the inventory heuristic in the following way: treat the T -epoch
problem as a single fulfillment epoch. A similar method was also used by Tagaras
and Cohen (1992) to set heuristic inventory levels for the two-location transshipment
problem with leadtime, based on numerical evidence that most transshipments took
place at or near the end of the planning horizon, when stockouts are more likely to
happen.
Our problem is different in two aspects: 1) we have in-store demands which are more
costly to lose than online demands and do not have pooling flexibility, and 2) demands
follow lost sales. However, we adopt this single fulfillment epoch approximation as
it provides a tractable alternative by decoupling inventory and fulfillment decisions,
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because:
1. a myopic fulfillment policy is optimal, where online demands are fulfilled to the
maximum possible extent with the available inventory, and as a result,
2. the inventory problem reduces to a single stage stochastic linear program.
With the help of results obtained through this approximation, we formulate inven-
tory and fulfillment heuristic solutions for the multi-period, multi-location problem in
Section 2.6, and numerically test their performance in Section 2.7.
2.5 The Single Fulfillment Epoch Case (T=1) -
Model and Analysis
In this setting, items are ordered and received at the beginning of the period with zero
lead time, and in-store demand is fulfilled as it arrives. Due to the single fulfillment
epoch assumption, the fulfillment of online demand is done once at the end of the
review period, after in-store demands are fulfilled. There is no benefit to reserving
inventory for future demands as replenishments arrive immediately. In such a case, a
myopic fulfillment policy is optimal, where online orders are fulfilled to the maximum
possible extent in each period.
The case of single fulfillment epoch is quite common in present day omnichannel
retailing where stores are replenished daily. Most stores still rely on third party carriers
such as UPS and FedEx to ship items to customers. Online orders to be shipped are
loaded onto these trucks once a day from the store backroom, usually towards the end of
the day. This is especially popular in the context of same-day and next-day deliveries,
where stores allow online ordering until a cutoff time, and these orders are ready to
be shipped by the end of the day. However with developments in drone technology in
the future, one can easily envision stores that fulfill multiple times in a day, which we
address through the general case of multiple fulfillment epochs (T > 1) in Section 2.6.
We first consider the two-store setting to exhibit the complicated nature of the
decoupled inventory problem alone, given the optimal fulfillment policy is myopic.
The insights derived in this case inform our analysis of a generalized multi-location








Decentralized Inventory Planning (DIP) Integrated Inventory Planning (IIP)
Figure 2.2: Two methods of inventory planning - 1) Decentralized inventory planning
(DIP) and 2) Integrated inventory planning (IIP)
2.5.1 The Two-store System
A firm owns two retail stores R1 and R2 serving different regions, with two demand
streams originating form each region – in-store demand (D1s, D2s), and online demand
(D1o, D2o). The objective is to set the initial inventory levels y1 and y2 to minimize
the total expected cost. We consider two solutions – decentralized inventory planning
(DIP) and integrated inventory planning (IIP), which are represented in Figure 2.2.
The assumptions on cost parameters are recapitulated in the set Ψ in Equation 2.4.
Ψ =
{
ps > po − si > 0, ∀i; h+ po > sij > s, ∀i, j 6= i
}
(2.4)
2.5.1.1 The Decentralized Inventory Planning (DIP) Strategy (Pooling
within Regions)
We first consider the case where the firm plans for inventory at its stores in a de-
centralized fashion, without planning in advance for cross-shipping. This serves as a
benchmark for any inventory heuristic we may develop for the centralized planning
case. The inventory level at store i is set with an objective to minimize the total







+ ps(Dis − yi)+
+ po
(




(yi −Dis)+ , Dio
) ] (2.5)
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where x+ = max(x, 0). The cost function is convex, which can be seen by expressing
Equation 2.5 in terms of the total demands Di = Dis +Dio as follows:
CDIP (yi) =sµio + E
[
h (yi −Di)+ + (po − s) (Di − yi)+ + (ps − (po − s)) (Dis − yi)+
]
(2.6)
where µio = E[Dio]. The simplification is done using the identities min(x, y) = y −
(y − x)+, and (Dis − yi)+ +
(
Dio − (yi −Dis)+
)+
= (Di − yi)+, the latter holds when
demands are non-negative. The optimal inventory levels (yDIP1 , y
DIP
2 ) can obtained
from implicit equations:








= ps, ∀i = 1, 2 (2.7)
where Fi is the cumulative distribution function of demand Di. A line search yields
unique optimum, as the left hand side is increasing in yDIPi , and the right hand side is
constant.
2.5.1.2 The Integrated Inventory Planning (IIP) Strategy (Pooling within
and across Regions).
This is similar to the DIP scenario, except that after Ri has fulfilled its own in-store
and online demands, unfulfilled online orders from region j (6= i) can be fulfilled using
any available inventory at Ri. In the two-store problem, the cross-shipped quantity
from store Ri to region j can be explicitly calculated as the minimum of the inventory
available at Ri and the unfulfilled online demand at Rj, after each store has attempted
to fulfill its own demands. The total expected one-period cost function is:
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The additional terms in Equation 2.8 that are absent in Equation 2.5 represent the
value of cross-shipping: the total savings by cross-shipping a unit from Ri to region
j, h + po − sij, times the total quantity cross-shipped from Ri to region j. The total












The first term represents the total unfulfilled online demand if there was no cross-
shipping allowed, and the second term represents the unfulfilled online demand with
cross-shipping. Naturally, the difference yields the cross-shipped quantity. By using
this expression, as well as the simplification techniques used in Equation 2.6, we can
simplify Equation 2.8 as follows:








h (yi −Di)+ + (ps − po + s)(Dis − yi)+ + (po − s) (Di − yi)+
]
+ (s12 − h− po)
[∑
i
(Di − yi)+ −
∑
i




























D1o +D2o − (y1 −D1s)+
)+
, if y2 ≤ D2s
D2 +D1o − (y1 −D1s)+ − y2, if D2s < y2 < D2 +D1o − (y1 −D1s)+
0, if y2 ≥ D2 +D1o − (y1 −D1s)+
(2.10)
In the event that Dis = 0,∀i (similar to traditional transshipment considered by Dong
and Rudi, 2004), the formulation in Equation 2.9 would directly yield a convex cost
function. Convexity is not obvious in our case, as the nested piecewise linear function
in Equation 2.10 is neither convex nor concave, and this is purely due to the fact that
in-store demand is fulfilled first and cannot be subject to cross-shipment. However,
the total cost can be shown to be jointly convex in the inventory levels (Proposition
2.5.1):
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Proposition 2.5.1 Under the conditions on cost parameters in Ψ,
(a) CIIP (y1, y2) is jointly convex in the order-up-to levels.
(b) There exist regions Ωk(y1, y2) in the demand space, such that in each region the
dual-price vector λk corresponding to the variables y1, y2 remains constant, and
the gradient of the IIP cost function can be written as
∇CIIP (y1, y2) = (h, h)ᵀ −
∑
k
λkP (Ωk (y1, y2))) (2.11)
All proofs are relegated to the Appendix. We first observe that under the assumptions
in Ψ, CIIP can be expressed as the expectation of a linear program, through which
joint convexity in inventory levels is established. By noting structural similarities with
a newsvendor network (van Mieghem and Rudi, 2002), we derive an expression for the
gradient based on the dual prices λ = (λ1, λ2)
ᵀ, which are simply the shadow prices
of the constraints involving y1 and y2 in the linear program representation (Equation
A.1, Appendix A.1).
The demands are shown to be separable into independent regions Ωk based on the
values of y1 and y2, within which the dual prices λ
k = (λk1, λ
k
2) are constant (refer
to Appendix A.2 for a detailed discussion), which enables formulating the gradient
as shown in Equation 2.11. The optimal solution (yIIP1 , y
IIP
2 ) can thus be obtained
by a gradient descent algorithm. Given values of (y1, y2) in each iterative step, the
probability of realization of every demand region has to be calculated. As we extend
to N stores, we face the following hurdles:
 exponentially increasing number of demand regions Ωk (in which the dual prices
remain constant), whose identification is non-trivial, and
 repeated probability calculations of a 2N -dimensional multivariate distribution
for these demand regions.
The non-triviality in identification of these demand regions arises from the fact
that cross-shipment quantities are now set by a transportation linear program, as
compared to explicit expressions in the two-store case. Hence we develop a tractable
lower bound which yields a heuristic solution for the two-store case, which we later
extend to multiple locations.
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2.5.1.3 Lower Bound and Heuristic for the Two-Location Problem
An important feature which complicates the IIP cost function is that the in-store de-
mands are not pooled across regions, which in turn leads to complex and non-convex
coupled terms in the cost function. We relax this by treating unfulfilled in-store
demand as online demand which can be fulfilled by cross-shipping. Specifically, we
replace the total unfulfilled demand
∑
i
















. Substituting this in Equation 2.9 and simplifying, we get the fol-
lowing cost function:
CLB(y1, y2) = s(µ1o + µ2o) + E
[
h (y1 + y2 −D)+ + (po − s12) (D − y1 − y2)+
+ (po − s− (po − s12)) (D1 − y1)+ + (po − s− (po − s12)) (D2 − y2)+
+ (ps − (po − s)) (D1s − y1)+ + (ps − (po − s)) (D2s − y2)+
]
where D = D1 + D2, the total demand. Proposition 2.5.2 establishes C
LB as a lower
bound:
Proposition 2.5.2 CLB(y1, y2) ≤ CIIP (y1, y2), ∀y1, y2 ≥ 0
By removing the nested piecewise linear terms in CIIP from Equation 2.9, we no longer
need the gradient descent approach, as the first order conditions for CLB are greatly
simplified:





+ (s12 − s)FDi(yi) + (ps − po + s)FDis(yi) = ps, ∀i
(2.12)
We have a system of two equations with two variables, which can be solved using
numerical methods to yield a heuristic solution yLBH with expected cost CLBH =
CIIP (yLBH). Equation 2.12 is of a similar structure to the first order conditions ob-
tained by Dong and Rudi (2004) for the case of constant transshipment cost, with
a key difference: there is an additional term stemming from the presence of in-store
demands with a higher underage cost than the online demands. This allows us to fix
inventory levels at each location separately, in contrast to Dong and Rudi (2004) where
the optimality equation only yields a system-wide inventory level.
We make the following relaxation to formulate the lower bound:
∑
i
(Dis − yi)+ +
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Figure 2.3: Shows the effect of online market share on CIIP , CLBH , and CDIP (left)
















; this relaxation will be tight when
the in-store demand is very small compared to the online demand, as the optimal
inventory levels are set based on the total demands. We test this numerically by
changing the mix of in-store and online demands in Figure 2.3. The mean in-store and
online demands are calculated as a proportion of a fixed total mean demand (= 100) in
each region. The demands are normal and identical across regions, with the coefficient
of variation fixed at 0.3 for each demand. The cost parameters are: h = 5, ps = 100,
po = 100, s = 10, s12 = 15.
From Figure 2.3a, we see that the heuristic provides savings over the DIP strategy
for most cases, except for small values of online market share (< 10%). However,
we note that for such small values of online market share, the potential savings from
centralized planning is also small, as seen from comparing the IIP and DIP costs. In
such cases, one can simply resort to planning for each region separately using the DIP
strategy.
Centralized inventory planning is most valuable when there is a moderate mix
of online and in-store demands. As online demand grows in comparison to in-store
demands, the effect of pooling across regions increases, due to two reasons: 1) more
demand is pooled across regions which leads to a bigger reduction in variability of the
total online demand, and 2) pooled online demands can better absorb the variability
in the in-store demands. Thus, the maximum savings is achieved when there is a good
mix of online and in-store demands so that the pooling across channels and locations
work in synergy.
22
As the in-store demand becomes smaller, the probability that there will be unful-
filled in-store demand decreases, and the heuristic solution converges to the optimal IIP
solution (Figure 2.3b). Thus for high values of online market share, in-store demand
can effectively be treated as online demand which explains the stable savings achieved
by the IIP solution.
The cost savings directly arise from a change in inventory levels in anticipation of
pooling across locations. Proposition 2.5.3 addresses this observation from Figure 2.3b
that the IIPH solution consistently stocks less than the DIP solution at each store.
Proposition 2.5.3 For identical stores and normally distributed demands, yLB ≤ (≥
)yDIP whenever yDIP ≥ (≤)µ, where µ is the mean total demand at a store. Under
perfect positive correlation across locations, yLB = yDIP = yIIP .
Similar to the intuition in newsvendor settings, yDIP ≥ µ would hold when underage
costs are greater than overage costs, but this does not translate into an analytical
proof due to the structure of the optimality equations in Equation 2.7, which has a
mixture distribution as compared to a simple normal distribution in newsvendor theory.
Lastly, positive correlation across locations reduces the pooling benefits achieved by
cross-shipping, and under perfect correlation, there is no benefit from pooling as all
locations either have too much or too little inventory without any imbalance.
2.5.2 The Multi-Location Problem
We extend the two-store problem discussed so far to a generalized setting with multiple
regions, as described earlier in Section 2.4 (Figure 2.1). The cross-shipping costs are
taken to be sij = s + f(dij), where dij is the distance between location Ri and region
j, and f is a non-negative, increasing function such that f(d) → 0 as d → 0. Also,
supd∈D f(d) ≤ h + po − s, where D = {dij,∀i, j}, so that the conditions in Equation
2.4 hold true.
The decentralized solution yDIP derived from Equation 2.7 readily extends to the
multiple locations as the problem is decoupled by region, whereas the optimal IIP
solution cannot be obtained due to the computational infeasibility even of the two-
store approach. However, we can extend the heuristic and lower bound developed in










+ (smin − s)FDi(yi) + (ps − po + s)FDis(yi) = ps, ∀i ∈ S
(2.13)
The corresponding cost function yields a lower bound to the multi-location problem,
satisfying Propositions 2.5.2 and 2.5.3 (the proofs are similar to the two-store case,
and hence omitted). The optimal solution can be found easily for small number of
stores by iterative root-finding algorithms such as the Newton-Raphson method. The
computational burden of this solution, although reduced from the newsvendor network
approach by van Mieghem and Rudi (2002), is still significant for omnichannel networks
in practice with thousands of stores due to the number of variables involved. A small
change to the parameters: reducing smin to s yields a weaker lower bound:























CLBN is convex in the inventory levels, and can be solved to yield a heuristic solution
yLBN characterized by the first order conditions:





+ (ps − po + s)FDis(yLBNi ) = ps, ∀i ∈ S (2.15)
Parallels can be drawn to Equation 2.12 and Dong and Rudi (2004), as the presence of
in-store demands enables the characterization of inventory levels at each individual lo-
cation. As a consequence, the calculation of yLBN is computationally light, established
by the following Proposition.
Proposition 2.5.4 The heuristic solution is unique, and when demands follow a mul-
tivariate normal distribution, the heuristic inventory levels at stores are at the same
critical fractile of their corresponding in-store demands.
In contrast with Equation 2.13, we only need to solve for one variable, namely the
common critical fractile of the in-store demands. This reduces the computational
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effort drastically, even for very large networks. However, the optimal solution has zero
inventory in the OFCs – this is because when all cross-shipping costs are lowered to s,
a unit of inventory at the OFC can lead to a decrease in total cost if it was instead at
a store, as it can also serve to fulfill in-store demands.
We modify yLBN to obtain the heuristic solution yIIPH for multiple locations by
calculating order quantities for the OFCs separately, and using them in Equation 2.15
to compute order quantities for the omnichannel stores. The order-up-to quantities for
OFCs are calculated from the pooled total order quantity for OFCs, which is deter-











h+ po − s
)
(2.16)
The actual underage cost for online demands at the OFCs would be less than po − s
and would depend on inventory information of stores, as stores can fulfill these online
orders with available inventory. The calculation of inventory levels at stores and OFCs
are dependent on each other, but since we are forced to estimate the inventory at OFCs
separately, we inflate the underage cost to po−s which yields a higher overall inventory
level at the OFCs. This is a limitation that arises out of our heuristic approximation,
but it allows us to extend the heuristic to the case where OFCs have a different service
cost (so) compared to the stores (s), as the inventory calculation for the OFCs is done
separately.
To calculate the individual order quantities yIIPHi , i ∈ So, we use the method
of obtaining order-up-to quantities for multiple products with capacity constraints,
as described in Chopra and Meindl (2007, p. 367). The total capacity is the total
order-up-to quantity calculated from Equation 2.16, and the order-up-to quantity for
each product corresponds to the order-up-to quantity for each OFC. Each unit from∑
j∈So
yIIPHj is allocated incrementally to the OFCs based on the individual expected
marginal costs. Once the order-up-to quantities for the OFCs are obtained, they are
used in Equation 2.17 to determine order-up-to levels for other omnichannel stores.









= ps, ∀i ∈ Sso (2.17)
Note that individual store inventory levels are directly obtained from Equation 2.17
due to the presence of in-store demands. Calculating the heuristic solution yIIPH is
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also computationally fast, as Proposition 2.5.4 still applies to Equation 2.17. The cost
of the heuristic solution is given by CIIPH = CIIP (yIIPH). We capture the effect of
virtual pooling among the facilities in this heuristic, and the systematic approach is
shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Procedure to calculate the heuristic solution yIIPH






2: for i ∈ So (OFCs) do



























i ). Set y
IIPH
i∗ ← yIIPHi∗ + 1
7: Set rem← rem− 1. If rem > 0, go to Step 3.
8: for i ∈ Sso do
9: Calculate order quantities implicitly from the optimality equations:









= ps, ∀i ∈ Sso.
The performance of the heuristic clearly depends on the structure of the network
which directly influences the cross-shipping costs, in addition to the mix of in-store and
online demands. However in practice, the range of shipping costs is not too large: for
a 5lb package, the ratio maxi,j sij/s is less than 2 for the UPS Ground option, and less
than 3 for the UPS Next Day Air option (UPS, 2017) for locations within the mainland
US. We test the sensitivity for factors that adversely affect heuristic performance in
Section 2.7 (Figure 2.5).
As the problem scale increases, and the number of stores grows large within a
given area to accommodate the increase in demand, it is highly likely that a store
with unfulfilled online demand can find a close-by store with available inventory, and
hence, almost all cross-shipping takes place over short distances, at a cost close to s.
Thus, we can expect the heuristic solution to be close to the optimal solution, and as a
consequence of this notion, Proposition 2.5.5 shows that the heuristic is near optimal
in an asymptotic sense.
Proposition 2.5.5 As the number of omnichannel stores in a given area increases,
with demands bounded and i.i.d. across regions, for sufficiently small h > 0, the






ps − po + s
, as N →∞
The proposition holds when all locations have omnichannel stores, and yLBN = yIIPH .
We first show that reducing cross-shipping costs to s preserves optimality in the asymp-
totic setting, by considering a simplified setting where the stores are uniformly dis-
tributed in the given region, which is in-turn divided into identical sub-regions. As
the number of stores grows large, each sub-region has sufficient supply to fulfill its
demands, and hence cross-shipping takes place only within the sub-regions with costs
converging to s.
The assumption that in-store demands are pooled can affect the heuristic when
online demands are small. However, we bound the heuristic performance by a constant
approximation factor dependent only on cost parameters. While this bound is not
tight, it shows that the heuristic is not critically affected by its assumptions as the
problem scale grows.
2.6 Multi-Period, Multi-Location, and Multiple
Fulfillment Epochs
So far, we have discussed the single review period setting where online fulfillment is done
once, at the end of the period. We now switch back to the general version of the problem
described in Section 2.4, with multiple review periods and online demand fulfilled over
T fulfillment epochs in each review period. This is a more realistic representation of
practice, as we closely approximate the continuous time case, because the value of T
can be flexibly large. We start by proving convexity for the single period problem
described in Equation 2.1.
Proposition 2.6.1 The single-period, T -fulfillment-epoch expected cost function given
by C(y) = EC1(y, D̃) is jointly convex in the inventory levels yi.
The proof follows by induction. Let the optimal solution to the single period prob-
lem be denoted by yIIP. We extend our analysis to the finite horizon case with multiple
periods.
Proposition 2.6.2 For the finite horizon problem with lost sales and zero replenish-
ment leadtime, a stationary base-stock policy is optimal, with order-up-to levels yIIP.
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For the zero replenishment leadtime case with lost sales, the multi-period problem
reduces to solving a single-period problem, and the proof is similar to traditional multi-
period inventory problems involving lost-sales. As noted earlier, solving for yIIP is
difficult, as optimal fulfillment decisions are intractable. Hence, we resort to heuristic
solutions developed from our analysis of the single period problem.
2.6.1 Inventory Levels
To obtain a heuristic solution to set order-up-to levels, we use the procedure described
in Algorithm 1, by approximating the problem as a single fulfillment epoch problem.
Naturally, the demands used to calculate the heuristic solutions are the total review-
period demands at each location. For example, the review-period in-store demand at
store i is given by Dis =
T∑
t=1
Dtis. Also, the holding cost parameter used in the algorithm
is the review-period holding cost, which is given by h̄ = h∗T .
We compare this heuristic solution with the naive strategy which plans for inven-
tory in a decentralized fashion. We extend the DIP solution derived in Equation 2.7,
by using the total review-period demands for each location and holding cost h̄. We
will continue to denote the heuristic solution derived in this fashion by IIPH and the
decentralized solution as DIP for the numerical studies in the following sections.
2.6.2 Fulfillment Policies
We consider two fulfillment policies, which dictate how online orders are fulfilled:
1. the myopic fulfillment (MF) policy, where online demands in the current ful-
fillment epoch are fulfilled to the maximum possible extent with the available
inventory, without consideration for demands in the future, and
2. the threshold fulfillment (TF) policy, which reserves inventory at each location
for future in-store demands, by halting online fulfillment from a location when
the inventory level falls below a certain threshold in each fulfillment epoch.
As future in-store demands are costlier to lose and do not have the additional
flexibility of cross-shipping, it is intuitive that the TF policy can lead to reduction in
costs compared to the MF policy when implemented well. Rationing inventory between
high-priority and low-priority demands has been studied in literature (for a review, refer
to Kleijn and Dekker, 1999), and along similar lines, Jalilipour Alishah et al. (2015)
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Algorithm 2 Implementation of the Threshold Fulfillment (TF) Policy
1: At the start of the review period, evaluate thresholds wti , ∀i, t using Equation 2.18.
2: In each fulfillment epoch t, each location first fulfills its own in-store demand to
the maximum possible extent, and the leftover inventory at location i is x̂i
t.
3: Calculate fulfillment capacities for each location i as Kti = (x̂i
t − wti)+.












Ztik ≤ Kti , Ztij ≥
0, ∀i, j
}
prove the existence of an optimal threshold rationing policy between in-store and online
demands at a single store.
In our case it is not straightforward to estimate the underage cost for the low-
priority (online) demand, as it is endogenized by the fulfillment policy followed and
depends on where an order is fulfilled from. The optimal thresholds depend on in-store
and online demands in a complicated, network-based fashion, as online demands are
pooled across locations, and their calculation is akin to obtaining optimal transship-
ment decisions based on such a threshold structure. We propose simple newsvendor-
based thresholds which only take into account future in-store demands. In any fulfill-







h(T − t+ 1) + ps
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We have developed a static fulfillment policy, as these thresholds can be evaluated at
the start of the review period based on the demand forecasts. We formalize the TF
policy in Algorithm 2. The MF policy places no such restriction on fulfillment, and
can simply be recovered from Algorithm 2 by setting the thresholds wti to be zero in
step 1.
Note that the fulfillment heuristic is agnostic to current inventory levels and online
demands. While including such information would be valuable, we show that such a
simple policy, when combined with a good inventory heuristic which positions inventory
in a calculated fashion, can provide considerable savings compared to naive strategies.
To evaluate the performance of the fulfillment policies, we compare them with the
so-called hindsight-optimal policy. The cost of this policy can be evaluated through
a linear program which minimizes the total cost in the review period, given that all
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uncertainty is realized at the beginning of the period. Given inventory levels, the cost
of such a policy is a natural lower bound for the cost of any fulfillment policy, and we
numerically show that the simple TF policy performs very well compared to this lower
bound in Section 2.7.
2.7 Numerical Analysis
We employ a realistic setting to test the performance of the inventory and fulfillment
heuristic solutions, based on a fictitious network embedded in mainland US. We shall
mainly focus on the case with zero lead time and multiple fulfillment epochs.
We evaluate the total expected costs through a Monte-Carlo simulation with a
sample size of 104, for two inventory heuristics - IIPH (integrated planning heuristic)
and DIP (decentralized planning), and two fulfillment heuristics - MF (myopic) and
TF (threshold-based). We mostly focus on comparing our combined heuristic, the
〈IIPH,TF〉 strategy, to the benchmark 〈DIP,MF〉 strategy, which represents a naive
solution.
2.7.1 Network Setup
We take the locations of the stores to be at the most populous cities in mainland US
(Wikipedia, 2016) and the OFCs are located according to the list of most efficient
warehouses in the US, in terms of possible transit lead-times (Chicago Consulting,
2013). The shipping costs are calculated using the cost equation estimated by Jasin
and Sinha (2015) based on UPS Ground shipping rates for an item weighing one pound:
sij = 9.182 + 0.000541dij, where dij is the distance in miles from region i to region
j. We also perform sensitivity analysis for the slope of the shipping cost with respect
to distance, to study the effect of shipping costs on the relative performance of our
combined heuristic. Other cost parameters used are: h̄ = 5, ps = po = 100, s = 9.182.
The review-period demands are taken to be independent and normally distributed
with mean and standard deviations calculated based on the population of the cities.
To study the effect of online market share (α) on the performance of the heuristic
solutions, we take that the sum of the mean in-store and online demands in each
region to be a fixed proportion of the cities’ populations. This represents the average
market size of the region, and the review-period mean in-store and online demands
are calculated as 1 − α and α proportions respectively of this mean market size in
each region. The coefficient of variation of the review-period demands are fixed at 0.2.
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Figure 2.4: Shows the effect of network size on the performance of 〈IIPH,TF〉 compared
to 〈DIP,MF〉, in terms of cost (left), inventory imbalance and inventory efficiency (right)
Demands are identical and independently distributed across fulfillment epochs, with
parameters calculated from the review-period demands. In the base case, α = 0.5 and
T = 5, and we perform sensitivity analyses with respect to these parameters. Let ns
be the number of physical stores and no be the number of OFCs. An online order can
be fulfilled from any physical store or OFC with available inventory. Further details
on the numerical setup and a brief overview of the simulation process can be found in
Appendix A.3.
2.7.2 Results
We tabulate the results obtained. We mainly focus on comparing the cost of the
combined heuristic 〈IIPH,TF〉 to that of the naive strategy 〈DIP,MF〉. In some cases,
to test the severity of assumptions made to derive the inventory heuristic, we compare
〈IIPH,TF〉 and 〈DIP,TF〉, keeping the fulfillment policy fixed.
2.7.2.1 Network Size.
As the network size increases, centralized inventory planning and strategic fulfillment
can be valuable, as there is more flexibility in terms of options available in fulfill-
ment. Figure 2.4a shows that increasing network size have a positive and marginally
decreasing effect on the relative performance of the combined heuristic.
We also compare the strategies based on two important metrics, inventory imbal-
ance and inventory efficiency, and the results are shown in Figure 2.4b for no = 2.
Higher imbalance can lead to costly spillovers and local stockouts (Acimovic and
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Figure 2.5: Shows the effect of the slope of cross-shipping costs with distance by varying
the ratio smax/s (left) and online market share (right) on the performance of 〈IIPH,TF〉
compared to 〈DIP,TF〉.
Graves, 2017), which in turn can cause markdowns in stores. We measure imbalance
by recording the variance of ending inventory positions across locations at the end of
each epoch, and taking the average value over the review period. Although this is
different from the metric used by Acimovic and Graves (2017), it captures the essence
of imbalance among locations in an omnichannel network. We see that our combined
heuristic achieves a lower imbalance across locations as compared to the 〈DIP,MF〉
strategy, and this effect is more pronounced for larger networks.
We define another metric, inventory efficiency, as an equivalent measure for in-
ventory turnover, calculated as the ratio of the total fulfilled demand to the average
inventory level of the system in a review period (calculated as the mean of the starting
inventory level and expected ending inventory at the end of the review period). Higher
efficiency achieved by the heuristic stems from a reduction in inventory levels without
a considerable decrease in service levels, due to planning in advance for cross-shipping.
This offers a potential solution to decreasing trend in turnovers in the retail industry
in recent years (Kurt Salmon, 2016).
2.7.2.2 Cross-shipping Costs and Online Market Share.
As discussed in Section 2.5.2, two major factors affect the inventory heuristic perfor-
mance – shipping cost structure and online market share. For fixed fulfillment policy
TF, we compare the 〈IIPH,TF〉 and 〈DIP,TF〉 strategies to understand the effect of
these parameters on the inventory heuristic. We found similar results when comparing
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to the 〈DIP,MF〉 strategy.
We first vary the slope of shipping costs with respect to distance, thereby increasing
the ratio smax/s (value of 1.2 corresponds to the base case setting). As expected, the
relative performance of the heuristic decreases as shipping costs become more sensitive
to distance (Figure 2.5a). For a perspective, the costliest shipping option, the UPS Next
Day Air, has a ratio of smax/s less than 3 for shipping a 5lb package within mainland
US. Hence the heuristic provides significant savings for most existing shipping cost
structures.
Figure 2.5b shows the effect of online market share. As expected, we see that
the heuristic performs worse than the decentralized solution when the online market
share is low (< 20%). This reflects the deficiency noted in the two-store case, as
the inventory heuristic assumes that in-store demands are pooled across locations.
When the online demand is very low compared to the in-store demand, the value from
centralized planning is limited (as previously seen in Figure 2.3a), and the firm can
simply resort to decentralized planning.
However, the heuristic provides a valuable alternative to the decentralized solution
for products that have adequate online market shares: for example, books, computers
and consumer electronics have an online market share of about 50% (FTI Consulting,
2015). Additionally, with rapidly increasing online sales, firms can obtain considerable
savings through centralized inventory strategies, and for most cases, our heuristic serves
as a viable proxy for inaccessible optimal decisions.
2.7.2.3 Number of Fulfillment Epochs (T ).
By increasing the number of times online fulfillment decisions are made, we can closely
model the continuous time case. We keep the total review-period demand parameters
constant, and keep demands across fulfillment epochs independent and identically dis-
tributed. To reduce the computational burden associated with higher values of T , we
use a smaller network with ns = 10, no = 2.
The results are shown in Figure 2.6. In Figure 2.6a, we compare the MF and TF
fulfillment strategies with IIPH inventory levels, against the hindsight optimal strategy
HF, which makes fulfillment decisions with all uncertainty realized at the start of the
review period.
As T increases, the MF policy is punished for failing to reserve inventory for future
in-store demands (Figure 2.6a). The TF policy on the other hand proves to be a simple
but effective fulfillment strategy, achieving costs within 0.5% of the HF lower bound.
For a fixed fulfillment policy TF, we compare the 〈IIPH,TF〉 and 〈DIP,TF〉 strate-
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Figure 2.6: Shows the effect of increasing the number of fulfillment epochs in a single
review period on the cost of fulfillment policies with respect to the hindsight optimal
policy (left) and the performance of 〈IIPH,TF〉 compared to 〈DIP,TF〉 (right).
gies in Figure 2.6b, and see that the effect of increasing T has a decreasing effect on
the relative performance of the inventory heuristic.
Finally, we note that our heuristics are extremely scalable with respect to network
size - for a network with ns = 150, no = 10 and T = 5, calculating the inventory
levels using the heuristic takes only around 10 seconds, and the calculation of ful-
fillment thresholds takes around 2 minutes. Real-life retail networks are often much
bigger in size – for instance, Target ships online orders from more than 1000 stores
(Lindner, 2016), and our heuristic can provide considerable improvements compared
to traditional strategies in most cases.
2.8 Conclusion
Despite numerous retailers struggling with the operational problems posed by om-
nichannel retailing, the area has received comparatively less attention in literature.
Our research addresses an important facet of omnichannel retailing — inventory man-
agement, by demonstrating the value in utilizing the pooling benefits offered by om-
nichannel retailing, through a combined inventory and fulfillment policy.
Our heuristic policies, though derived from a complicated multi-location and multi-
period model, are quite generalizable. We can extend our analysis to demands orig-
inating from abstract regions, by treating them as OFCs that carry zero inventory.
Disparity in service costs at OFCs and stores can also be taken into account by using
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so, the service cost from OFCs, instead of s in Equation 2.16, as inventory planning is
done separately for OFCs. We still need to make the assumption that demands from
a region with an omnichannel store can be fulfilled from that store with the least cost.
Otherwise, the demand at this store will be assigned to be fulfilled from the online
FC with the least fulfillment cost, which can lead to different first order conditions in
inventory planning for the online FC.
We can also extend the heuristic solutions to the case of positive leadtimes as
follows: assuming each location i has a replenishment leadtime of Li review periods, the
total planning horizon for order-up-to policies is (Li+1) review periods, or equivalently,
(Li + 1)T fulfillment epochs for each location. Using the total demands during the
planning period for each location instead of review period demands, we can directly
extend our inventory heuristic to set order-up-to levels for each location.
For the fulfillment heuristic, an additional threshold for inventory position needs to
be calculated based on future in-store demands in the remainder of the current planning
horizon, which can also be computed based on a simple newsvendor formula. Online
fulfillment from a location is temporarily stopped in an epoch when either threshold is
violated.
An important direction for future research is to include multiple classes of online de-
mand, especially in-store pickups, which is a popular mode of omnichannel fulfillment.
A heuristic control for managing multiple products is also an interesting and impor-
tant extension to be considered. Future research may also focus on further extensions
such as capacities and stochastic leadtimes. We believe that our framework provides a
platform to build further complexities on, which can yield important decision support
tools for the industry.
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CHAPTER 3
The Distribution-free Inventory Problem
for E-commerce Fulfillment Networks
3.1 Abstract
With rapidly increasing e-commerce sales, firms are leveraging a network of inventory
nodes to fulfill online orders by its customers. This results in demand spillovers: de-
mand is first fulfilled using the nearest node, but then demand can spill over to other
nodes when there are stockouts. Inventory planning for e-commerce is challenging due
to this complex nature of fulfillment. Further, e-commerce demand is difficult to esti-
mate due to flash promotions, recommendation engines, and other strategies typically
employed by e-tailers. We address this by solving a distributionally robust inventory
problem where the fulfillment network has a nested hierarchy and the firm only knows
the mean and covariance of the demand. The objective is to minimize the worst-case
expected total cost of procurement, fulfillment, and penalties for any unmet demand.
If there are two nodes in the nested network, we derive a tight bound for the
expected cost of unmet demand that only requires mean, variance, and correlation
of the demands in the two locations. We show that this new bound is significantly
tighter than the well-known Scarf bound in the regime when inventory levels are low
and demand spillovers are likely to occur. For general nested fulfillment networks, the
problem is NP-hard. We develop a heuristic by deriving an upper bound to the expected
cost of unmet demand that ensures the nested structure of fulfillment is preserved. The
heuristic is computationally tractable since it relies on solving a semidefinite program
with dimension quadratic in the number of nodes. We also develop an algorithm
to approximate any general distance-based fulfillment cost structure with a nested
structure, which we show in numerical experiments to result in tight approximations
to the expected total cost.
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3.2 Introduction
As e-commerce continues to grow rapidly (Zaroban, 2018), retail firms are equipping
themselves with the ability to fulfill online orders from multiple inventory nodes (stores,
fulfillment centers, etc.) in their network. In many modern e-commerce fulfillment
systems, a customer order may be fulfilled by a shipment originating from any inventory
node in the retail network. Shipping rates are proportional to distances, so typically
the nearest node to the customer location is chosen first. However, in the event of
stockouts, the demand would “spill over” to other nodes (Acimovic and Graves, 2017),
guaranteeing that the demand is not lost while there is inventory still remaining in
the retail network. This is reminiscent of the flexibility offered in brick-and-mortar
retail with periodic store transshipments. However, a key difference is that, since the
transaction is conducted through a virtual store, e-commerce always allows for this
flexibility without the need for inventories to be first prepositioned in a customer’s
location.
Allowing demand spillovers essentially pools the geographically separate inventories.
Hence e-commerce fulfillment requires less inventory than what would be recommended
by traditional decentralized inventory models that do not account for demand spillovers.
Therefore, in order to reduce the burden of carrying too much inventory, e-commerce
inventory planning must use network-based models that capture fulfillment flexibility.
However, there are several challenges in inventory planning for e-commerce retail.
One such challenge is demand estimation, since e-commerce demand often has a
higher variance than brick-and-mortar demand. Reasons for this include the ease with
which online customers could choose to purchase from any of multiple competing e-
tailers, the use of dynamic price-matching strategies and flash promotions, recommen-
dation engines that manipulate click-streams, etc. Hence the empirical distribution of
past sales is a less reliable estimate of the distribution of future e-commerce demands.
A common heuristic is to assume that the underlying uncertainty (i.e., the vector
of demands in customer locations) has a multivariate normal distribution. Such an
assumption can help an inventory planner in two ways. First, describing a multivariate
normal demand vector requires information about only the first two moments, namely
the mean and covariance matrices, which can be reliably estimated. Second, the nor-
mal distribution lends itself to simple analytic solutions (e.g. Dong and Rudi, 2004).
However, the normal distribution assumption can lead to solutions that overestimate
pooling benefits if the true demand distribution is non-normal. Eppen (1979) showed
that for demand distributions that are of ‘light-tailed nature’ (including the normal
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Figure 3.1: Example of a nested network: 1 - San Francisco, 2 - Los Angeles, 3 - New
York, 4 - Pittsburgh.
distribution), pooling can lead to savings in expected cost that scale with
√
n, where
n is the number of random demands being pooled. However, Bimpikis and Markakis
(2015) show that the pooling benefits can scale significantly lower than
√
n when the
demand distribution is heavy-tailed. There have been earlier studies that show evi-
dence of real-life demands exhibiting non-normal distributions: Bimpikis and Markakis
(2015) give empirical evidence of heavy-tailed demands for movies at Netflix and shoes
at a major retailer, Agrawal and Smith (1996) show that the negative binomial distri-
bution fits the sales data for men’s slacks at a major retailer better than Poisson or
Normal.
In this paper, we address the challenge in demand estimation by adopting a distri-
butionally robust approach. Since this approach assumes an adversary always chooses
a distribution resulting in the highest expected cost, it leads to robust decisions for a
firm that has access to only partial information of the demand distribution. Specifi-
cally, we assume that the only information known about the demand vector is its mean
and covariance.
Another challenge in e-commerce inventory planning is the complex nature of ful-
fillment in the retail network due to demand spillovers. Inspired by e-commerce ful-
fillment, we assume that the fulfillment network is nested, which results in a natural
hierarchy in the demand spillovers. Figure 3.1 is an example of a nested fulfillment
network with four inventory nodes (San Francisco, Los Angeles, Pittsburgh, and New
York).
Consider an online customer located in New York. When the nearest fulfillment
center (node 3, New York) stocks out, the next best option is to fulfill from the nearby
node in Pittsburgh (node 4). If this node is also stocked out, fulfillment from San
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Francisco (node 1) or Los Angeles (node 2) will roughly have the same cost—one that
is higher than the cost of fulfillment from Pittsburgh—as these locations are farther
away. This is similarly true for a customer in San Francisco—node 1 is preferred,
followed by node 2, then by nodes 3 and 4. Thus, to fulfill an unmet demand, nodes
or groups of nodes are considered progressively based on their proximity (in terms of
distance or cost) to the unmet demand. We refer to cost structures that induce such
hierarchical levels of fulfillment as nested fulfillment structures, and networks with such
cost structures as nested networks.
The focus of this paper is the problem of deciding the inventory levels for firm
that fulfills sales of a single product through a nested network of multiple inventory
nodes (such as warehouses, stores, etc.) when the firm only knows the mean and the
covariance matrix of the demand vector. The firm incurs inventory purchasing costs,
penalty costs for unmet demand, and fulfillment costs. We consider a single-period
model where network fulfillment occurs after the demands across multiple locations
are realized.
Main Results and Contributions
1. The distributionally robust inventory problem with a single node can be analyt-
ically solved using the well-known result by Scarf (1958) that provides a tight
bound for the expected cost of unmet demand which only requires mean and vari-
ance. We extend this result to the case of demand spillovers by deriving a tight
bound for the expected cost of unmet demand in a nested fulfillment network
with two nodes. This bound only requires the mean, variance, and correlation
of demands in the two locations. This yields a closed-form expression for the
optimal inventory levels in the distributionally robust problem under a nested
network with two nodes. We show that the new bound is significantly tighter
than the Scarf bound in the regime of low inventory levels where demand spillover
is most likely to occur.
2. We introduce the class of nested fulfillment structures that greatly simplify the
computation of the expected cost of the firm. Specifically, we derive a closed-form
expression for the expected cost under this general class. We develop a simple
algorithm (based on hierarchical agglomerative clustering) to approximate any
general distance-based fulfillment cost structure as a nested fulfillment structure.
We show empirically that this structure tightly approximates the expected total
fulfillment cost under a variety of distributions. A nested fulfillment structure not
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only yields tractability for our robust problem, but also for stochastic systems.
3. For general nested fulfillment networks with multiple nodes, the distributionally
robust problem is NP-hard. We develop a heuristic for the robust inventory
problem by deriving an upper bound to the expected cost of unmet demand in
a nested network with demand spillover that requires only mean and covariance
data. The bound is constructed to ensure that the nested structure of fulfillment
is preserved. Moreover, it is computationally tractable since it relies on solving
a semidefinite program (SDP) with dimension O(n2), where n is the number of
inventory nodes. By means of numerical experiments, we show that the distri-
butionally robust heuristic can lead to significant savings in expected cost as
compared to stochastic solutions that assume an incorrect distribution.
3.2.1 Literature Review
Our study is related to the literature on inventory pooling, since e-commerce fulfill-
ment virtually pools geographically separate inventories. We mention only works that
establish the importance of distributional properties of the stochastic demand in pool-
ing. Eppen (1979) showed that if n normal and uncorrelated demands are pooled,
the benefit from inventory pooling is
√
n, and the benefit decreases with increasing
positive correlation among demands. Corbett and Rajaram (2006) extended Eppen’s
result to more general distributions. Yang and Schrage (2009) study various cases of
‘inventory anomaly’ (a situation where pooling leads to an increase in inventory as
opposed to a reduction), one of which is for right-skewed demand distributions with
product substitution. Berman et al. (2011) found through numerical simulations that
the normal distribution misestimates the benefits of pooling stemming from a reduc-
tion in variance. Bimpikis and Markakis (2015) find that the benefit from pooling
under heavy-tailed demand distributions can be significantly lower than
√
n. Specif-
ically, they show that the benefit from pooling decreases as the tail of the demand
becomes heavier. All these studies indicate that pooling benefits crucially depend on
the distribution of the demands being pooled.
The inventory problem for e-commerce network fulfillment is mathematically iden-
tical to reactive lateral transshipments in brick-and-mortar retail networks, which have
been discussed in great detail in the literature (for a review, refer to Paterson et al.,
2011). Two features make the transshipment problem difficult to analyze. First, for
more than two locations, analytically optimal solutions become elusive as a linear pro-
gram recourse is needed to model the network flow problem among multiple locations
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(Robinson, 1990). Second, in a multi-period setting with leadtimes, the optimal trans-
shipment decisions are intractable due to complexity in the state space even for the two
location problem, as it can be ex-post optimal to reserve inventory for future use rather
than transshipping to another location (Tagaras and Cohen, 1992). In this paper, we
focus on the multi-location problem in a single period setting. Dong and Rudi (2004)
consider a similar setting for the special case where the transshipment cost between any
two locations is a constant. However, none of these works consider a distributionally
robust framework.
Distributionally robust inventory problems have a long history, dating back to Scarf
(1958) who considers the classic newsvendor problem with only mean, variance and
support information. He shows that a two-point demand distribution results in the
smallest expected profit given the inventory level, and derives the optimal inventory
level of the robust max-min problem. After 35 years, Gallego and Moon (1993) ex-
tended this framework to multiple products with moments (mean and variance) of
the marginal distributions. Recourse decisions were also studied in Gallego and Moon
(1993) (by allowing an additional order to be placed after demand is realized) and in
Mostard et al. (2005) (by allowing returned products to be resold if there is sufficient
demand).
The multiple-product setting was further extended by Hanasusanto et al. (2015)
to include mean and covariance of the joint distribution, and they show that the re-
sulting distributionally robust newsvendor problem is NP-hard. Natarajan and Teo
(2017) develop a tractable heuristic for this problem in the form of a semi-definite pro-
gram. They achieve this by expressing piecewise linear terms through integer variables,
and relaxing the equivalent completely positive program into a semi-definite program.
They relax the integrality constraints through a boolean quadric polytope, previously
studied by Padberg (1989). Natarajan et al. (2017) use similar techniques to derive
tractable heuristics for the multi-item newsvendor with known mean, covariance and
semivariance information, which additionally captures asymmetry in the distribution.
Our work is related to distributionally robust inventory problems over a network
that allow for recourse network flows after the demand is realized. Chou et al. (2006)
addresses such a problem by assuming that the transshipment quantities are linearly
dependent on some primitive uncertainties with known support, forward and backward
deviations. Linear decision rules are common in approximating multi-stage programs
(Ben-Tal et al., 2004), however they are not necessarily optimal. In contrast to their
work, our study models the optimal flows by directly approximating the nested ful-
fillment cost structure, and assuming known mean and covariance matrices of the
41
demands, rather than allowing the demands to depend on primitive uncertainties that
may be hard to estimate. Recently, Yan et al. (2018) used techniques from Natarajan
et al. (2011) to obtain an exact reformulation of the distributionally robust min-cost
network flow problem as a completely positive program, given the mean and covari-
ance information and under restricted 0-1 edge costs. Our paper in contrast allows
for general nested fulfillment cost structures under which the problem becomes more
difficult, but which are more appropriate for e-commerce network fulfillment.
We note that the nested structure is similar to a tree metric, which has been studied
in the Computer Science literature. Bartal (1998) and Fakcharoenphol et al. (2004)
consider probabilistic approximations of metric spaces using a tree metric, where the
nodes of a graph forms the leaves of a rooted tree. The distance between two nodes
is approximated by the sum of edge weights on the shortest path between them, and
probabilistic approximations of O(log n) are available. A distinction in the quality of
approximation is that these papers study how closely the generated tree metric approx-
imates the actual distance metric, whereas we consider the closeness in approximating
the expected fulfillment cost.
Finally, our study can also be related to the growing literature in e-commerce inven-
tory and fulfillment optimization. Acimovic and Graves (2017) show that decentralized
inventory solutions can lead to costly spillover effects, and perform poorly compared
to network-based policies. Govindarajan et al. (2018) consider joint optimization of
inventory and fulfillment decisions in an omnichannel setting where in-store demands
cannot be flexibly fulfilled from other locations, whereas e-commerce demand can.
More generally, we relate to the problem of capacity allocation in networks with flexi-
bilities, which has been recently gaining relevance due to applications in e-commerce;
Lyu et al. (2017) study the optimal allocation policy given target fill rates, and find
that the required capacity levels in a long-chain network are close to the levels in a
fully flexible network. DeValve et al. (2018) study the benefit of adding fulfillment
flexibility to a large online retailer’s network by combining an allocation policy based
on a stochastic program with a fulfillment policy which restricts the spillover demand
that is fulfilled. Given the volatility in online customer behavior, we contribute to the
above streams of literature by studying the distributionally robust inventory allocation
problem where only lower order moments of the demands can be reliably estimated.
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3.2.2 Preliminaries
For any integer n, we use notation [n] to denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. We denote by
2[n] the power set of [n], defined as the set of all subsets of [n] including the empty
set. We denote by en the n-dimensional column vector of all ones, where we drop the
subscript if the size is clear from the context. We denote by In the identity matrix of
size n× n, and 0m,n the zero matrix of size m× n.
We denote by < the set of real numbers, and by <≥0 the set of nonnegative real
numbers. We similarly denote by <n the set of n-dimensional vectors of real numbers,
and <n≥0 := {x ∈ <n|x ≥ 0} its subset of nonnegative vectors. For a scalar variable
x ∈ <, we define x+ := max(0, x) as the positive part of x. For a column vector
x = (xi) ∈ <n, we define x+ := (x+i ) as the positive part of each element in x. We
write A  0 if a square matrix A is symmetric positive semidefinite. We write B ≥ 0
if all entries of the matrix B are nonnegative.
3.2.3 Outline
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.3, we describe the model,
and introduce the nested fulfillment cost structure. Section 3.4, presents closed-form
bounds on the expected unmet demand in a nested network with two nodes, and
contrasts the bound to Scarf. Section 3.5 is devoted to developing computationally
tractable heuristics for the multi-location case for nested networks. In Section 3.6, we
develop an algorithm to recover the nested structure from a general cost structure,
and empirically test the strength of approximation. In Section 3.7, we analyze the
multi-location heuristic solutions numerically to understand the effect of additional
information and to test the performance of the heuristic solutions. Extensions and
future directions follow in Sections 3.8 and 3.9.
3.3 The Model
Consider a firm managing the inventory in a network of nodes (e.g., stores or ware-
houses) that support sales of a product during a selling horizon. We assume that there
is no inventory replenishment during the selling horizon (as is typically the case when
the horizon is short compared to the procurement lead time), so the firm only needs to
decide the initial inventory levels. We assume that demand for the product originates
from n geographic regions. For simplicity of the model, we consider a fulfillment net-
work with n inventory nodes, where one node is located in each customer region. Our
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framework can easily be extended to general networks by modeling customer regions
without a fulfillment node as zero-inventory nodes.
3.3.1 Nested fulfillment networks
We assume that the firm incurs a per-unit “fulfillment” cost (e.g. shipping cost and/or
handling cost) for using an inventory node to fulfill demand in a customer region, and
this cost depends on both the inventory node and the customer region. Specifically, if
a unit of demand in region j ∈ [n] is met with inventory from the node in the same
region j, then the fulfillment cost is sjj, where sjj > 0; if met with inventory from a
node i 6= j, then the fulfillment cost is sij. We assume that sij = sji and sij ≥ sjj
for all i, j. We further assume that not all fulfillment costs are the same (otherwise,
the location of inventory does not matter). We denote the n × n matrix of per-unit
fulfillment costs as S = (sij).
Motivated by e-commerce, we focus our attention to fulfillment networks where the
cost structure has a nested hierarchy. We refer to these as nested fulfillment networks
since they result in a hierarchical ordering of nested node sets. Before introducing the
general definition, we first provide a simple example of such a network.
Example 1 (A 3-level nested network) Consider the network discussed earlier in
Figure 3.1 with n = 4 (nodes) regions. Suppose that in-location fulfillment has a per-
unit cost s0 > 0 (using our notation, sjj = s0 for j = 1, 2, 3, 4). Fulfillment from region
1 to 2 (and vice versa) incurs cost s1, and fulfillment between regions 3 and 4 also has
cost s1 (i.e., s12 = s34 = s1). Fulfillment between any other pairs of regions has cost s2
(i.e., s13 = s14 = s23 = s24 = s2). If s0 < s1 < s2, the fulfillment structure induces the
nested hierarchy illustrated in Figure 3.2 since a higher level fulfillment is used only if
fulfillment in a lower level is not possible due to lack of inventory. Since there are three
levels to this hierarchy, we refer to this as a 3-level nested fulfillment network.
We now describe a general L-level nested fulfillment network. For a given level `,
where ` = 0, 1, . . . , L−1, the regions are partitioned into n` sets, where n` ≤ n. (In the
previous example, there are four sets (i.e., {1}, {2}, {3}, {4}) in the level 0 partition,
and two sets (i.e., {1, 2}, {3, 4}) in the level 1 partition). We denote the n` sets in
partition ` as {I(`)1 , I
(`)
2 , . . . , I
(`)
n` }. By definition, the sets in a partition must cover all
regions, and that the intersection of any two sets is empty.
The fulfillment network is nested because of the following property: any set in level
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Figure 3.2: Example of a 3-level nested fulfillment cost structure with four warehouses
W1, ..,W4.
K(`)k are the indices of the level `− 1 children of I
(`)
k . Note that n0 > n1 > · · · > nL−1,
since there are fewer sets in higher order levels. We assume that for level 0, n0 = n
and I(0)i = {i} for all i ∈ [n]. For the final level L − 1, nL−1 = 1 and I
(L−1)
1 = [n].
Any L-level nested fulfillment structure can be represented as an L-level tree similar
to Figure 3.2 (another example is Figure 3.7b).
The nested hierarchical structure can also be represented through the assignment
matrices Ξ = {E0,E1, . . . ,EL−1}. We define the level ` assignment matrix E` as the
binary matrix of size n` × n where the (k, i) entry is equal to 1 if and only if i ∈ I(`)k .
Note that E0 is the n× n identity matrix, and that EL−1 is the row vector of all ones.
To complete the description of the nested fulfillment network, we next discuss the
fulfillment costs. If two regions are in set I(`)k , then the per-unit cost of fulfillment
between the two regions is s`,k. (In Example 1, regions 1 and 2 are in the same level
1 set, so the fulfillment cost between them is s1. Note that in the example, all level 1
costs are equal; however, in general, we allow sets in the same level to have different
costs.) To induce the nested hierarchy, we assume that it is less costly to fulfill demand
using fulfillment in lower levels. Mathematically, if k(`)(i) is the level ` set index of
region i, then we assume that s0,k(0)(i) ≤ s1,k(1)(i) ≤ · · · ≤ sL−1. We denote by s = {s`,k}
the set of all fulfillment costs.
The nested hierarchy, Ξ, and the fulfillment costs, s, fully characterize the nested
fulfillment network. As we later discuss in Section 3.3.4, this class of fulfillment struc-
tures can approximate general fulfillment cost structures.
3.3.2 The cost function
At the start of the selling horizon, the firm decides the vector of initial inventory lev-
els y = (yi) to fulfill demands that arrive throughout the selling season. We assume
that fulfillment is done at the end of the selling horizon, so that the problem can be
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approximated as a single period problem.1 The single-period approximation allows
us to study inventory pooling in a distribution-free context by side-stepping the com-
plications that arise from dynamic fulfillment decision-making, and focusing on the
inventory decisions. In Section 3.7, we empirically show that the single-period assump-
tion is a tight approximation for the dynamic setting under the common practice of
myopic fulfillment.
We let d̃j denote the stochastic demand in region j ∈ [n] (a variable with a tilde
placed on top refers to a random variable; the same variable without the tilde is a
particular realization). The vector of stochastic demands in the n customer regions is
D̃ = (d̃j) (unless otherwise stated, any vector is a column vector). In the single period
setting, the vector of customer demands D = (dj) is realized at the end of the period,
and the firm fulfills the demand with the objective of minimizing the total newsvendor
cost (i.e., penalty, overage, and fulfillment costs). Unmet demand in any region incurs
a per-unit penalty cost p, while unsold inventory in any node incurs a per-unit overage
cost h. Without loss of generality, we assume that any fulfillment cost in the nested
network does not exceed p+ h; that is, the firm prefers to fulfill any unmet demand if
there is available inventory in the network. (If s`,k > p+ h, then the children nodes of
set k will never use level ` fulfillment, and the problem decomposes as each level `− 1
child of set k can be removed to form new networks. )
Mathematically, if zij units of inventory from node i is used to satisfy demand in























zij ≤ yi, ∀i ∈ [n]∑
i∈[n]
zij ≤ dj ∀j ∈ [n] (3.1)
where the terms in the objective are the overage cost, the penalty cost, and the ful-
fillment cost, respectively. The first constraint specifies that the units used to fulfill
demand from inventory node i should not exceed the initial stocking level yi. The
1While taking into account dynamic fulfillment decisions is more realistic, the problem becomes
complicated due to the well-known curse of dimensionality (see Tagaras and Cohen (1992) for a
stochastic system, and Ben-Tal et al. (2004) for the robust system). Multi-location considerations
often complicate the problem further by adding complexity to the action space, as a linear program
recourse is needed to make fulfillment decisions.
46
second constraint specifies that the total units used to fulfill demand in region j must
not exceed dj.
Since the fulfillment network has a nested hierarchical structure, we are able to
express the total cost (3.1) in closed form.
Lemma 3.3.1 Under the L-level nested fulfillment cost network,





where ηL−1 = p+h−sL−1 and, for ` ≤ L−2, η` = (η`,k)k∈[n`] with η`,k = s`+1,m(`+1)(k)−
s`,k where m
(`+1)(k) is the index of the level `+ 1 parent of set I(`)k .
Note that η`,k = s`+1,m(`+1)(k) − s`,k ≥ 0, and can be interpreted as the marginal
benefit of fulfillment in level ` instead of level ` + 1 of any demand occuring in I(`)k .
Similarly, ηL−1 is the marginal benefit using a unit of inventory for fulfillment with the
highest cost instead of holding onto it.
Proof. To obtain the fulfillment cost of a demand realization D in an L-level
nested fulfillment cost structure, we sum the fulfillment costs in each level. The total
fulfillment cost in level 0 is
∑
i∈[n] s0,i ·min(di, yi) = s>0 D−
∑
i∈[n] s0,i · (di− yi)+, where
s0 = (s0,i)i∈[n]. For ` = 1, 2, . . . , L − 1, the total units of demand in regions of I(`)k






















unmet demand in I(`)k after level `
,
where K(`)k are all level ` − 1 children of set I
(`)
k . Since p + h is strictly greater than









. Therefore, the total cost (overage, penalty and fulfillment) is equal
to




















where m(`+1)(k) ∈ [n`+1] is the level `+1 parent of set k ∈ [n`]. Using compact notation
with the parameters η` and assignment matrices E`, we obtain the lemma. 
3.3.3 Distributionally robust framework
If the firm knew that the stochastic multi-location demand D̃ has a joint distribution
f : <n 7→ <+, then the firm will choose the initial inventory vector y so as to minimize
the expected total cost. Mathematically, the firm’s problem is equivalent to solving








where Ef is the expectation operator under the joint probability distribution f . Note
that the objective is to minimize the expected total cost, where C(y,D) is as described
in (3.2). Since inventory in one location can be routed to meet demand in another
location, we will refer to (3.3) as the multi-location newsvendor problem with inventory
risk pooling. Note that the above problem can be numerically solved as a linear program
either by sample average approximation using large enough number of samples, or
by approximating the joint distribution by a discrete distribution. Under the nested
structure, we can also obtain closed-form first order conditions, which can be solved
numerically to yield the optimal solution.
In reality, however, firms do not have a complete description of the joint distribution
of the multi-location demands. At best, the firm may only have partial information
about the distribution. We will assume that the firm only has knowledge of the mean
vector m and the covariance matrix Σ. We chose this information set as in practice, e-
commerce firms may have a good sense of how demands across locations are correlated.
Moreover, it is known from the literature that covariance across locations is crucial for
decisions that take pooling benefits into account.
As discussed in Section 3.2, if the firm assumes a particular distribution for the
demand vector, say a multivariate normal distribution with parameters (m,Σ), then
the optimal decision resulting from the stochastic program (3.3) may be suboptimal
with a high expected cost under the true (unknown) demand distribution. To protect
against such cases, we adapt a minmax distributionally robust approach (Scarf, 1958;
Gallego and Moon, 1993; Hanasusanto et al., 2015; Natarajan et al., 2017) that aims
to choose inventory levels y to minimize the maximal expected cost over all demand
distributions consistent with the information known to the firm.
To understand the minmax robust approach, assume that after the firm makes a
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decision on the inventory levels y, an “adversary” is able to choose a joint distribution f
that results in the highest expected cost Ef (y, D̃) for the firm. However, the adversary
cannot choose just any f ; consistent with the known mean and covariance, it has to
belong to the distribution set:
F≥0 :=
{












which is the set of all joint probability distributions of the n-dimensional demand, whose
support is nonnegative, where the sum of probabilities equal to 1, the expectation is m,
and the covariance is Σ. The firm’s best strategy against this adversary is to choose y
that minimizes the “worst-case” expected cost (i.e., the maximum expected cost among











We denote the optimal value of (3.5) as C∗ and its optimal solution as y∗. If the
firm chooses the initial inventory level y∗, then it can be guaranteed that the expected
cost is no larger than C∗ under any joint demand distribution with mean-covariance
(m,Σ). Since the inventory levels are chosen to be robust to any specific distribution,
we also refer to (3.5) as the distributionally robust multi-location newsvendor problem
with inventory risk pooling.
3.3.4 Discussion of the model
For the special case of sij > h + p for all i 6= j, it is never optimal to allow demand
spillover (i.e., zij = 0 for any i 6= j and zii = min(di, yi)), so the cost reduces to n
separable single-location newsvendor costs. Note that in this special case, while the
newsvendor cost is separable by location, the minmax robust problem (3.5) is not,
due to the joint constraints (3.4) on the joint probability distribution. Hanasusanto
et al. (2015) proved that a minmax robust problem of n single-location newsvendor
costs with joint mean and covariance information is NP-hard even in the absence of
constraints on the support.
The minmax robust problem under a general fulfillment network (where sij ≤ h+p)
is intractable, due to the recourse network flow linear program. In general, there are
two ways that previous studies in the literature deal with such issues. The first method
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is to assume a linear decision rule (Ben-Tal et al., 2004). Using this technique, Chou
et al. (2006) develop a tractable formulation for the robust transshipment problem,
where the decision variables are assumed to be linear functions of some underlying
primitive uncertainties, and that these primitives have known support, and known
forward and backward deviations. Linear decision rules usually have little basis in
reality and are used solely to yield tractability, and hence there is no guarantee that
they approximate the optimal second-stage flows well.
The second method (which this paper employs), is to approximate the cost structure
of the network flow problem. Recently, Yan et al. (2018) studied the distributionally
robust network flow problem under restricted 0-1 cost structures. This simplified cost
structure gives rise to binary solutions in the dual program, which are then exploited
using techniques from Natarajan et al. (2011). In our study, we extend this analysis
to a more general class of fulfillment cost structures which preserve tractability. It is
worthwhile to note that the simplest case of a 2-level nested fulfillment structure is
similar to the problem analyzed by Yan et al. (2018).
The nested fulfillment structure is a good approximation whenever the geographical
region inherently contains this hierarchical cluster structure. In particular, this is com-
mon in countries like the US that have dispersed population centers, where inter-cluster
distances are much higher than intra-cluster distances. Indeed, errors in approximation
arise when we ascribe a single fulfillment cost to fulfillment between any two locations
in two different clusters. However the number of units being shipped in these higher
levels is small when more demands are being pooled within each cluster, and as a result
the error in approximation of the total fulfillment cost is small.2
The ubiquity of the nested structure can also be understood by noting its similarity
to a tree metric, which is an approximation for a general metric on n nodes derived
from an edge-weighted rooted tree with the n nodes as leaves. The tree metric has
found applications in various problems that exhibit hierarchial characteristics, and the
approximation of a general metric by a tree metric has been studied in the Computer
Science literature (see Bartal, 1998; Fakcharoenphol et al., 2004).
In Section 3.6, we develop a simple algorithm that employs hierarchical agglomer-
ative clustering to recover an n-level nested structure from a general distance-based
2Govindarajan et al. (2018, Proposition 5) showed that the error from assuming a constant ful-
fillment cost diminishes to zero in the asymptotic case where there are infinite number of locations
while holding positive safety stock. This is because, as the number of inventory nodes in a given area
increases, the chance that a unit of unfulfilled demand from one location is fulfilled from a close-by
location is high. In our case, a similar intuition applies: the probability that fulfillment happens in
higher levels is low, as there is enough supply to fulfill the pooled demand in lower levels. As a result,
the error contribution to the expected total shipping cost from higher levels of fulfillment is low.
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fulfillment cost structure, and empirically show that this nested structure tightly ap-
proximates the actual expected total fulfillment cost under a variety of distributions.
3.4 Closed-form bounds
As can be seen from the closed-form expression in Lemma 3.3.1, solving a distribution-
ally robust newsvendor-type problem requires finding a tight bound on the expected un-
met demand. In previous works on the classical newsvendor, tight closed-form bounds
have been derived that rely on specific parameters of the demand distribution. The
most well-known of these uses mean and variance (Scarf, 1958; Gallego and Moon,
1993), which we state below for completeness.
Lemma 3.4.1 (Scarf 1958; Gallego and Moon 1993) If D̃ has mean m and










(m− y)2 + σ2
)
. (3.6)
It has been shown that this bound is tight, in the sense that there exists a demand
distribution where (3.6) holds with equality.
The challenge in deriving tight closed-form bounds in our setting is that there are
multiple demands which interact, not only because they are correlated, but also from
the nested terms resulting from inventory pooling. From Lemma 3.3.1, a näıve bound















where e>`,k is the k
th row of matrix E`. Combining these for all `, k results in a bound
for the expected total cost. While this bound uses covariance information, what it
loses however is the information from the nested hierarchy of fulfillment. Hence, for a
nested network with multiple locations, using the Scarf bound would result in a loose
bound for the expected total cost.
We demonstrate this precisely for the special case of two identical regions, i.e., they
have the same fulfillment cost parameters (s12 = s21 = s > s0) and the demands d̃1, d̃2,
though correlated, have the same mean and standard deviation. Suppose that m and
σ are the mean and standard deviation, respectively, of both demands. We denote the
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correlation coefficient by ρ. We refer to the set of all joint distributions with these
statistics as Fmσρ.
The symmetry of the problem yields the following lemma.
Lemma 3.4.2 If there are two identical regions, then there exists optimal inventory
levels in each node that are also identical of the form y = (y, y)ᵀ for some y ≥ 0.
The proof is relegated to the Appendix, and relies on the convexity of the min-max
robust problem in (3.5). This property aids us in simplifying the derivation, since we
can restrict our analysis to only inventory decisions where the quantity is identical
in both locations. Note that from the definition of Fmσρ, we allow the demands to
take all values in <2, including negative values.3 The later sections would assume a
nonnegative support.
For the case with two identical locations, each with an initial inventory level y, we
are able to derive a tight bound on the combined unmet demand, which we state as a
proposition below.
Proposition 3.4.1 (Nested bound) For any ζ > 0, y, and f ∈ Fmσρ,
Ef
[
(d̃1 − y)+ + (d̃2 − y)+ + ζ
(
d̃1 + d̃2 − 2y
)+]




(m− y)2 + γσ2
)
(3.8)
where γ := ζ+1+ζρ
2ζ+1
∈ (0, 1]. Moreover, if γ(ν2 + 1) ≥ 2, where ν := 3ζ+1
ζ+1
, then this
bound is tight for some probability distribution f ∗y ∈ Fmσρ with six support points.
The left-hand side is the cost of unmet demand in a network with two regions,
where the inventory level in each region is y. If there is not enough inventory within a
region, a penalty cost (normalized to 1) is incurred, with an additional penalty cost ζ
when demand remains unmet after pooling.
We prove Proposition 3.4.1 in the appendix, however, we provide a discussion here.
The supremum in Fmσρ of the left-hand side of (3.8) is a moment problem which we
show to be equivalent to the dual problem:
max
t,u,r,v
t+ 2mr + 2(m2 + σ2)u+ (m2 + ρσ2)v
s.t. g(d1, d2; t, u, r, v) ≤ q(d1, d2) ∀(d1, d2) ∈ <2 (3.9)
3If we assume a nonnegative support for the distribution f , the derivation of the analytic expression





Figure 3.3: Illustration of the dual program. (a) The piecewise-planar function
q(d1, d2), (b) The quadratic function g(d1, d2), (c) The functions corresponding to a
dual feasible solution, (d) The functions corresponding to the dual optimal solution.
where q(d1, d2) is a piecewise linear function in (d1, d2) with six pieces (shown in Figure




2) + vd1d2 is a quadratic function in
(d1, d2) (shown in Figure 3.3b). The dual variables t, u, r, v are the parameters of the
quadratic function.
Note that the dual program (3.9) has infinitely many constraints. A dual solution
(t, u, r, v) is feasible if the quadratic function is bounded above by the piecewise-planar
function in all of <2 (Figure 3.3c shows these functions corresponding to a dual feasible
solution). The optimal dual solution results in the two functions touching at exactly six
points in <2 (shown as the bright points in each face of the piecewise-planar function
in Figure 3.3d). The points where the two functions touch are the support points of
the demand distribution where the bound (3.8) holds with equality.
We note that the cap function q(d1, d2) is a linear transformation of the function
inside the expectation in (3.8). Therefore, the information about the hierarchical nest-
ing is reflected in this cap function. Because of this additional structure, we can easily
check that the bound in (3.8) can be much smaller than the corresponding Scarf bound.
This is especially true for small values of y when demand spillover is more likely to
occur (hence, the pooling term is more likely to be positive), as illustrated in Figure 3.4.
Therefore, this motivates the need to develop a new solution framework that uti-
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Figure 3.4: Scarf bound and nested bound (Proposition 3.4.1) for two identical locations
with ζ = 4,m = 100, σ = 50, ρ = 0.
lizes the cascading structure of the cost function (3.3.1) under a hierarchical nested
fulfillment network. Unfortunately, the general problem is NP-hard, and only in the
simplest case (two identical locations) do we have an exact solution due to the exis-
tence of a closed-form tight bound (though the proof is cumbersome). In Section 3.5,
we propose such a solution framework that works on any hierarchical nested fulfillment
network.
An implication of Proposition 3.4.1 is that the worst-case expected cost of inven-
tory level y = (y, y): maxf∈Fmσρ Ef [C(y, D̃)] = C̄(y) is attained under a six-point
distribution f ∗y .
Theorem 3.4.1 If there are two identical regions, then for any y = (y, y),
sup
f∈Fmσρ
Ef [C(y, D̃)] ≤ C̄(y) := 2s0m− (p− h− s0)(y −m) + (p+ h− s0)
√
(y −m)2 + γσ2,
(3.10)
where γ := (p+h−s)(1+ρ)+s−s0
2(p+h)−s−s0 . Moreover, if γ(ν
2 + 1) ≥ 2, where ν := 3(h+p−s0)−2(s−s0)
h+p−s0 ,
then Ef∗y [C(y, D̃)] = C̄(y) for some probability distribution f
∗
y ∈ Fmσρ with six support
points.
Proof. From Lemma 3.3.1, we know that




(s− s0)(dj − y)+ + (p+ h− s)(d1 + d2 − 2y)+.




A corollary of Theorem 3.4.1 is an analytic expression for the robust optimal in-
ventory level under the two-location nested fulfillment network. The proof is relegated
to the appendix.
Proposition 3.4.2 If there are two identical regions, and if γ(ν2 + 1) ≥ 2 where
γ := (p+h−s)(1+ρ)+s−s0
2(p+h)−s−s0 and ν :=
3(h+p−s0)−2(s−s0)
h+p−s0 , then the inventory levels that minimize










The minmax expected cost is C∗ = 2s0m+ 2σ
√
γh(p− s0).
If demand spillover is not allowed or if s > p+ h, then inventory is decentralized with
each location solving a classical single-location newsvendor problem. In this case, the









Since γ ≤ 1, it directly follows that y∗ ≤ y∗Sc whenever p − s0 ≥ h, and that y∗ ≥ y∗Sc
whenever p − s0 ≤ h. Since p − s0 is the underage cost without pooling, then when
p − s0 ≥ h, the decentralized solution y∗Sc is large due to the high underage cost. On
the other hand, in a centralized system, unmet demand can be fulfilled by inventory
from any location, so the solution y∗ is lower when p − s0 ≥ h. For a similar reason,
when p − s0 ≤ h, the decentralized solution is low due to the high overage cost. In
a centralized system, excess inventory in one location can be used elsewhere, so the
solution y∗ is higher when p − s0 ≤ h. Hence, the fact that |y∗ − m| ≤ |y∗Sc − m| is
because of inventory risk sharing resulting from pooling, mirroring similar results from
stochastic systems. Indeed, as ρ→ 1, we have γ → 1, and as a result, y∗ converges to
the decentralized solution y∗Sc.
3.4.1 The Effect of Cost and Demand Parameters on the
Worst-case Distribution
We provide in the Appendix the expressions for the support points and the probabilities
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Figure 3.5: The six support points of f ∗y . Each support point lies on one of three solid
lines passing through (y, y), where the distance from this point increases in proportion
to Φy =
√
(y −m)2 + γσ2. The dashed line corresponds to a perfect balance between
demand and supply after demand spillover.
worst-case distribution depends on the inventory level).
Figure 3.5 shows the support points of f ∗y , where Φy :=
√
(y −m)2 + γσ2. From
the figure, we observe that each support point lies on one of three solid lines that
pass through point (y, y). When we either increase |y −m|, increase σ, or increase ρ,
the distance of the support points to (y, y) increases proportionally in the direction
indicated by the arrows in Figure 3.5.
The dashed line in the figure (d1+d2 = 2y) corresponds to a perfect balance between
demand and inventory after demand spillover. Two of the solid lines converge to this
dashed line as ν → 1, which occurs when h + p decreases to the limit s. Thus, when
the overage or the underage cost is high (or the fulfillment cost s is low), the solid lines
pivot further away from the dashed line, and hence the support points of the worst-case
distribution result in very large excess inventory or unmet demand after pooling.
We call a system imbalanced if, after in-location fulfillment, there is leftover in-
ventory in one location and unfulfilled demand at the other location. In Figure 3.5,
we divide the demand region into four quadrants (Regions 1 through 4 demarcated by
the two dotted lines), and observe that when the demand realizations are in Regions 1
and 4, there is imbalance in the system. In these regions, we measure the magnitude
of imbalance as the sum of the leftover inventory and unfulfilled demand. Mathemat-
ically, this is the L1 distance between the support point and (y, y). We find that the
magnitude of imbalance induced by the support points is increasing in |y −m|, σ and
ρ.
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The probability of imbalance (sum of probabilities of realizations in Regions 1 and
4), however, is no more than γσ2/Φ2y. When the decision maker chooses inventory lev-
els with high safety stock (as is typically done in practice), the worst case distribution
causes imbalance across locations with low probability, but of large magnitude. Thus
retailers should strive to eliminate such low-probability extreme situations, which can
be done by adopting various demand-shaping strategies that prevent imbalances in the
customer locations, such as strategic location-specific product display, recommenda-
tions and flash promotions.
3.5 Heuristic for general nested fulfillment net-
works
Our objective in this section is to develop a computationally tractable solution method










requiring only the mean and the covariance of D̃, where Ξ = {E`}L−1`=0 defines the
structure of a nested fulfillment network. Importantly, the solution method should
preserve the cascading nature of the hierarchical nested fulfillment network, resulting
in a tighter bound than by simply using Scarf-type bounds (3.7). This provides a
computationally tractable heuristic that results in a good approximation to the robust
newsvendor problem under a general nested fulfillment network
Before developing our solution method, we first introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 3.5.1 If F is the set of all joint probability distributions with mean vector m





















(r− a)> t+ a>y
)








` (η`  eA`) for some (A0, A1, · · · , AL−1) ∈ 2[n0] × 2[n1] ×
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· · · × 2[nL−1]
}
and eA` is an n`-dimensional binary vector where eA`,k = 1 if and only
if k ∈ A`.
The proof is relegated to the Appendix and relies on strong duality in moment prob-
lems.
Note that because of the form of C(y,D) under an L-level nested fulfillment network
(Lemma 3.3.1), the implication from Lemma 3.5.1 is that an exact solution y∗ to the
minmax robust problem can be found through solving a semidefinite program (SDP)
with 2N semidefinite constraints, where N :=
∑L−1
`=0 n` is the total number of nodes in
the tree representation of the nested fulfillment structure (similar to Figure 3.2). This
is done by defining y as a decision variable in the SDP.
Semi-definite programs, much like linear programs, can be solved through interior
point methods which have polynomial time worst-case complexity (Vandenberghe and
Boyd, 1996). However, the SDP in (3.13) is not computationally tractable beyond small
values for n, since it involves O(2N) constraints that each require a (n + 1) × (n + 1)
matrix to be positive semidefinite. In the worst case, N = n(n+1)
2
if the number of
levels is L = n and n` = n− `. This motivates the need for tractable approximations
to the tight bound for larger values of n.














where x(`) is an n`-dimensional binary vector, for ` = 0, 1, . . . , L − 1, and  is the
element-wise product operator.
We observe that formulation (3.14) preserves the hierarchical structure of the net-
work since the implied optimization problem inside the square brackets finds a solution
{x(`)(D)}L−1`=0 that obeys the nested structure for a particular demand realization D.
To see this, note that since η`,k ≥ 0 for any ` and k ∈ n`, we have that x(`)k (D) = 0 if
and only if e>`,kD̃ < e
>
`,ky. In words, x
(`)
k (D) = 0 will be chosen only if there is inventory
remaining after level ` fulfillment of regions in I(`)k . Note that this can only occur if
there exists at least one path in the tree from level 0 to level ` (for example, the path
through {I(0)k0 , I
(1)
k1
, . . . , I(`)k` }) where there is excess inventory in all sets in this path.
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This makes sense because level ` fulfillment will not occur unless there was excess in-
ventory after all the less costly lower level fulfillments. Mathematically, if x
(`)
k (D) = 0,






(D) = · · · = x(`−1)k`−1 (D) = 0.
The inherent interdependence among the values in {x(`)(D)}L−1`=0 is due to the nested
structure of the fulfillment network.
Since the value of the maximizer depends on the specific realization of random
demands, the maximizers are random variables, which we denote as {x̃(`)}L−1`=0 . Hence,











where we use tilde on the binary variables to emphasize that they are stochastic vari-
ables.
Note that reformulation (3.15) has cross products of random variables, where the
underlying uncertainty has a joint distribution f with nonnegative support and with
mean m and covariance Σ. A method to relax a bilinear function into a linear formula-
tion is to introduce new variables, which lifts the problem to a higher dimensional space
(see for instance Sherali and Alameddine 1992). This method was used in developing
heuristics for the multidimensional robust newsvendor problems in Natarajan and Teo
(2017) and Natarajan et al. (2017), where such cross products of random variables
occur, though these papers study simpler networks without demand spillover.
Consider the N -dimensional random vector x̃ :=
(
x̃(L−1)> x̃(L−2)> · · · x̃(0)>
)>
.
We linearize the function (3.15) by lifting it to a higher dimensional space by intro-
ducing the following new variables:










∈ <N×N . (3.18)
Defining NL−1 := 0 and N` :=
∑L−`−2
m=0 nL−1−m for ` = 0, 1, . . . , L − 2, we now have














Therefore, an upper bound to (3.12) can be found by taking the maximum of the
linear function (3.19) with respect to the variables (x,Q,R) that satisfy some feasibility
constraints which are consistent with their definition in (3.16)–(3.18). First, since the













m Σ + mm> Q>
x Q R
 ,
is positive semidefinite. Second, since the support of f is nonnegative, then it must




















: w ∈ {0, 1}N
 .
(3.20)
That is, the left-hand side matrix is a convex combination of a set of Boolean matrices
where each matrix is itself a product of Boolean variables. The convex hull of such
matrices is often refered to as the Boolean quadric polytope (Padberg, 1989).
Computing the convex hull is a difficult problem since unconstrained binary
quadratic programming is NP-hard in general. We instead use a simple linear relax-
ation of this polytope. Note that if the matrix on the left-hand side of (3.20) belongs
to the Boolean quadric polytope, then R ≥ 0 and, for all i, j ∈ [N ], Rii = xi, Rij ≤ xi,
and Rij ≥ xi + xj − 1.
Therefore, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.5.1 If f is a joint probability distribution with nonnegative support and
60


























m Σ + mm> Q>
x Q R
  0
Rii = xi i ∈ [N ]
Rij ≤ xi i ∈ [N ], j ∈ [N ]
Rij ≥ xi + xj − 1 i ∈ [N ], j ∈ [N ]
Q,R ≥ 0 (3.21)
The proposition states that the expected unmet demand can be bounded by the
optimal value of a semidefinite program with a single semidefinite constraint of size
(N + n + 1) × (N + n + 1). Contrast this with the tight bound in Lemma 3.5.1 from
an SDP with O(2N) semidefinite constraints of size (n+ 1)× (n+ 1).
The dual of the SDP (3.21) is a minimization problem. Therefore, from































t0 ∈ <, t ∈ <n, u ∈ <N ,





L−2diag(ηL−2) · · · E>0 diag(η0)
)>
∈ <N×n. Thus, a
computationally tractable heuristic for finding robust inventory levels under a nested
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Figure 3.6: Experiments with the optimal minmax cost and the optimized upper bound
cost. (a) The gap between the two optimized costs is small, revealing that optimiz-
ing the upper bound is a good heuristic for the minmax robust problem. (b) The
computational time of the heuristic is significantly smaller than the optimal SDP.
fulfillment network is to choose the inventory levels based on the optimal solution y
to the SDP (3.22), which we denote as yH (recall that the true robust inventory levels
are y∗).
Whether yH is a close approximation to y∗ depends on whether the SDP (3.21) can
tightly approximate (3.13). We demonstrate this in computational experiments (since
there is no support restriction in Lemma 3.5.1, we allow negative values for q and Q,
so the third constraint in (3.22) is an equality constraint). Our experiment is on a
2-level structure: in level 0, in-location fulfillment has a per-unit cost s0, and in level
1, inventory from any location in the network can be used to meet unfulfilled demand
at a per-unit cost s.
Figure 3.6 shows the results of the experiment as the number of locations is varied,
with h = 1, p = 100, s = 1, s0 = 0, with identical marginal distributions (mean
m = 100 and standard deviation σ = 50), and with each pair of locations having a
correlation coefficient of ρ = 0.25. Figure 3.6a shows the gap between the minmax cost
C∗ and the optimal value CH of the SDP (3.22). The plot shows that CH is close to
the minmax cost (within 0.2%) and, in general, this gap decreases with the number of
locations. Therefore, the upper bound (3.21) is empirically tight in the neighborhood
of yH and y∗. This reveals that our proposed solution method provides a good heuristic
for approximating the robust inventory levels in a nested fulfillment network.
Figure 3.6b shows the computational tractability of this heuristic compared to solv-
ing for the robust inventory levels through (3.13). We observe that the computational
time of the heuristic is significantly smaller compared to the optimal SDP, as demon-
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strated in the figure.4 As a result, our proposed heuristic solves a general class of
problems with nested fulfillment cost structures, with significantly less computational
burden than the optimal SDP.
3.6 Approximating distance-based fulfillment costs
with a nested structure
We now describe how to approximate a general distance-based fulfillment cost structure
by a nested fulfillment structure. Suppose that the fulfillment cost is a function of
the distance between two regions. In particular, for any two regions i, j, suppose
sij = φ(rij), where rij is the distance between the regions and φ is an increasing
function. We denote by R = (rij)ij the distance matrix and S = (sij)ij the fulfillment
cost matrix.
A decomposition of a general cost structure with n locations into an n-level nested
fulfillment structure is done by hierarchical agglomerative clustering, which has been
extensively studied in literature, dating back to Johnson (1967). We outline the pro-
cedure in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Hierarchical Agglomerative Clustering Algorithm
1: Let S = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Set R̄ = (r̄ij)i,j∈S = R.
2: while |S| > 1 do
3: Choose the two closest nodes i∗, j∗ = argmini,j∈S r̄ij.
4: Cluster i∗, j∗ into a single node: S ← S + {i∗, j∗} − {i∗} − {j∗}
5: Recalculate distance matrix R̄ = (R̂ij)i,j∈S
The algorithm proceeds by progressively clustering the two closest nodes into a
single node starting from the n leaf nodes corresponding to locations, until there re-
mains only one cluster node which encompasses all the locations. In each step of the
algorithm, the number of nodes is reduced by 1. Note that in order to choose the two
closest nodes in each step, we need a notion of distance between clusters of nodes.
A variety of measures can be considered to define the distance between two clusters,
namely the minimum or maximum or average distance between the nodes in the two
clusters, Ward’s method, distance between the center of masses of the two clusters,
etc.
4Even for n = 9, the optimal robust solution required around 20,000 unique SDP variables involved
in the SDP constraints, whereas the heuristic required only 20 unique SDP variables, and the disparity
is clearly seen in the computational times. The heuristic could solve up to n = 100 in under an hour,
whereas the optimal solution could not be evaluated even for n = 10 due to memory constraints.
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Figure 3.7: Approximating a distance-based fulfillment cost structure with a nested
fulfillment structure. Panel (a) is the dendrogram obtained by hierarchical clustering
based on the distance matrixR. Panel (b) is the corresponding 5-level nested fulfillment
structure.
We demonstrate the algorithm using an example, where define the distance between
two clusters as the average distance measure, namely the Unweighted Pair Group
Method with Arithmetic Mean (UPGMA). The UPGMA distance between clusters




i∈I1,j∈I2 rij. In other words, it is the average distance
between any two pairs of locations in I1 and I2.
Consider the following distance matrix among 5 nodes, and the corresponding ful-
fillment cost matrix constructed by the equation sij = 10 + 0.005 · rij:
R =

0 1, 220 1, 411 770 872
1, 220 0 2, 404 624 420
1, 411 2, 404 0 1, 785 2, 187
770 624 1, 785 0 557
872 420 2, 187 557 0
 , S =

10.0 16.1 17.1 13.8 14.4
16.1 10.0 22.0 13.1 12.1
17.1 22.0 10.0 18.9 20.9
13.8 13.1 18.9 10.0 12.8
14.4 12.1 20.9 12.8 10.0

Applying Algorithm 3 with UPGMA as the distance metric, we obtain the dendro-
gram shown in Figure 3.7a. The dendogram depicts the clustering in each step (level).
L = 5 levels are shown, where level ` = 0 consists of {3, 1, 4, 5, 2}, ` = 1 consists of
{3, 1, 4, {5, 2}} and so on, with ` = n−1 corresponding to the cluster of all nodes. The
dendogram also depicts the distance between the entities being clustered: in level 2 for
instance, {4} is clustered with {5, 2} at the UPGMA distance r̂4,{5,2} = 590.6. This
means that any fulfillment between nodes 4 and 5, or between nodes 4 and 2 takes
place at a cost ŝ4,{5,2} = 10 + 0.005 · r̂4,{5,2}. Thus we have an approximation of the
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Figure 3.8: The approximation of the expected total fulfillment cost by a nested ful-
fillment structure. Panel (a) shows the relative gap in expected total fulfillment cost
under a variety of distributions as fulfillment costs become more sensitive to distance.
Panel (b) shows the quality of approximation and computational time as the number
of levels in the nested structure is varied.
distance and fulfillment cost matrices:
R̂ =

0 954 1, 947 954 954
954 0 1, 947 591 420
1, 947 1, 947 0 1, 947 1, 947
954 591 1, 947 0 591
954 420 1, 947 591 0
 , Ŝ =

10.0 14.8 19.7 14.8 14.8
14.8 10.0 19.7 13.0 12.1
19.7 19.7 10.0 19.7 19.7
14.8 13.0 19.7 10.0 13.0
14.8 12.1 19.7 13.0 10.0

Algorithm 3 always results in a nested fulfillment structure with L = n levels (see
Figure 3.7b). We can also generate a nested fulfillment structure for any general L.
We do this by cutting the dendrogram horizontally at L − 2 places across the y-axis:
the `th line from the bottom gives rise to a partition of the set of locations by cutting
through links that cluster these partitioned sets further. This partition gives us the
clusters at level `. We provide a detailed example in Appendix B.3.
3.6.1 Quality of nested approximations
We next study the nested network approximation in realistic fulfillment networks in-
spired from U.S. data. In these experiments, n = 10. (Further details of the exper-
imental setup can be found in Section 3.7.2.) In particular, we calculate the relative
gap in expected total fulfillment costs under the nested structure and under the actual
fulfillment structure where sij = s0 + λ · rij. Given the inventory levels, if the gap is
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found to be small, we can confidently use the proposed heuristic to approximate the
robut inventory levels for general networks with distance-based fulfillment costs.
Indeed, we see that the nested cost structure with L = n tightly approximates the
expected total fulfillment cost for a variety of distributions such as Normal, exponential,
lognormal and gamma (Figure 3.8a). The approximation is detriorating as fulfillment
costs become more sensitive to distance, however, even for high values of the distance
sensitivity factor λ, the relative gap in expected total fulfillment costs is less than
3%. (We note that the distance sensitivity factors for the UPS Ground shipping is
0.0005 as estimated by Jasin and Sinha (2015), which is ten times lower than the
lowest value of distance sensitivity considered in this experiment.) As a result, the
nested fulfillment structure can serve as a good approximation for most distance-based
shipping alternatives seen in practice.
Larger number of levels L best approximates general fulfillment networks, however
it is at the expense of increased computational effort in solving the SDP (3.22). We next
test how the approximation and the computational time are affected by the number
of levels. The results under an exponential distribution are shown in Figure 3.8b. As
expected, increasing L improves approximation quality, albeit marginally for L > 7,
however, the computational time increases exponentially. Hence nominal values of L
can achieve good approximations in relatively shorter time.
3.7 Numerical Analysis
We conduct multiple experiments on the proposed heuristic solutions. First, we com-
pare the heuristic solution to stochastic optimal solutions in the 2-level structure (con-
stant fulfillment cost for spillover demand) for various distributions to understand the
expected value of additional information (EVAI) in a pooling context, which is de-
fined as the loss incurred due to incomplete information about the distribution, as the
heuristic solution only uses mean and covariance information. We then conduct exper-
iments on simulated data to illustrate the superiority of the robust heuristic solution
compared to stochastic solutions.
3.7.1 Experiments with a 2-level nested network
We begin by studying the performance of our proposed heuristic in a 2-level nested
network where fulfillment costs for spillover demands are constant (sij = s > s0 for




Figure 3.9: Relative gaps (CHf −C∗f )/C∗f (robust actual cost) and (CH−C∗)/C∗ (minmax
cost). The x-axis spread of the data around each value of p is solely for visual clarity.
pooling from the network structure.
We randomly generate distribution parameters for the following parametric fam-
ilies: Normal, exponential, beta prime, and Student-t (the details for the parameter
generation are given in Appendix B.4). Given a specific joint demand distribution





average approximation with 104 samples of the demand vector. Given the mean and
the covariance of the random demand, we use our heuristic to approximate the robust
inventory levels with yH. We then compute the expected cost of the heuristic solution
under the known true distribution f (which we denote as CHf ).
Figure 3.9 illustrates the gap CHf − C∗f (the ◦ markers), which represents the per-
formance of the heuristic under a specific distribution f . In these experiments, n = 5,
h = 1, s = 1, s0 = 0.5, and we vary p ∈ {0.5, 1, 2, 4, 8}. We observe that the per-
formance of the heuristic depends on p, seen from the small optimality gap for small
values of p. If the distribution is either Normal or exponential, the heuristic has an
actual expected cost that is close to optimal even for high values of p, with relative
gaps in the order of .1% or 1%. For the beta prime and the Student-t distribution
families, we observe that the relative gap can be as high as the order of 10%.
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Figure 3.10: Reduction in expected cost (under the true distribution) of the robust
inventory levels with partitioned statistics information.
The figure also shows the gap CH−C∗f (the + markers). Since under beta prime or
Student-t distributions, the circle markers are close to the plus markers, we can infer
that the expected cost under these distributions is close to the worst-case expected cost
in the neighborhood of yH. (Note that the plus markers are always above the circle
markers since CHf ≤ CH.) We next discuss how the performance of a distributionally
robust heuristic can be improved for these cases.
Since there are multiple joint ditributions in F , then the range of possible values
of Ef [C(y, D̃)] for a given y could potentially be wide. This ambiguity may result in
the true optimal solution to be different from the robust solution under some distribu-
tions (e.g. under beta prime or Student-t). A way to reduce ambiguity is by further
restricting the distribution set, which can be accomplished by adding more informa-
tion to F . This can be done with partitioned statistics information, specifically, the
mean and covariance of random vector (D̃+, D̃−) whose ith elements are (d̃i−mi)+ and
(mi− d̃i)+, respectively. Partitioned statistics measures asymmetry of the distribution
that is not represented by covariance alone (Natarajan et al., 2017). Moreover, we
can utilize the techniques from this paper, hence adapt Proposition 3.5.1, for a dis-
tributionally robust heuristic under this additional information (see Appendix B.5 for
the complete formulation). Figure 3.10 shows that the additional information could
significantly reduce the expected cost of the distributionally robust inventory levels.
It is no surprise that asymmetry information is important to estimate the impact of
pooling, as this is in line with results from the pooling literature, specifically Yang and
Schrage (2009) who show that right-skewed demand distributions can cause inventory
levels to increase rather than decrease under pooling.
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3.7.2 Experiments with realistic networks
3.7.2.1 Network Setup.
We now use realistic networks of fulfillment centers located in mainland US to study
the performance of our heuristic solutions. We build these networks based on publicly
available data from Chen (2017), who use unofficial data of a US-based online retailer’s
fulfillment center network. The dataset contains information about locations of the
fulfillment centers, population of the US by zipcode, and estimated shipping costs
based on UPS Ground and UPS Next Day Air from the fulfillment centers to customer
locations.
We consider networks of size n = 10, by choosing n random fulfillment centers from
the 87 fulfillment centers available in the data. Since the results of our experiments
depend on network characteristics, we take a sample of 102 networks and conduct our
experiments for each sample, reporting the mean values over all the networks for the
metrics considered.
For each network, the mean demands at customer locations (approximated by zip-
codes) are the population in millions, and each customer location demand is assigned to
the nearest fulfillment center. That is, the fulfillment centers can fulfill demands from
their assigned customer locations at the in-location fulfillment cost. The coefficient of
variation is taken to be equal to 1. We generate a random correlation matrix based on
Numpacharoen and Atsawarungruangkit (2012), such that the maximum correlation
coefficient has an absolute value less than 0.4. We take 103 samples of the demand
vector for sample average approximations.
Similar to Jasin and Sinha (2015) and Lei et al. (2018), we take the fulfillment
costs to be linear functions of the distance. Specifically we have sij = s0 + λ · rij,
where rij is the distance in miles, λ = 0.005 is the distance sensitivity factor, with
in-location fulfillment done at cost s0 = $10. This gives fulfillment costs in the range
of [$10, $23.6] for the entire network. The overage and underage cost parameters are
taken to be: h = $10, p = $50. We use Algorithm 3 to generate the L-level nested
fulfillment structure with L = n as the base case.
3.7.2.2 Misspecifying the Distribution.
We study the effect of misspecifying demand distributions. In particular, we compare
the expected costs under the nested fulfillment cost structure achieved by the following
two inventory solutions:








Figure 3.11: The relative gap in expected costs under the true distribution, of the
robust solution yH and the Normal solution yN. The x-axis spread of the data is solely
for visual clarity.
2. The stochastic inventory solution yN = argminy≥0Ef [C(y, D̃)] that assumes f
is the Normal distribution (the solution is approximated using sample average
approximation).
The expected costs Ef [C(y, D̃)] are calculated under the true distributions, where f
is a Normal, exponential, lognormal, or gamma distribution (details are provided in
Appendix B.4).
The results are shown in Figure 3.11. Each circle corresponds to a randomly chosen
network of size n = 10. Indeed, if the true demand distribution were Normal, then
yN will be the true optimal solution, in which case the relative gap in expected cost
achieved by the robust solution is negative. However, this is not usually the case in
reality, as the real joint distribution of demands can seldom be accurately predicted.
We see that for certain networks, when the true distribution is non-Normal, significant
reduction in expected costs can be realized by using the robust solution instead of the
Normal solution. The savings are likely to be higher for larger networks as the normal
distribution perceives higher pooling benefits which may not be the case under the true
distribution.
3.7.2.3 Dynamic Myopic Fulfillment.
By considering a dynamic setting where demands arrive at random, we study the
quality of the single-period assumption made in our study. We model random arrivals
in the following fashion: we generate the single period demand vector, and randomize













Figure 3.12: Figure showing the relative gap in expected costs between the dynamic
setting under myopic fulfillment and the single-period lower bound for various distri-
butions.
fulfills an incoming unit of demand is taken myopically – the nearest location with
available inventory is chosen to fulfill the demand, which is the fulfillment norm in
practice.
The starting inventory levels are set by the robust heuristic. Note that given any
inventory levels, the single period cost is a hindsight optimal lower bound for the cost
under the dynamic setting. We see in Figure 3.12 that the relative gap in expected
costs between the single-period and dynamic settings is less than 2%, and hence the
single-period expected cost can serve as a good approximation for the expected cost
under a dynamic setting. Note that the myopic strategy need not be the optimal
fulfillment strategy in a dynamic setting, and hence the actual relative gap in expected
costs will be less than 2%. Similar results were observed when the nested fulfillment
structure was used in place of the actual fulfillment costs.
3.8 Extensions
3.8.1 Location-specific Demand Classes
In the previous sections, we made the assumption that all demands can be fulfilled
by inventory in any node, regardless of the demand location or the inventory node
location. However, in some settings, there may be classes of demand that cannot be
fulfilled by inventory nodes in a different location. One example is an omni-channel
store network; in each location, there are two types of customers: those purchasing
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from the local brick-and-mortar store, and those placing an order through the online
store. Demand from store customers can only be met with inventory that is located in
the local store. On the other hand, demand from an online customer can be fulfilled
from any store location, through what is known in the retail industry as ship-from-store
fulfillment.
Note that there are two different types of inventory risk pooling involved here.
First, within a location, store demand and local online demand are pooled since they
deplete from the same store inventory. Second, online demand across locations are
pooled since they are fulfilled from inventory in the store network. While ignoring the
first type (for instance, by keeping a separate inventory for store customers) simplifies
the problem to one explored in the previous section, it results in suboptimal inventory
levels since it is likely that local demands are highly correlated.
Detailed analyses of this setting can be found in Appendix B.6. We show that this
problem can also be analyzed in a similar fashion to Section 3.5, except that there are
nested piecewise linear terms of the form (x− (y− z)+)+ in the objective. Introducing
integer variables similar to what was done in (3.19) yields products of integer variables.
We deal with this complication by introducing new integer variables to replace these
product terms, and we obtain the heuristic in the form of an SDP of increased size,
though still polynomial in the number of nodes).
3.8.2 Uncertainty in Moment Information
As e-commerce demands are highly volatile, there may be uncertainty in the moment
information estimated from the data. Such uncertainty may be in the form of confidence
intervals constructed around the moment information through empirical estimation
from the data, or in the form of more complicated uncertainty sets. These can be
incorporated easily into our models by simply including the constraint (µ,Σ) ∈ U ,
where U is a non-empty, closed and convex uncertainty set for the estimated mean and
covariance matrices, and allowing µ and Σ to be variables that are constrained in the
above fashion, rather than parameters (Natarajan et al., 2011).5
Natarajan et al. (2011) provide two examples of uncertainty set representations:
1. Linear: U = {(µ,Σ) : µL ≤ µ ≤ µU ,ΣL ≤ Σ ≤ ΣU}. This can simply be incorpo-
rated as linear constraints, for which the dual can be taken easily.
5Note that this modification is to be made before taking the dual SDP of the inner robust problem
– the constraint (µ,Σ) ∈ U is included in the SDP relaxation of the moment problem in maximization
form in (3.21).
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γ2Σ0, where µ0,Σ0 are the estimated mean and covariance matrices, and γ1, γ2 are
parameters. Notice that the first constraint is non-linear, but can be expressed





We note that any uncertainty set that can be characterized by linear or semi-definite
constraints can be included, as they easily yield themselves to dualizing.
3.9 Conclusion
Robust strategies are gaining importance in retail due to the increase in complexity
arising from innovations. Particularly for e-commerce demands, incorrect forecasting
may lead to disastrous results, as inventory planning is done at the network level.
We provide a framework to analyze the distributionally robust newsvendor network
problem where there are network flows after realization of uncertainty. We solve the
two-location setting to yield a closed-form nested bound that serves as an analogue to
the Scarf bound for a system with inventory pooling.
For the multi-location case, we provide a heuristic approximation and upper bound
for the case where the fulfillment costs exhibit a nested fulfillment structure, where
the cost function can be written as the sum of piecewise linear terms. We show how
any general fulfillment cost structure can be approximated by this nested fulfillment
structure through simple agglomerative clustering algorithms, and that the approxi-
mation of the expected total fulfillment cost is empirically tight for commonly seen
distance-based shipping cost structures under various distributions.
Following Natarajan et al. (2017), we show that the value of asymmetry informa-
tion is significant for a system with pooling, which also echoes results from pooling
literature which state that the shape of the distributions have a significant effect on
pooling benefits. We also demonstrate that a distributionally robust solution can sig-
nificantly outperform stochastic inventory solutions that assume a particular demand
distribution.
Multiple directions for future work exist. A multi-period formulation can be con-
sidered, where actions in the current period affect the future state. While tractable
formulations can elude us, we can approximate future stages through an affine approxi-
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mation, where the future actions are restricted to be affine functions of the correspond-
ing data (Ben-Tal et al., 2004). Under such settings, robust fulfillment decisions can
be analyzed which can yield helpful tools for practitioners to fulfill online demands.
Our heuristic also yields the probability of stockout at the end of the period for each
node in the nested fulfillment structure, which can also be used to guide dynamic ful-
fillment. Another natural extension is to consider how the network should look like in
the first place: the solution from the inventory optimization can inform network design
decisions, which is an important unexplored area in e-commerce.
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CHAPTER 4
The Value of Personalized Return Policies
in Retail
4.1 Abstract
With increasing online purchases and retail firms competing to provide lenient return
policies, customer returns has become an important problem with roughly 10% of all
the products being returned. In this paper, we consider a firm that jointly decides the
inventory level and return policy at the start of the selling season. In particular, the
return policy consists of two components – a return window and a return fee. The
return policy affects the hassle experienced by the customer in returning the product,
and customers are heterogeneous in how they perceive this hassle. In the absence
of information about customers’ hassle types, the firm can only offer blanket return
policies, or a menu of return policies for customers to choose from; however, knowing
customers’ hassle types, the firm can offer personalized return policies. We show that
the firm can achieve higher profits by offering a menu of policies as compared to blanket
policies. When the firm provides full refunds and personalizes return windows, we
show that, consistent with industry practice, low-hassle types (customers that return
frequently under lenient policies) must be banned from returning. However when the
firm can also personalize return fees, we show that the firm should prioritize sales to
low-hassle types by offering them strict return policies (short return window and high
return fee). We also show that personalization based on customer behavior data wipes
out the customer surplus, providing implications for usage of customer behavior data
in enforcing operational policies.
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4.2 Introduction
The advent of e-commerce has infused intense competition in the retail industry, with
firms competing for customers in both physical stores as well as digital platforms. In
this competitive landscape, customers returns has emerged as a significant problem –
in 2018, the total merchandise returns accounted for nearly $369 billion in lost sales
for US retailers, which is around 10% of the total sales (Appriss Retail, 2018). Cus-
tomer returns have been allowed by retail firms to incentivize purchases by alleviating
customers’ uncertainty over product fit, and this feature has become crucial for online
purchases due to the lack of direct interaction with the product at the time of purchase.
Return rates in e-commerce sales are much higher (more than 30%) compared to
brick-and-mortar sales (around 10%) (Saleh, 2016), due to lenient return policies which
is one of the most important drivers of online purchases, next only to free shipping
(Walker Sands, 2018). With online sales channels becoming a principal part of most
retail firms, high return rates are accompanied by several problems; the product can
be returned outside the selling season, the product can be in a state (damaged or used)
that is not suitable for reselling, restocking costs, etc. In addition, many e-commerce
firms also bear the brunt of return shipping fees, which is estimated to cost $550 billion
by 2020, representing an increase of 75% over the costs in 2016 (Statista, 2018).
Retailers have adopted various strategies to reduce the cost of returns due to the
problems mentioned above. Some firms have reduced the return window – firms such as
LL Bean and Bed, Bath and Beyond, which had an unlimited return window (customers
could return items years after purchase and did not need receipts to do so), have
shortened the return window to one year, citing return abuse by certain customers
(Rosato, 2018). While full refunds are common, some retailers charge customers upon
return of certain items (e.g. electronic products) in the form of a flat restocking fee or
partial refunds. To reduce return shipping costs on online purchases, firms may pass
on the return shipping costs (wholly or partially) to the customer, or in the case of
omnichannel retailers such as Macy’s and Target (with physical stores), customers are
allowed to return to one of their physical stores free of cost (which is later transported to
return processing centers through internal logistics). While refunds and return windows
are common levers in return policies, Janakiraman and Syrdal (2016) list other aspects
of returns which firms can focus on, such as leniency on the cause of return, selectivity
based on products and customers (members vs non-members), and starting the return
policy later by allowing trial windows.
While these initiatives have helped reduce cases of misuse by customers, they still
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suffer from a fundamental problem – these policies are agnostic to variations in cus-
tomers’ return behaviors. Abbey et al. (2018) segment customers based on profitability
using transaction data from a retailer into three groups – non-returners (47.7% of cus-
tomers), legitimate returners (52% of customers, 23% return rate) and abusive returners
(0.4% of customers, 60% return rate). The profit contributions were $1,445, $222 and
-$1,254 per year respectively. It is clear that in such a case, a one-size-fits-all policy
that aims to target the small fraction of abusive returners can hurt profits by adversely
affecting the majority of profitable customers.
Indeed, strategies that target different segments of customers relies on the firm’s
knowledge of its customers. This is particular easy for e-commerce firms as huge
amounts of data are collected when users interact with online platforms. Several brick-
and-mortar retailers also track their customers with the use of third-party companies
such as The Retail Equation, which creates a risk report for customers based on their
historical return behavior (Safdar, 2018). Equipped with this data, firms can tailor
return policies to their customers. In fact, many firms have already started engag-
ing in this practice – Amazon.com (Safdar and Stevens, 2018) and Costco (Hanbury,
2018) have banned several customers that they identified as fraudulent returners, and
61% of US retailers are ready to ban frequent returners from shopping on their web-
sites (Brightpearl, 2018). Motivated by this practice of targeting customers based on
historical data, we address the following research questions in this paper:
1. Knowing information about customers’ return behavior, how should a firm per-
sonalize return policies to maximize profits?
2. What is the value in collecting information about customers to offer personalized
policies?
3. What is the effect of personalized policies on consumer welfare and surplus?
We employ a stylized, single-period newsvendor model to analyze the problem,
where there is uncertainty in the aggregate demand as well as customers’ valuation for
the product. As return policies (partial refunds, return windows, return shipping fees)
primarily affect the customers’ disutility once they decide to return (and in turn their
purchasing decision itself), we choose to model demand as a continuous mass of cus-
tomers that are heterogeneous in their perceived hassle in returning items. Perceived
hassle may include the physical hassle (distance or access to the nearest store or ship-
ping center), as well as psychological hassle (mental characteristics inhibit returning
items). Incidentally, the hassle types of customers can also be thought of as a proxy
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for return rates under lenient return policies – low-hassle customers are more likely to
return items due to lower disutility in doing so, whereas high-hassle customers are less
likely to exercise the return option.
We assume that the return policy consists of two components: 1) a return window
(short or long), and 2) a refund fee. The firm benefits from a shorter return window, as
returned items are less likely to be damaged and more likely to be resold during the sell-
ing season (modeled by a higher salvage price), whereas customers are inconvenienced
by shorter windows (modeled by increase in their return hassle).
First, when the firm offers only a blanket policy for all customers, we show that for
products that lose value quickly, short return window policy leads to higher profits by
minimizing the loss due to returns. However, for products that have a relatively stable
value over time (e.g. non-perishable goods), long return windows are more profitable
as they increase sales by lowering the hassle due to returns. We also show that the firm
can achieve higher profits compared to the blanket policy case by offering customers a
menu of policies to choose from.
When the firm provides full refunds but personalizes the return window for each
customer, we show that low-hassle customers (who return frequently under lenient
return policies) must be banned from returning, consistent with industry practice of
banning serial returners. However, when refunds can also be personalized, we show that
when inventory is limited, the firm benefits by prioritizing sales to low-hassle customers
under strict return policies (short return window and high return fees). When firms
can identify customers based on their return behavior, we show that customer surplus
is wiped out. This provides implications for customers’ privacy in retail settings, and
the value of data about customer behavior.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss the relevant literature
in Section 4.3. We then introduce the stylized model in Section 4.4, detailing cus-
tomer decisions and the firm’s profit maximization problem. In Section 4.5, we analyze
retailer return policies in the absence of personalized information about customers’
return behavior. In Section 4.6, we analyze the optimal personalized return policy. We
conclude with extensions in Section 4.7 and future directions in Section 4.8.
4.3 Literature Review
Our research primarily belongs to the stream of literature on consumer return policies.
In particular, there are several studies on the refund amount: Davis et al. (1995)
and Che (1996) consider full-refund and no-refund return policies when customers face
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uncertainty in their valuation of the product. Lenient return policies have been shown
to be useful tools – Moorthy and Srinivasan (1995) show that full refund policies can
be used as a signal for high product quality, and Petersen and Kumar (2009) find
that positive return experiences build trust in the firm, and in turn leads to positive
behavioral outcomes.
In studying return policies, several studies jointly consider pricing and refund deci-
sions. Su (2009) shows the optimality of partial return policies, with the optimal refund
amount being equal to the salvage price, and also examine the impact of consumer re-
turns on supply chain performance. Shulman et al. (2009) consider a two-product set-
ting where products can also be exchanged, and find that the optimal refund need not
be the same as the salvage price. Altug and Aydinliyim (2016) show that the optimal
refund is bounded by the clearance price when customers are strategic when purchas-
ing under full price, and offer explanations for the commonly seen “no-restocking-fee”
return policies. Shang et al. (2017) consider price and restocking fee decisions when
customers indulge in ‘wardrobing’ (misuse of trial periods intended to identify fit),
and find that the optimal price and refund are decreasing in the extent of wardrobing
among the customers.
Some researchers have also studied return policies in the form of return windows
(time to return the product to obtain refund). Ülkü et al. (2013) consider a firm that
decides the price and return window, where customer valuations and salvage price of
inventory is affected by the return window. Ülkü and Gürler (2018) also considers the
return window decision, however in the context of a newsvendor that decides inventory
levels rather than price. Both these studies explicitly model fraudulent customers that
buy products with no intention of keeping them, a feature also seen in Hess et al. (1996)
and Chu et al. (1998). We take a different approach by attributing high return rates
to customers who perceive little or no hassle in returning items that they deem unfit.
We model customer behavior and firm’s policy based on the return hassle perceived
by the customer. Davis et al. (1998) models hassle as a decision variable that the
firm can set, and find that the retailer should offer low-hassle policies when the salvage
value is high, or when there are opportunities for cross-selling, or the products’ benefits
cannot be consumed during a short period of time. There are two studies that explicitly
model customer heterogeneity in hassle costs. Hsiao and Chen (2012) compare two
cases: first, under full returns, the firm sets the optimal amount of hassle for the
customers, and second, a hassle-free policy with partial returns. Hsiao and Chen
(2014) study the interplay between price, return policy and quality risk, where the
firm decides the quality of the product in addition to price and return policy. In both
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studies, customers are segmented into two groups – high hassle low hassle customers. In
contrast, we use a more general model for hassle heterogeneity where the firm may not
know the hassle-types or valuations of customers, and we focus on inventory decisions
as compared to price optimization.
While it is common to examine pricing decisions along with return policies, there
are several papers that place return policies in other contexts. Alptekinoğlu and Grasas
(2014) study the optimal retail assortment when consumer returns are allowed. Sim-
ilar to our setting, Akçay et al. (2013) and Ketzenberg and Zuidwijk (2009) consider
inventory decisions along with pricing when product returns can be salvaged or resold.
There have also been studies that analyze supply chain interactions due to consumer
returns. Crocker and Letizia (2014) studies return policies between a manufacturer
and retailer who receives customer returns; Shulman et al. (2010) study how retailer’s
optimal return policy is affected by the reverse channel structure, namely whether re-
turns are salvaged by the manufacturer or by the retailer; and Ferguson et al. (2006)
address the problem of reducing false failure returns through supply chain coordination
methods, as manufacturers primarily incur the cost of these returns, whereas efforts to
reduce returns are primarily taken by retailers.
There has been a growing literature recently on role of return policies specifically
in the context of e-commerce and omnichannel firms. Nageswaran et al. (2017) study
the pricing and return policy decisions of an omnichannel retailer, whose customers
can purchase products in-store (and return in-store) or online (and return online or in-
store). They find that generous refunds observed in practice are driven by customers’
channel choice and the convenience of returning in-store. Ofek et al. (2011) consider
the strategies of competing retailers with respect to opening an internet outlet, as
online purchases lead to higher likelihood of costly product returns. Some firms like
Jet.com have started offering the no-returns option to customers at a discounted price.
Najafi and Duenyas (2018) consider a firm’s decision to offer the no-returns option,
while offering full refunds when purchased at the full price. Hsiao and Chen (2015)
show that allowing retailers to implement the no-return option can sometimes improve
supply chain efficiency by eliminating the manufacturer’s attempt to induce inefficient
cosumer returns.
Finally, we note that although customer returns has been well-researched, we pro-
vide a new perspective on this problem by considering the case where the firm can
personalize return policies based on historical customer behavior. There have been
papers that study personalization in other areas in retail, such as pricing (Fudenberg
and Villas-Boas, 2006; Liu and Zhang, 2006; Choe et al., 2017), assortment (Golrezaei
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et al., 2014; Gallego et al., 2016), and advertising (Bleier and Eisenbeiss, 2015). To the
best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to study behavior-based personalization
in return policies in retail.
4.4 Model
We consider a monopolistic firm selling finite inventory of a single product at a fixed
price p. We model the demand as a continuous mass of customers with a mean valuation
V for the product, and their true valuation can only be realized after purchase of the
product. This is a common assumption in literature, and is justified in the context of
e-commerce retail where customers can only experience the product after purchase. If
a customer chooses to buy the product, she realizes the true valuation V + ε, where ε
is drawn from a distribution G. Once the product is purchased and the true valuation
is realized, the customer can choose to return the product, in which case she incurs
a hassle cost (this models the customer’s proximity to store or ease of returning the
product, or the customer’s psychological hassle in returning the product), as well as
a return fee (equivalent to partial refunds). 1 If the customer chooses not to buy the
product, she leaves the system and receives a utility of 0.
Customers are characterized by their hassle type θ, which influences their perceived
hassle in returning a product. In particular, a customer of type θ returning a product
incurs a hassle cost that is linear in θ. We assume that each customer knows their
hassle-type θ, and their purchasing decision takes into account the hassle cost of returns.
However, the valuation uncertainty ε is only realized after purchase. We assume that
θ and ε are independent and uniformly distributed: θ ∼ U [0, θ̄], and ε ∼ U [ε, ε̄]. 2
In the base case where the firm does not have knowledge of each customer’s hassle
type, we assume that the distribution of the hassle types H across customers is known
to the firm. The aggregate demand is assumed to be a random variable D following
distribution F . In addition to uncertainty from the aggregate demand, the firm’s
decisions also depend on customer behavior with respect to purchasing and return
decisions, which in turn depend on customers’ hassle types and valuations. Thus, the
firm has knowledge of the distributions F , G and H.
At the start of the period, the firm decides the starting inventory level y ≥ 0
(purchased at a per-unit cost c), as well as the return policy π, which maps each
1The return fee can also include any return shipping fees that the customer bears.
2We note here that the distribution of ε is constrained such that the resultant valuation V + ε is
non-negative, and we also have p < V + ε̄ so that the price is not too high so that no one buys.
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customer of hassle-type θ to a combination of a return window and a return fee: π(θ) =
(T π(θ), rπ(θ)). The return policy affects the customers’ disutility when they choose to
return a product after purchase. In particular, when a customer of type θ purchases
the product under policy π(θ) and chooses to return the product, they face a disutility
comprised of two components – a perceived hassle cost of θ
Tπ(θ)
, and the return fee rπ(θ).
3 We note that in the case where the firm does not have access to each customer’s type
θ, the return window and return fees are necessarily independent of θ.
To simplify analysis, we assume that T π(θ) can only take one of three values T π(θ) ∈
{T∅, TS, TL}, with 0 = T∅ < TS < TL where TS and TL correspond to short and
long return windows respectively, and T∅ corresponds to the no-return option. We
make the implicit assumption that shorter return windows inconvenience the customer,
and hence are associated with a higher hassle cost, whereas longer return windows
provide flexibility to the customer, and hence are associated with lower hassle cost.
We assume that the no-return option increases the perceived hassle cost to −∞, and
hence returning is not an option for any customer that is offered T∅.
In practice, returned items can rarely be resold at the full price as they lose some
of their value, primarily due to two reasons – first, the item may be damaged during
the time that it spends with the customer, and second, the item may be returned at a
time outside the normal selling season. In such cases, the firm either spends restocking
efforts to sell the product at a discount, or directly salvages the product (Phillips,
2018). Consistent to a single period setting, we assume that items that are returned
within the short window carry a higher salvage price of s′ compared to the salvage
price s for unsold items or items that are returned later under the long window policy,
i.e. s′ > s.
Finally, we note that charging a return fee of r is equivalent to a refund amount
of p − r. Thus, r = 0 is equivalent to full refunds, and r > 0 is equivalent to partial
refunds. We assume that the firm cannot profit off a return: that is, the profit from a
customer keeping the product is higher than the profit if she returns it. Mathematically,
this means that p− rπ(θ) ≥ s′, or rπ(θ) ≤ p− s′.
4.4.1 Customer Decisions
We first analyze the decision of a customer once she arrives and observes the return
policy offered to her: (T π(θ), rπ(θ)). The customer decision tree is shown in Figure 4.1.


















Figure 4.1: Figure showing the decision tree for customer of hassle-type θ when offered
a return policy π(θ).
If a customer decides to purchase the product, she realizes her random valuation
V + ε for the product. The customer will choose to keep the product if and only if the
utility of keeping the product (V + ε− p) is greater than the utility from returning the
product.
In our model, when the customer returns the product, she gets p− rπ(θ) as refund
towards her purchase cost of p, but she also incurs a hassle cost of θ
Tπ(θ)
. Therefore,
the utility from returning the product is − θ
Tπ(θ)
− rπ(θ) (we refer to the negative of
this value as the disutility of product returns).
Suppose that the return disutility is equal to K. Then, the expected utility of
purchasing the product is
U(K) := Eε [max (V + ε− p,−K)] . (4.1)
A customer will only purchase the product if the expected utility is at least equal to
zero.
We note here that if p ≤ V , the firm is better off not offering the return option to
customers. This is because, all customers will buy the product irrespective of whether
the return option is offered or not since
U(K) ≥ Eε [max (V + ε− V,−K)] ≥ Eε [ε] = 0
The firm is better off if customers keep their products (rπ(θ) + s′ ≤ p), and hence
allowing returns only serves to decrease the profits in this case. Offering the return
option allows the firm to charge a higher price, as customers now have a recourse in
case they are dissatisfied with the product. Hence, we will only assume that p > V ,
and we discuss the no-returns option as an extension in Section 4.7.
Since the customer type θ only influences the hassle cost, hence, the disutility of
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returns, we have a simple threshold rule to characterize customers’ buying behavior.
This is formalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.4.1 There exists a threshold K̄ (independent of θ) such that a customer
buys the product if and only if her return disutility does not exceed this threshold. That
is, a customer type θ will buy if and only if θ
Tπ(θ)
+ rπ(θ) ≤ K̄.
The Proposition states that K̄ is the maximum return disutility that customers
are willing to accept before purchasing, and that this threshold is independent of θ.
This threshold exists because the expected utility of buying the product (4.1) is non-
increasing in K. Since ε is independent of the customer type θ, there exists a threshold
K̄ that is independent of θ and where U(K) ≥ 0 for all K ≤ K̄ and U(K) < 0 for all
K > K̄.
An implication of the Proposition is that K̄ is the maximum return fee that the
firm will charge to any customer. While charging a return fee higher than K̄ results in
a higher profit for returns, this benefit will never be realized since the customer never
buy the product. Therefore, we can assume that K̄ ≤ p− s′. This is due to our earlier
assumption that the return fee rπ(θ) charged to a customer cannot exceed p− s′.
Suppose that customers with type θ are offered policy (rπ(θ), T π(θ)). There will
be demand for the product from this customer type if the threshold rule in Proposi-
tion 4.4.1 is satisfied. Further, given that this customer purchases the product (con-
tingent on inventory being available), the probability of a product return is
Pε
(
V + ε− p < − θ
T π(θ)
− rπ(θ)





which is the probability that the valuation is too low to justify keeping the product.
4.4.2 Firm’s Problem
We now formulate the firm’s expected profit maximization problem. As a result of
Proposition 4.4.1, customers that are offered T∅ do not buy the product (since V < p)
and do not affect the profit function, and hence we can ignore these customers while
formulating the profit function.
The salvage value of returned products depends on when the product is returned.
Therefore, knowing when the product is returned is important for evaluating the firm’s
expected profit. We denote by ξπS and ξ
π
L the fraction of customers that demand the
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are the set of customers offered a short (long) return window and have a nonnegative
utility for purchasing the product. Note that the total demand rate is ξπ = ξπS + ξ
π
L.
If there is infinite inventory, all customers with positive purchase utility will be able




















Note that the integration is over all customer types who generate demand for the
product (Proposition 4.4.1). In the case of infinite inventory, these customers are able
to purchase the product, and (4.2) is the return probability conditional on purchasing
the product. Thus, the expression for the total salvage value is straightforward from
(4.6).
On the other hand, if inventory is finite, the rate of early or late returns depends
on how the inventory is allocated between customers offered a short return window
and those offered a long window. For example, suppose that all inventory has been
allocated to customers given a long return window. Then even if there is demand
from customers with a short return window, the early return rate will be zero. Hence,
expressing the total salvage value requires keeping track of which customers possess
each unit of inventory.
In the interest of tractability, we make the following reasonable assumption: we
assume that inventory is sold at the same rate of purchase for the two classes of
customers ΩπS and Ω
π




available for customers belonging to set ΩπS, and likewise,
ξπL
ξπ
·y for customers belonging
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where D is the random total demand.
We require a final assumption to be able to formulate the expression for the rate of
early and late returns. This is due to the fact that the return behavior depends on the
specific customer types in ΩπS and Ω
π
L that receive the product. For example, though
the salvage value of returns from types θ1 and θ2 (where θ1 < θ2 and θ1, θ2 ∈ ΩπS)
is the same, selling the product to the former customer type will result in a lower
probability of return. Hence, as before, expressing the rate of returns requires keeping
track of which specific customer types receive the product. To address this issue, we
assume that customers in ΩπS have equal chances of receiving the product, and similarly,
customers in ΩπL have equal chances of receiving the product.
Under this last assumption, the expected return probability ψπS of a customer se-
lected at random among all who purchased in ΩπS is:




p− V − θ
TS
− rπ(θ)














Similarly, the expected return probability ψπL of a customer selected randomly from
those who purchased in ΩπL is:




p− V − θ
TL
− rπ(θ)














Note that, due to our assumption, these expected return probabilities do not depend
on the actual sales from ΩπS or Ω
π














Since (4.10) distinguishes between early returns (the first term which has salvage value
s′) and late returns (the second term whose salvage value is s), we are able to compute
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the expected total salvage value.
To complete the specification of the firm’s expected profit, we need to determine
the expected total refunds that the firm will issue for product returns. Let RπS and
RπL are the expected return fees collected from a customer selected at random from
those who purchased in ΩπS and Ω
π








































Putting everything together, the firm’s expected total profit is given by:





























L returns salvaged at s













unsold items salvaged at s
Simplifying, we get:





· [(p− s′ −RπS) ξπSψπS + (p− s−RπL) ξπLψπL]
)
· Emin (y, ξπD)
(4.13)
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The firm’s problem is to choose (y, π) so as to maximize its expected profit Π(y, π) in
(4.13).
We next discuss how the return policy affects the firm’s expected profit. To do this,




· [(p− s′ −RπS) ξπSψπS + (p− s−RπL) ξπLψπL] . (4.14)
Then, we have:
Π(y, π) = (s− c) · y + (p− p̃π − s) · Emin (y, ξπD) (4.15)
We will assume that for all return strategies, p̃π ≤ p− s and c ≤ p− p̃π, as otherwise,
it is optimal to keep zero inventory. Comparing (4.15) with the profit in a traditional
newsvendor setting, it seems at first glance that implementing a return policy reduces a
firm’s profit since it reduces the effective price at which the product is sold by p̃π, while
also reducing the demand. However, this is not true since the traditional newsvendor
setting does not model customer choice, so all customers are willing to buy the product
at price p even without the option of returns. In our setting, if price p > V is offered
without the option for returns, no customer will buy the product so the expected profit
is zero. 4 Given a fixed price, the effect that a return policy has on the expected profit
is two fold: first, it limits the effective demand, as some customers may choose to not
buy the product due to higher price in spite of the return option; and second, allowing
returns reduces the effective revenue, as the firm loses the sale and only obtains the
salvage value of the product and any return fee it may have charged.
These effects demonstrate the tradeoff in setting a return policy – imposing a lenient
return policy (i.e., by increasing the return window or by reducing the return fee)
encourages more people to buy (reflected in a higher ξπ); however, it also increases the
revenue loss p̃π by either a lower salvage value or a higher rate of return. Strict return
policies can serve to keep the revenue loss due to returns low, however it reduces
the effective demand due to increased hassle in returns. Janakiraman and Syrdal
(2016) advise that retailers “should approach return policies as a balancing act between
increasing demand and limiting returns”; we thus capture the essence of return policies
through our model as a tradeoff between limiting demand and limiting the revenue loss
from returns.
4Offering returns allows the firm to charge a higher price p > V than in the case where no returns
are offered. For the purpose of this study, we assume that the price is exogenous to the model (we
discuss optimizing the price when no-returns option is also offered in Section 4.7).
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We have the following Proposition that establishes the structure of the profit func-
tion given a return strategy π.
Proposition 4.4.2 Given a return strategy π, the expected profit function Π(y, π) is
concave in y, with the optimal inventory level y∗(π) given by:






Thus, the problem of optimizing the expected profit can be restated as a problem
where the return strategy π is the only variable. However, optimizing Π(y∗(π), π) can
be complicated. In fact, even when the inventory level y is fixed, it is not immediately
clear what the optimal return policy π∗(y) looks like. In the following sections, we
solve these problems under various cases:
1. Blanket Return Policies (πSB, and πLB) where all customers are offered the same
return policy,
2. Menu of Return Policies (πM) where all customers can choose among a set of
return policies, and this set is the same for all customers,
3. Personalized Return Policies (π∗) where the return policy is specific to each cus-
tomer type
4.5 Return Policies without Customer-Specific In-
formation
In this section, we assume that all customers regardless of their type are offered the
same return policy. This can be because either the firm does not have information
about the individual customer hassle costs, or because the firm chooses not to imple-
ment a customer-specific return policy. Mathematically, we assume that the firm only
knows the distribution of customer types G, but that the return policy π = (T, r) is
independent of the customer type θ. As in Section 4.4.2, we ignore the no-returns
option (T∅) since it is inconsequential to the profit function in these cases.
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4.5.1 Blanket Policies
A typical practice seen in retail is to offer the same return policy π = (T, r) to every
customer. A natural question is: if the firm imposes a blanket return policy, should
the return window be short or long? By shortening the return window, the firm can
earn a higher salvage value for returned products; however, this is at the cost of a lower
demand rate since the option of buying the product with a short return window is less
attractive. In this section, we will investigate the conditions under which a firm should
impose a short return window or a long return window.
We start with a simple result. The following corollary of Proposition 4.4.1 es-
tablishes the customer types that are willing to buy under a blanket return policy
π = (T, r):
Corollary 4.5.1 The set of customer types willing to buy the product under blanket
return policy π = (T, r) is Ω =
{







We next compare two blanket return policies:
1. The Short Blanket Policy, where all customers are offered πSB = (TS, rS), and
2. The Long Blanket Policy, where all customers are offered πLB = (TL, rL)
Using Corollary 4.5.1 to calculate customer parameters that should be substituted
in Equation 4.15, the expected profits of the firm given inventory level y and return
fees rSB, rLB are given by:



















p̃SB = (p− s′ − rSB) · ψSB (4.19)
p̃LB = (p− s− rLB) · ψLB (4.20)
Note that early returns under πSB are salvaged at price s′, whereas late returns under
πLB are salvaged at price s, however unsold inventory are salvaged at price s in both
cases.
Given an inventory level y ≥ 0, let ΠSB(y) and ΠLB(y) denote the optimal expected
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profit under a short-blanket and a long-blanket policy, respectively. That is,
ΠSB(y) = max
rS∈[0,K̄]
Π(y, TS, rS) (4.21)
ΠLB(y) = max
rL∈[0,K̄]
Π(y, TL, rL) (4.22)
We have the following Proposition which sheds a light on the choice of blanket policy
based on the salvage price s′:
Proposition 4.5.1 Let ∆Π(y) = ΠSB(y)−ΠLB(y) denote the difference in the optimal
expected profits under a short blanket policy and a long blanket policy. Then,
1. For low values of s′ (close to s), ∆Π(y) ≤ 0, so the firm should impose a long
blanket policy, and
2. ∆Π(y) is monotonically increasing in s′.
The proposition implies that shortening return windows can lead to higher profits for
products that lose value quickly with the time they spend with the customer. For
products that have a relatively stable value over time (e.g. non-perishable consumer
goods), longer return windows are more profitable as they boost sales by lowering the
hassle cost of return. However for products that do not lose value and can be resold
efficiently, shorter return windows may be preferable due to lower rates of return and
increased values for returned goods.
While Proposition 4.5.1 provides guidance for the firm to choose between short and
long window policies, it does not provide any information about the optimal return fee
that the firm has to charge to maximize profits. Let y∗(r) denote the optimal inventory
level for a blanket policy that charges a return fee of r with a return window of T ,
given by Equation 4.16:






The effect of increasing r on y∗(r) is characterized by two effects: first, the demand
effect, which is due to the decrease in the demand rate ξ(r), and second, the revenue
effect, which is due to the decrease in the revenue loss p̃(r). The following Proposition
establishes the structure of the expected profit function in terms of the return fee r.
Proposition 4.5.2 Given a return window T , when the demand effect of increasing
























Figure 4.2: Figure showing the decision tree for a customer of hassle-type θ, when
offered a menu of policies (πM,S, πM,L).
in r. Furthermore, there exists a threshold c̄ such that whenever c > c̄, it is optimal
for the firm to charge a return fee r∗ > 0. For low values of c, it is only optimal for
the firm to offer full refunds (r∗ = 0) when the revenue loss due to returns is not too
large.
4.5.2 Menu of Policies
While blanket policies are commonly seen in practice, in the absence of customer-
specific information, the firm can also offer a menu of policies and allow customers to
choose the policy that suits them best. We analyze the case where the firm offers two
policies πM,S : (TS, rS) and π
M,L : (TL, rL).
The decision tree of the customer’s decision is shown in Figure 4.2.
As the customers are free to choose their return policy, they choose the policy
that maximizes their expected utility. First, following Proposition 4.4.1, we have the
following Corollary:




























Figure 4.3: Figure showing the customer adoption under a menu of policies
(πM,S, πM,L). Customer θ1 (in red) buys with policy π
M,S, and customer θ2 (in green)
buys with policy πM,L. The darker lines represent the choice of customers correspond-
ing to the option that yields the highest expected utility (or lowest return disutility).
customers with θ > θM,L will never buy the product under π
M,L.
Corollary 4.5.2 is illustrated in Figure 4.2. Note that a customer type θ will only
buy if her disutility from product returns is less than the threshold K̄. The figure
plots the return disutility as a linear function of θ (each return policy in the menu
is associated with one disutility function). θM,S and θM,L are the points where these
disutility functions cross K̄. The figure also shows that the fee charged for product
returns coincides with the vertical intercept of the disutility function. So increasing
the fee charged for product returns will result in a shift up of the disutility function
(i.e., less customers would be willing to buy).
Given the option between πM,S and πM,L, a customer will choose the return policy
that results in the lower disutility of product returns. Hence, we can use the lower
envelope of the two return disutility functions in Figure 4.3 to determine which return
policy each customer type will choose. This is formalized in the following proposition:
Proposition 4.5.3 Let ΩM,S and ΩM,L denote the sets of customers who buy the prod-
uct under πM,S and πM,L, respectively, when offered the menu of return policies. As-






1. ΩM,S = {θ ≤ θM,SL},
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The conditions of Proposition 4.5.3 are needed so that the customer choice is non-
trivial. Note that we require rS ≤ rL since, otherwise, all customers will choose πM,L





+ rL ≤ K̄.
Let Π(y, πM) denote the expected profit under the menu of policies πM , and let


















, ∀y ≥ 0.
Interestingly, Proposition 4.5.4 shows that if the firm is able to optimize the refund
fees, its profit from offering a menu of return policies is higher than what it can earn
when it imposes a blanket return policy. Thus the firm can achieve higher expected
profits by allowing customers to choose from a menu of policies, rather than offering a
single blanket policy.
4.6 Personalized Return Policies with Customer-
Specific Information
In this Section, we establish important structural results about the optimal personalized
return strategy that the firm should follow to maximize its expected profits. In order to
understand the optimal policy better, and to contrast with industry practices, we first
analyze the case where the retailer offers full refunds (i.e., r = 0), but can personalize
the return window according to the customer types.
4.6.1 Personalized Return Policies with Full Refunds
In the case of the firm offering full refunds, we have rπ(θ) = 0 for all θ, but the firm












Figure 4.4: Figure showing the optimal personalized policy under full refunds. The
dotted regions correspond to customers not buying the product.
Equation 4.13 for the case of full refunds as follows:




· [(p− s′) ξπSψπS + (p− s) ξπLψπL]
)
· Emin (y, ξπD)
(4.25)
We have the following Proposition that establishes the structure of the optimal policy
π∗,F :
Proposition 4.6.1 Given inventory level y ≥ 0, there exists an optimal policy such
that:
1. For any θ ≤ K̄TS, if T ∗,F (θ) = T∅, then for any other θ′ < θ, T ∗,F (θ′) = T∅.
2. For any θ ≤ K̄TL, if T ∗,F (θ) = TS, then for any other θ′ < θ, T ∗,F (θ′) = TS or
T ∗,F (θ′) = T∅.
3. If θ ≤ K̄TS, T ∗,F (θ) 6= TL.
We restate the proposition in the following Corollary:
Corollary 4.6.1 Given an inventory level y ≥ 0, the optimal return policy π∗,F that
maximizes the expected cost has a threshold structure:
π∗,F =

T∅, if 0 ≤ θ ≤ θ∗,F1
TS, if θ
∗,F





2 < θ ≤ K̄TL
(4.26)
where 0 ≤ θ∗,F1 ≤ K̄TS ≤ θ
∗,F
2 ≤ K̄TL.
This paints an intuitive picture of the optimal policy, shown in Figure 4.4. We see
that the optimal policy bans customers of low-hassle types from buying the product,
which is consistent with the strategies seen in practice by Amazon.com and Costco,
who identify customers who return frequently and ban them from purchasing products.
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We also note that there is another set of customers that may not end up purchasing
the products – as opposed to low-hassle customers for whom offering the option of
return is too lenient, we have customers for whom offering the long-return window is
too lenient. As a result, they are only offered the short-return window, and hence they
do not purchase the product.
4.6.2 Personalized Return Policies with General Refunds
We now move on to the general case where return fees can be applied to customers. We
first establish the importance of return fees. It is apparent that the expected profit can
be increased, if the effective revenue loss due to returns p̃π can be decreased (keeping ξπ
the same). One way of doing this is to increase the return fee for customers – increasing
return fees can reduce the rate of returns, as the utility in returning the item decreases.
Additional revenue is also obtained from returning customers in the form of increased
return fees. The following lemma establishes the dependency of the effective revenue
loss on the return policy:
Lemma 4.6.1 Let π1 and π2 be two return policies such that





2. for any θ with rπ2(θ) ≤ K̄− θ
Tπ(θ)
, it is also true that rπ2(θ) ≤ rπ1(θ) ≤ K̄− θ
Tπ(θ)
.
Then, p̃π1 ≤ p̃π2.
The lemma solidifies the intuition behind the benefits of increasing the return fees.
Keeping the set of purchasing customers fixed, increasing the return fee for these cus-
tomers can increase the expected profit. It is to be noted that the firm cannot charge
customers drastically high return fees, as this can dissuade the customers from pur-
chasing the product in the first place.
Let π∗ be the optimal personalized return strategy which maximizes the expected
profit given any inventory level y (π∗’s dependence on y is abbreviated for notational
clarity), and π∗ assigns each θ to a return window T ∗(θ) and a return fee r∗(θ). Let
Ωπ = ΩS ∪ ΩL denote the set of customers that will buy the product.
With the help of Lemma 4.6.1, we have the following Proposition which establishes
the structure of the optimal personalized return policy π∗ given any inventory level y:
Proposition 4.6.2 For any given y, there exists a profit maximizing return policy π∗,
corresponding to return fee r∗(θ) and return window T ∗(θ) for every θ such that the
following are true:
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1. ∀θ ∈ Ωπ, − θ
T ∗(θ)
− r∗(θ) = −K̄.







3. If θ ∈ Ωπ, then for all θ′ < θ, θ′ ∈ Ωπ.
Proposition 4.6.2 (1) reiterates the result from Lemma 4.6.1, by stating the cus-
tomers should be charged the maximum return fee that they are willing to accept to
purchase the product. However, it stops short of addressing which customers ought to
be allowed to purchase the product. This is addressed by Proposition 4.6.2 (2) and (3),
which state that customers with lower values of θ are preferred by the firm to purchase
the product. To understand these better, we have the following Corollary:
Corollary 4.6.2 An optimal policy that has the properties in Proposition 4.6.2 can be




TS, K̄ − θTS
)
, if θ ≤ min(θ∗, θ∗1)(
TL, K̄ − θTL
)
, if min(θ∗, θ∗1) < θ ≤ θ∗











, TS · K̄
)
(4.28)
Note that for any θ ≤ θ̃S (where θ̃S = TS · K̄), two policies can satisfy the condition
in Proposition 4.6.2 (1):
(




TL, K̄ − θTL
)
. Both these policies yield
the same return disutility to the customer, and hence the probability of return is also
the same. When the customer returns under TS, a higher salvage value s
′ is obtained,
and a return fee of K̄− θ
TS
is collected. However, when the customer returns under TL,
a lower salvage value s is obtained, but a higher return fee K̄ − θ
TL
is collected. Thus,
θ∗1 is the value at which these two are equal, which yields Equation 4.28.




Finally, since any return policy is a feasible solution to the personalized return























Figure 4.5: Figure showing the structure of the optimal personalized policy with general
refunds. First, a threshold θ∗ is chosen, which determines the demand rate. Then,
customer θ1 (in red) is offered a policy (TS, K̄ − θ1TS ), and customer θ2 (in green) is
offered a policy (TL, K̄ − θ2TL ).
Proposition 4.6.3 Π∗(y) ≥ ΠM(y), ∀y ≥ 0.





≤ ΠM(y) ≤ Π∗(y), ∀y ≥ 0 (4.30)
Additionally, since customers are offered the maximum return fee that they are willing
to pay, the firm extracts all the surplus from the customers. The structure of the
optimal strategy is illustrated in Figure 4.5.
Note that the optimal policy prioritizes low-hassle type customers as opposed to
high-hassle customers, which is in direct contrast to the case where full refunds are
offered. This is because, when partial refunds are allowed, it is more profitable to
extract the surplus from low-hassle customers than to ban them from purchasing the
product. This suggests that firms such as Amazon.com and Costco may be better off in
offering strict return policies to customers who return frequently rather than banning




4.7.1 No Returns Option
Note that we have trivialized the no-returns option so far, as whenever p > V , when
customers are offered the no-returns option they will choose to not buy the product.
However, we now consider a case where the no-returns option is provided at a lower
price equal to V . This is common practice for retailers like Jet.com that provide the
no-return option at a lower price compared to the regular option of buying the item
with a return option.
We can extend our analyses easily to the case where customers have an option
to buy the product with the no-return option at a lower price V , compared to the
option of buying the product at the regular price of p > V under a return policy π.
In this case, any customer that did not buy in the original formulation will now buy
the product under the no-returns option at price V , as this gives them a non-negative
(zero) expected utility.





where Ωπ∅ := (Ω
π
S ∪ ΩπL)





That is, ξπ∅ = 1− ξπS − ξπL. The firm’s expected total profit is thus:
Π(y, π) = −c · y + p · Emin (ξπSy, ξπSD) + p · Emin (ξπLy, ξπLD) + V · Emin (ξπ∅ y, ξπ∅D)












+ s · E (ξπSy − ξπSD)
+ + s · E (ξπLy − ξπLD)
+ + s · E (ξπ∅ y − ξπ∅D)
+
Simplifying, we get:
Π(y, π) = (s− c) · y + (p− p̃π − s) · Emin (y,D) (4.32)
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where p̃π = [(p− V ) · (1− ξπS − ξπL) + (p− s′ −RπS) ξπSψπS + (p− s−RπL) ξπLψπL].
We note that all the results in our paper continue to hold in this setting. In
addition, as can be seen from Equation 4.32, the inventory and return policy decisions
are decoupled, as the total demand rate is equal to 1. Thus, we can first optimize the











We also note that in some cases (such as personalized return policy with partial
refunds), where the optimal return policy has a simple structure, we can obtain the
optimal threshold in closed-form in terms of the price. This also implies that we can
find the optimum price that the firm should charge to maximize profits, as the price
optimization can also be done independent of the inventory situation.
4.8 Conclusion
With recent innovations in retailing due to the rapid rise in sales conducted over the
internet, retail firms are increasingly focusing on personalizing customer experiences
through collected historical data about customer behavior. Personalized policies have
been implemented in various areas such as pricing, promotions, recommendations, bun-
dle deals, etc., and firms are competing to innovate in this space. We address the
important problem of consumer returns in retail by analyzing the value of personalized
return policies that are tailored based on customers’ historical return behavior.
When the firm does not have access to customer’s individual behavior information,
we show that the firm can achieve higher expected profits by offering customers a menu
of policies as compared to a single blanket policy. Equipped with information about
individual customers, the firm can offer personalized return policies – we show that
when the firm offers full refunds, customers with low-hassle types (those that return
frequently under lenient policies) ought to be banned from returning items, as seen in
practice with firms like Amazon.com and Costco banning customers for returning too
frequently. However, when the firm can personalize refunds, we find that it is better to
sell to the low-hassle customers, as they can be charged higher return fees as compared
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to high-hassle customers.
Several future directions exist. One stream of research that can follow is personal-
izing other features that affect customers’ experience. One such feature where blanket
policies are common is shipping policies, where firms apply one policy to every cus-
tomer irrespective of their locations. Another avenue for customization is fulfillment
options, where the firm can strategically offer incentives for customers to select fulfill-
ment options that reduce the firm’s fulfillment costs.
While our model tries to capture different features such as product value uncertainty
and hassle due to return policies, customer behavior in reality can be quite complex.
For instance, Janakiraman and Syrdal (2016) show that increasing the return window
can lead to reduced return rates, which is attributed to endowment effect – customers’
valuation for the product increases with the time that they spend keeping the product.
This information asymmetry cannot be captured in our model, as customers do not
anticipate the endowment effect while deciding to purchase the item, but the firm
does. An additional difficulty that arises in this feature is heterogeneity in customer’s
endowment effects arising from keeping the product for longer times. We leave this as
an opportunity for future research.
As more and more firms are getting access to data about their customers from
various sources (in-house, social media, third-party companies, etc.), personalization
is at the forefront of retail innovation. While personalization can improve customer
satisfaction in certain areas (product recommendations), as we show in our study,
personalization is not always beneficial to customers – the firm’s effort to maximize
profits through personalized strategies based on data about customers’ behavior comes
directly at the cost of customer surplus. This provides policy implications for usage




Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Proofs
A.1.1 Proof of Proposition 2.5.1
We first observe that given a realization of the demands, the optimal cost can be
obtained using a linear program. The proof follows in similar fashion to Seifert et al.
(2006, Proposition 1). Consider the linear program P (y1, y2, D̃), where zi represents
the amount of inventory at Ri used to fulfill its in-store demand, and zij represents the
amount of inventory of Ri used to fulfill online demand from region j.


























subject to zi +
∑
j
zij ≤ yi, ∀i
zi ≤ Dis, ∀i∑
j
zji ≤ Dio, ∀i
zi, zij ≥ 0, ∀i, j
(A.1)
To show that the function P represents CIIP for a given demand D̃, notice
that the coefficients of the decision variables zi, zii, zij,(j 6=i) in the objective func-
tion follow (−h − ps) < (s − h − po) < (sij − h − po), under the conditions in Ψ
in Equation 2.4. The linear program can be solved greedily, and it is easy to see
that the optimal solution is given by zi = min (yi, Dis), zii = min
(









Djo − (yj −Djs)+
)+)
.
The sequence of fulfillment is clear: in-store demand is fulfilled first, followed by on-
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line demand from the same region, and finally cross-shipment to other regions. Hence,






. The objective function is linear and the
constraint set in (A.1) is a polyhedral convex set with linear constraints, and hence by
Heyman and Sobel (2003, Proposition B-4), P is jointly convex in y1, y2, D̃. As the
expectation of a convex function is convex, it follows that CIIP (y1, y2) is jointly convex
in y1 and y2.
The structure of CIIP as an expectation of a linear program draws direct comparison
with the value function in newsvendor networks (van Mieghem and Rudi, 2002). Similar
to Proposition 2 in Harrison and van Mieghem (1999), the gradient of the function









where λ(y1, y2, D̃) is the dual-price vector corresponding to the constraints with y1 and
y2 in (A.1). The 4-dimensional demand space can be divided into domains Ωk (y1, y2)
such that in each domain, the optimal values of the decision variables zi, zii and zij
are linear in y1 and y2, and hence the dual-price vector λ(y1, y2, D̃) is constant (refer
to Appendix B for a discussion). The first-order conditions are:







We can interchange the gradient and expectation on the right hand side of Equation A.2
(see Harrison and van Mieghem (1999) for a proof), and thus Equation A.2 becomes








= (h, h)T −
∑
k
λkP (Ωk (y1, y2))




for D̃ ∈ Ωk (y1, y2). 
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A.1.2 Proof of Proposition 2.5.2
Based on the approximation used to formulate CLB, the difference in costs between
CIIP and CLB is:
CIIP (y)− CLB(y)





































The first inequality follows from : a+ + b+ ≥ (a + b)+, and further simplification uses
x+ − (−x)+ = x. 
The proof follows for any number of stores, as long as the cross-shipping cost is a
constant and s12 < h+ po. The proof also follows when s12 is reduced to s, as done in
Equation 2.14.
A.1.3 Proof of Proposition 2.5.3
A similar result is proved in Dong and Rudi (2004, Lemma 1), who consider the case
of traditional transshipment. Substituting yDIP into the first order condition for CLB






+ (s12 − s)FDi(yDIPi ) + (ps − po + s)FDis((yDIPi )− ps













where Φ is the CDF of the standard normal distribution. The equality follows from the
fact that yDIP satisfies Equation 2.7, and the normality of demands, as we can write
yDIPi = µi+z
DIPσi, where Di ∼ N (µi, σi), and D ∼ N (µ, σ). As
∑
i
σi/σ ≥ 1, it follow







2ρlσiσj, where ρl is the correlation coefficient between locations, y
DIP
is optimal to CLB and CIIP when ρl = 1. 
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A.1.4 Proof of Proposition 2.5.4
Due to similarities to Dong and Rudi (2004), we have a similar solution where the
optimal inventory at each location is at the same critical fractile of the location’s






ps − po + s
)
, ∀i ∈ Sso (A.3)
where m = ps−(h+po−s)FDS (
∑
j∈S
yLBNj ). Substituting Equation A.3 into the definition










h+ po − s
)
Solving this yields a unique solution for m, which in turn yields a unique solution
yLBN, where each stores stocks at the same critical fractile of their in-store demand,
as seen from Equation A.3. 
For OFCs (i ∈ So), yLBNi = 0, as otherwise, the value of m is forced to be ps−po+s,
which renders Equation A.3 to infinity.
A.1.5 Proof of Proposition 2.5.5
Consider a square of unit area in which N stores are uniformly distributed. Let the
square be divided into
√
N identical cells, such that each cell contains
√
N stores. The








. The superscript l for a demand variable
(e.g. Dlis) denotes that the demand belongs to a store in cell l.
Let CLB
′
be the cost function obtained from CIIP by lowering all cross-shipping
costs to the within-region shipping cost s. Let CIIPc and CLB
′
c be the functions ob-
tained by restricting CIIP and CLB
′
respectively, so that cross-shipments can only be
made between two stores belonging to the same cell. Clearly, CIIP (y) ≤ CIIPc(y) and
CLB
′
(y) ≤ CLB′c(y) for any y ≥ 0. Let g(y,N) denote the cost incurred by N stores





h (y −Di)+ + ps (Dis − y)+
+ po
(


















N). Let CSij(y,N) denote the cross-shipped
quantity between stores i and j, when there are N stores with order-up-to quantity
y each (CSlij when defined within a cell). Note that both the functions g and CSij
also depend on the demand vector, but the dependency is ignored for notational con-





































































The expression for CLB
′
is written as the sum of CLB
′
c which restricts cross-shipping to
within each cell, and the cost of the additional cross-shipped units with this restriction
removed. We know that CLB(yIIPH) ≤ CLB′(yIIPH) ≤ CIIP (yIIPH) ≤ CIIPc(y), where










































































for the first term, and
CLB
′



























The first term on the right hand side vanishes to zero as N → ∞, as f(d) → 0 as
d→ 0. To simplify the second term, we need the following lemmas.
Lemma A.1.1 If h < po − s, then yIIPH > µ where µ = µs + µo, and if additionally
h < (ps − po + s)Fs(µ),
yIIPH → F−1s
(
ps − po + s− h
ps − po + s
)
∈ (0,∞), as N →∞
Proof: Lemma 1 is proved from the optimality equations of CLBN (Equation 2.15) for
identical stores:






+ (ps − po + s)FD1s(yIIPH) = ps
From the above equation, when h < po − s, we have






+ (ps − po + s)
This simplifies to yield yIIPH > µ. Now, by applying the central limit theorem as





→ 1, and the result follows. Note
that the asymptotic solution should also satisfy yIIPH > µ, which translates to the
condition h < (ps − po + s)Fs(µ). 
Lemma A.1.2 When h < po− s and h < ps− (po− s), and the demands are bounded


















































→ 0, as N →∞
The final inequality follows from the Hoeffding bound for tail probabilities Hoeffding
(1963), as yIIPH > µ and demands are bounded, and the limit exists as yIIPH ap-
proaches a finite positive quantity as N → ∞ by Lemma 1. The expectation in the





































































The last inequality follows from Lemma 2 and the boundedness of the demands as



























→ 1, as N →∞
(A.5)




























Similar to what was done to bound the second term in Equation A.4, we can show




















































h+ po − s
ps − po + s
)
(A.6)
Thus, from Equations A.5 and A.6, as N →∞, we have
CIIPc(yIIPH)
CLBN(yIIPH)
≤ 1 + h+ po − s





ps − po + s
The final step follows from CIIPc(yIIPH) ≥ CIIP (yIIPH) = CIIPH . 
The result may hold subject to some generalizations, such as the unit square can
be replaced with any finite area, and non-identical cells as long as the number of stores
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in each cell grows to infinity as N → ∞. The resulting cases may call for a more
complicated proof, and is outside the scope of this study.
A.1.6 Proof of Proposition 2.6.1
Consider the single period case, where items are ordered at the start of the pe-
riod, and online demands are fulfilled over T fulfillment epochs. Assume that
CT+1(x
T+1, D̃T+1) = 0 without loss of generality. Thus, CT (x
T, D̃T ) is given by a
simple linear program which is jointly convex in (xT, D̃T ). This leads to the base case
result that CT (x
T, D̃T ) is convex in xT given any D̃T . By backward induction, we
need to show that Ct(x
t, D̃t) is convex in xt for any given D̃t, with the assumption
that Ct+1(x
t+1, D̃t+1) is convex in xt+1 given any D̃t+1. The cost-to-go function can
be represented by Ct(x
t, D̃t) = min
zt,Zt∈∆
G(xt, D̃t, zt,Zt), where
G(xt, D̃t, zt,Zt) =
[







Consider any µ ≥ 0, and xt1,xt2 ≥ 0. Let (zti ,Zti ) = arg min
zt,Zt∈∆
G(xti , D̃t, zt,Zt).
Note that P is a linear function in its variables (Equation 2.2), and ECt+1(xt+1, D̃t+1)
is convex in xt+1, as expectation preserves convexity. Let x̄t = µxt1 + (1 − µ)xt2,



























2) are feasible in ∆. The second inequality follows from the convexity of P .
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As ECt+1(xt+1, D̃t+1) is convex in xt+1, we have:
ECt+1
(








































Thus, from Equation A.7, we have:
Ct(x̄




t) + (1− µ)Ct(xt2, D̃t)







A.1.7 Proof of Proposition 2.6.2
Let the single period cost function be given by CIIP (y) = EC1(y, D̃), and let yIIP be
the optimal solution. When the initial level of inventory xi at region i before ordering,
the cost function is as follows:
V IIP (x) = min
y≥x
CIIP (y) = CIIP (yIIP )
As yIIP minimizes the function CIIP , for any {x : x ≤ yIIP}, it is optimal to order
up to yIIP . We ignore cases where xi > y
IIP
i for some i, as eventually the system is
brought to the state x ≤ yIIP .
For the multiple period case, we have M time periods: m = 1, 2, ..,M . The in-store
demands {Dmis ,m > 0} and online demands {Dmio ,m > 0} are assumed to be i.i.d. The
available inventory at the end of a review period serves as the initial inventory for
the next review period, and we assume zero purchasing costs. The discount factor is
δ ∈ (0, 1].
The proof is by induction, and similar to the proof of Proposition 4 in van Mieghem
and Rudi (2002). If we show that V IIPm (x
m), the expected cost-to-go function evaluated
in review period m with the initial inventory xm, is convex and affine, a stationary base
stock policy would be optimal. For the M + 1th review period, the cost function is
V IIPM+1(x
M+1) = 0 (assuming zero purchasing costs) which is trivially convex and affine
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in xM+1. Let V IIPm+1 be convex and affine in x
m+1. The cost function for review period
m is:
V IIPm (x) = min
y≥x
[









where f (y, D) is the vector of ending inventories. D̃ is the demand vector constituting
the in-store and online demands for both the regions. As taking expectation preserves
convexity, and the sum of convex functions is convex, U IIPm (y) is convex in y. It only





≤ y ≤ yIIP . We have
U IIPm (y) = C










as V IIPm+1 is affine in x
m+1 and the purchasing cost is zero. Clearly, y = yIIP minimizes
U IIPm for y ≤ yIIP . Thus, V IIPm (x) = max
y≥x
U IIPm (y) is affine (constant) in x for all
x ≤ yIIP , and hence a stationary base-stock policy yIIP is optimal if x ≤ yIIP . If
there is some i for which xi > y
IIP
i , the optimal policy will be more complicated, but
eventually, the system comes back to x ≤ yIIP . 
A.2 Demand Regions for the IIP Solution
We illustrate the identification of demand regions in which the dual vector λ is constant
(as discussed in Section 2.5.1.2) and the calculation of the corresponding probabilities.
For any given (y1, y2), the demand space (D1s, D1o, D2s, D2o) can be divided into a
number of independent regions. Based on the values taken by the variables in the
optimal solution in (A.1), Table A.1 shows the different cases that are possible given
y1 and y2. From these cases, the independent demand regions are listed in Table
A.2 along with the constant dual prices in those regions. The underlined cases are
redundant, and can be discarded while calculating the probability for each region.
Table A.1: Table showing the various demand cases based on the values of y1, y2
A B C D
1 y1 < D1s D1s ≤ y1 < D1 D1 ≤ y1 < D1 +D2o y1 ≥ D1 +D2o
2 y2 < D2s D2s ≤ y2 < D2 D2 ≤ y2 < D2 +D1o y2 ≥ D2 +D1o
3 y1 + y2 < D1 +D2 y1 + y2 ≥ D1 +D2
The dual prices λ1, λ2 are the shadow prices of the constraints which contain y1 and y2
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Table A.2: Table showing the various demand regions and the corresponding constant
dual-prices.
Region Case λ1 λ2 Region Case λ1 λ2
Ω1 A1,A2,A3 h+ ps h+ ps Ω11 C1,A2,A3 h+ po − s12 h+ ps
Ω2 A1,B2,A3 h+ ps h+ po − s Ω12 C1,B2,A3 h+ po − s12 h+ po − s
Ω3 A1,C2,A3 h+ ps h+ po − s12 Ω13 C1,B2,B3 0 s12 − s
Ω4 A1,D2,A3 h+ ps 0 Ω14 C1,C2,B3 0 0
Ω5 A1,D2,B3 h+ ps 0 Ω15 C1,D2,B3 0 0
Ω6 B1,A2,A3 h+ po − s h+ ps Ω16 D1,A2,A3 0 h+ ps
Ω7 B1,B2,A3 h+ po − s h+ po − s Ω17 D1,A2,B3 0 h+ ps
Ω8 B1,C2,A3 h+ po − s h+ po − s12 Ω18 D1,B2,B3 0 s12 − s
Ω9 B1,C2,B3 s12 − s 0 Ω19 D1,C2,B3 0 0
Ω10 B1,D2,B3 s12 − s 0 Ω20 D1,D2,B3 0 0
respectively, namely the first set of constraints zi+
2∑
j=1
zij ≤ yi,∀i in the linear program
in (A.1), and can be obtain in a standard fashion from linear programming theory. For
example, for the demand regions with the case D1, that is, y1 ≥ D1 +D2o, irrespective
of the value of y2, there will be inventory left over at retail store 1 at the end of the
period. Thus the constraint z1 +
2∑
j=1
z1j ≤ y1 will not bind, and hence λ1 = 0.
The probability for each region is calculated as follows, when demands follow normal
distributions. The region is expressed as an inequality of the form RkD̃ <= SkY ,
where D̃ = [D1s, D1o, D2s, D2o]
ᵀ and Y = [y1, y2]
ᵀ. For example, Ω3 = (A1, C2) =
{y1 < D1s, D2 ≤ y2 < D2 +D1o}. This can be expressed as:
−1 0 0 00 0 1 1













RkD̃ is multivariate normal with mean Rkµ and covariance matrix RkΣΣ
ᵀRᵀk, where
µ and Σ are the mean and covariance matrices of D̃. The probability of region k reduces
to evaluating the cumulative distribution function of AkD̃ at BkY . For general demand
distributions, numerical methods have to be employed.
113
A.3 Additional Details for Numerical Analyses
All numerical analyses were done on a desktop computer (i7-3770 CPU @3.7GHz,
16GB RAM). The total market is assumed to be the top 300 most populous cities in
mainland US. The demands for the OFCs are calculated based on the population not
covered by omnichannel stores. This online demand is allocated to each OFC based
on the optimal throughput rates estimated by Chicago Consulting (2013).
A.3.1 Simulation Procedure
A brief overview of the simulation is listed below:
1. The parameters for demands in each fulfillment epoch are calculated based on
review-period demands estimated from population data. The starting inventory
level vectors yDIP and yIIPH are calculated using the demand information based
on Equation 2.7 and Algorithm 1 respectively.
2. We generate a sample of size 104, where each sample is a realization of demands
in a review period, although fulfillment decisions in each fulfillment epoch are
made without knowing future demands. For each sample, we iterate over steps
3-7, and take the sample averages as approximations for expectations.
3. The fulfillment thresholds for the TF policy are calculated based on Equation
2.18. For the MF policy, these thresholds are set to zero.
4. For t = 1, . . . , T , iterate over steps 5-6. The starting inventory levels are set
based on the inventory policy followed (IIPH or DIP).
5. Implement Algorithm 2 based on the fulfillment policy followed (MF or TF) and
the corresponding thresholds calculated in Step 3.
6. At the end of each fulfillment epoch, the holding, penalty and fulfillment costs are
calculated. The ending inventory at a location becomes the starting inventory
for the next epoch.




Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Proofs
B.1.1 Proof of Lemma 3.4.2
















is jointly convex in y1, y2, as C can be expressed
as a linear program, and expectation preserves convexity. Note that C is also symmetric
with respect to y1 and y2 when the locations are identical. Thus, we have G(y1, y2) =





is an optimal solution to C∗, then so is (y∗2, y
∗













To show joint convexity of G, consider two points: (ŷ1, ŷ2) and (ȳ1, ȳ2). Let λ ∈
[0, 1]. We have:










































= λG(ŷ1, ŷ2) + (1− λ)G(ȳ1, ȳ2)
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s.t. Ef (1)= 1,
Ef (d̃j)= m, j = 1, 2,
Ef (d̃2j)= m2 + σ2, j = 1, 2,
Ef (d̃1d̃2)= m2 + ρσ2,
f(D) ≥ 0, ∀D ∈ <2.
(B.1)
Using the relation (a − b)+ = a − min(a, b), we observe that the left-hand side of
(3.8) is equivalent to














Therefore, to prove the proposition, it suffices to show that




(y −m)2 + γσ2
)
,
and that the distribution that solves (B.1) has no more than six support points.
The dual of the semi-infinite linear program (B.1) is as follows:
sup
t, u1, u2, r1, r2, v
t+m(r1 + r2) + (m
2 + σ2)(u1 + u2) + (m
2 + ρσ2)v





≤ ζ min(d1 + d2, 2y) + min(d1, y) + min(d2, y), ∀(d1, d2) ∈ <2.
A result by Smith (1995) is that strong duality holds for moment problems if the
moment vector is an interior point of the set of feasible moments. For Fmσρ, this is
true for σ > 0 and ρ ∈ (−1, 1).
Note that because d̃1 and d̃2 are interchangeable in the primal, r1 and r2 must be
116
interchangeable in the dual. The same argument applies for u1 and u2 as well. This
implies, r1 = r2 = r, and u1 = u2 = u. Thus, we have the following dual formulation:
sup
t, u, r, v
t+ 2mr + 2(m2 + σ2)u+ (m2 + ρσ2)v





≤ ζ min(d1 + d2, 2y) + min(d1, y) + min(d2, y), ∀(d1, d2) ∈ <2.
The right hand side of the constraint is a piecewise linear function in <2. For
notational brevity, define the quadratic function g(d1, d2; t, u, r, v) = t + r(d1 + d2) +
u(d21 + d
2
2) + vd1d2. Hence, the dual formulation can be equivalently reformulated as
sup
t, u, r, v
t+ 2mr + 2(m2 + σ2)u+ (m2 + ρσ2)v
s.t. g(d1, d2; t, u, r, v) ≤ (ζ + 1)(d1 + d2), ∀d1 ≤ y, d2 ≤ y
g(d1, d2; t, u, r, v) ≤ ζ(d1 + d2) + d1 + y, ∀d1 ≤ y ≤ d2, d1 + d2 ≤ 2y
g(d1, d2; t, u, r, v) ≤ ζ(d1 + d2) + y + d2, ∀d2 ≤ y ≤ d1, d1 + d2 ≤ 2y
g(d1, d2; t, u, r, v) ≤ (ζ + 1)(2y), ∀d1 ≥ y, d2 ≥ y
g(d1, d2; t, u, r, v) ≤ ζ(2y) + d1 + y, ∀d1 ≤ y ≤ d2, d1 + d2 ≥ 2y
g(d1, d2; t, u, r, v)≤ ζ(2y) + y + d2, ∀d2 ≤ y ≤ d1, d1 + d2 ≥ 2y.
(B.2)
Note that the dual feasible set is the set of all bi-quadratic functions g(x1, x2)
that are bounded above by a piecewise linear function with six facets (one for each
constraint). Let qi(x1, x2) denote the linear function for facet i, i.e., the right hand
side of the constraint i in model (B.2).
Let us consider the case where g(d1, d2) touches the piecewise linear function at
exactly 6 points, one on each facet. We will later show that this case corresponds to
the dual optimal solution. To find these points, for each i, we equate ∇g(d1, d2) =







2) gives us a condition on the dual variables for which the
two functions touch at exactly one point. We for now ignore the ranges of d1, d2 in
which each constraint is valid (we will later use these ranges to establish constraints
on the dual variables). Table B.1 gives, for each facet, the points of contact and the
condition on dual variables t, u, r, v. Note that we have the following four equations
that need to be satisfied for g(d1, d2) to touch all six facets of the piecewise linear
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t = r(r−1)(2u−v)+u4u2−v2 + ζ(2y) + y
Table B.1: Points of contact of biquadratic with each facet, and conditions on (t, u, r, v)
for biquadratic and facet to touch at exactly one point.
function:
t =
(ζ + 1− r)2
2u+ v
, (B.3)




+ 2(ζ + 1)y, (B.5)
t =
r(r − 1)(2u− v) + u
4u2 − v2
+ ζ(2y) + y. (B.6)
We use the following transformation of variables:
θ = 2u− v (B.7)
φ = 2u+ v (B.8)
We convert all the dual variables into functions of θ and φ. It directly follows that:
u = 1
4
(φ+ θ) and v = 1
2
(φ− θ).














Using (B.9) and (B.10) in (B.6), we have the following:
φ = θ (2ζ + 1) . (B.11)
Note that we have not used (B.4) yet, but substituting (B.9)–(B.11) into (B.4), we
find that (B.4) is satisfied already. That is, of the four equations (B.3)–(B.6), one of
them is linearly dependent on other three.





− yθ (2ζ + 1) , (B.12)
t =
(









θ(ζ + 1), (B.14)
v = θζ. (B.15)
Thus, we know that the dual variables need to be of this form so that the biquadratic
touches all six facets. We still need to check whether the points at which the biquadratic
touches each facet satisfies the corresponding ranges of d1, d2 in (B.2). Substituting
the values (B.12)–(B.15) of the dual variables into the touching points in Table B.1,
and observing that ζ > 0, we find that the dual variables are feasible (i.e., the touching
points are in the required range) for any θ < 0 (see Table B.2).












a = 4(y +m)(ζ + 1) (2ζ + 1) , (B.17)
b = 4 (2ζ + 1)2
[
(y −m)2 + σ2
(




c = (ζ + 1)2, (B.19)
Note that the objective function is the objective of a dual feasible solution (B.12)–




, where b > 0
since we have that ζ > 0, σ > 0, and ρ ∈ (−1, 1). Let γ := ζ+1+ζρ
2ζ+1
∈ (0, 1]. The
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d∗2 ≤ y ≤ d∗1, d∗1 + d∗2 ≥ 2y ⇔ θ < 0
Table B.2: Condition on θ so that the points of contact of biquadratic with each facet
occurs in the required range.
optimal θ∗ is given by:
θ∗ = − (ζ + 1)
2 (2ζ + 1)
√
(y −m)2 + γσ2
. (B.20)




bc), where a, b, c are according to the





(y −m)2 + γσ2
)
≤M(y), (B.21)
where the inequality follows from weak duality.
All that is left to prove the proposition is to show that, if γ(1 + ν2) ≥ 2 where
ν := 3ζ+1
ζ+1

















To construct the distribution, we use the contact points of the biquadratic to each
facet as the support points. Define zy := (y −m)/σ and Φ(zy) :=
√
z2y + γ, where we
note that Φ(zy) > zy. If we use the optimal θ
∗, defined in (B.20), to find the associated
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contact points in Table B.2, where we use the fact that θ∗ (2ζ + 1) = −1
2Φ(zy)σ
(ζ + 1), we
get the following six support points of f ∗y :
D(1) =
[
m+ (zy − Φ(zy))σ




m+ (zy − νΦ(zy))σ




m+ (zy + Φ(zy))σ




m+ (zy + Φ(zy))σ




m+ (zy − Φ(zy))σ




m+ (zy + νΦ(zy)σ
m+ (zy − Φ(zy))σ
]
We next construct probabilities for the distribution f ∗y to ensure that it is a feasible
distribution in Fmσρ. In particular, we find the probabilities π1, π2, . . . , π6 such that
the following relationships are true:
6∑
i=1


























2 + ρσ2, (B.26)
where a b = (aibi) denotes element-wise multiplication of vectors a,b.
From the equalities (B.23)–(B.26), we have the following system of linear equations:
(where for notational brevity, we drop the subscript on zy and drop the dependence of
Φ on zy)
π1 + π2 +π3 + π4 +π5 + π6 = 1
(z − Φ)π1 + (z − νΦ)π2 +(z + Φ)π3 + (z + Φ)π4 (z − Φ)π5 + (z + νΦ)π6 = 0
(z − Φ)π1 + (z + Φ)π2 +(z − νΦ)π3 + (z + Φ)π4 +(z + νΦ)π5 + (z − Φ)π6 = 0
(z − Φ)2π1 + (z − νΦ)2π2 +(z + Φ)2π3 + (z + Φ)2π4 (z − Φ)2π5 + (z + νΦ)2π6 = 1
(z − Φ)2π1 + (z + Φ)2π2 +(z − νΦ)2π3 + (z + Φ)2π4 +(z + νΦ)2π5 + (z − Φ)2π6 = 1
(z − Φ)2π1 + (z − νΦ)(z + Φ)π2 +(z − νΦ)(z + Φ)π3 + (z + Φ)2π4 +(z + νΦ)(z − Φ)π5 + (z + νΦ)(z − Φ)π6 = ρ
By simple row operations, we can show that the last equation is linearly dependent
on the others. Additionally, it is easy to see that if we interchange π2 and π3 as well as
π5 and π6, the equations remain unaltered, thus π2 = π3 and π5 = π6. Thus, the new
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Facet i Support Point Probability
1 (d∗1, d
∗
































2) = (m+ (zy − Φ(zy))σ, m+ (zy + νΦ(zy)) π
6 (d∗1, d
∗
2) = (m+ (zy + νΦ(zy))σ, m+ (zy − Φ(zy))σ) π
Table B.3: The support points and the corresponding probabilities in a worst-case
probability distribution f ∗y,π, where max(0, α1) ≤ π ≤ min(β1, β2).
system of equations are:
π1 + 2π2 +π4 + 2π5 = 1
(z − Φ)π1 + (2z + (1− ν)Φ)π2 +(z + Φ)π4 + (2z − (1− ν)Φ)π5 = 0
(z − Φ)2π1 + ((z − νΦ)2 + (z + Φ)2)π2 +(z + Φ)2π4 ((z − Φ)2 + (z + νΦ)2)π5 = 1
Since we have three equations and four unknowns, we use parameter π5 = π. Then,













2(ν − 1)(z2 + γ)
π2 = π3 = −π +
(1− γ)










− (1− γ)(3− ν)
2(ν2 − 1)(z2 + γ)
π5 = π6 = π
We need to ensure that the probabilities lie in [0, 1] (they already sum up to one














(1− γ)(ν + 1)



















(1− γ)(ν − 3)




we have that the probabilities are nonnegative for max(0, α1) ≤ π ≤ min(β1, β2). Note
that β1 ≥ 0. If β2 < 0, β1 < α1, or β2 < α2, then the set of feasible values for π is
empty. However, according to the following lemma, if γ(ν2 + 1) ≥ 2 then this set is
non-empty for all values of z.
Lemma B.1.1 If γ(ν2 + 1) ≥ 2, then β2(z) ≥ 0, α1(z) ≤ β1(z), and α1(z) ≤ β2(z) for
all z ∈ <.
Proof. Since ν − 1 = 2ζ
ζ+1





























Note that β2(z) ≥ 0 if and only if: Φ(z)(Φ(z)−z) ≥ (1−γ)(3−ν)(ν2−1) . Let w(z) = Φ(z)(1−




















implying that w(z) is a convex function minimized at z = 0 (from equating w′(z) = 0).
Thus, whenever γ ≥ (1−γ)(3−ν)
(ν2−1) , we have β2(z) ≥ 0 for all z. The sufficient condition
translates to: γ ≥ 3−ν
ν2−ν+2 .




Thus, a sufficient condition is given by: 0 ≥ 2−γ(ν
2+1)
ν2−1 , which translates to: γ(ν
2 + 1) ≥
2. Note that the condition γ ≥ (1−γ)(3−ν)
(ν2−1) is implied by γ(ν
2 + 1) ≥ 2.
β1(z) ≥ α1(z) if and only if: Φ(z)(Φ(z) + z) ≥ (1−γ)(3−ν)(ν2−1) . The left hand side can
be shown to be a convex function minimized at z = 0 from the same argument in the
case β2(z) ≥ 0. Thus, the sufficient condition is the same as the case β2(z) ≥ 0. 
Let us define f ∗y,π as the six-point distribution that is summarized in Table B.3 for
some valid π. Note that the probabilities of f ∗y,π only ensure that the distribution has
the appropriate moments to belong in Fmσρ. We also need to ensure that the strong
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2(ν − 1)(z2 + γ)
)(




−π + (1− γ)
(ν2 − 1)(z2 + γ)
)(













(1− γ)(ν − 3)






(ζ + 1)(2y)− σΦ(z)
)
(B.27)





2(ζ + 1) [m+ (z − Φ(z))σ − y]
)
+ 2(ζ + 1) [2y − 2m− σ(2z + (1− ν)Φ(z))]
= 4ζ(−σΦ(z)) + 2(ζ + 1)(−σ(1− ν)Φ(z)) (y = m+ zσ)
= 0 (1− ν = −2ζ/(ζ + 1))
Hence, for any π, the left-hand side of (B.22) with f ∗y = f
∗
y,π simplifies to
P (y) = (ζ + 1)(2y − (z + Φ(z))σ) = (ζ + 1)(y +m− Φ(z)σ)
= (ζ + 1)(y +m−
√
(y −m)2 + γσ2)
which is equal to the right-hand side of (B.22). This completes our proof. 
B.1.3 Proof of Proposition 3.4.2
Let y∗ = (y∗1, y
∗
2) be the optimal solution of the distributionally robust problem (3.5).
Since the locations are identical, we have that y∗1 = y
∗
2 = y
∗ for some y∗. Hence, we
need only consider the subset of inventory levels y = (y, y), for which we derive an
analytic expression of the worst-case cost as C̄(y) in (3.10). Thus, the distributionally
robust problem (3.5) is equivalent to miny C̄(y). The first two derivatives of C̄(y) are
C̄ ′(y) = −(p− h− s0) +
(p+ h− s0)(y −m)√
(y −m)2 + γσ2
C̄ ′′(y) =
(p+ h− s0)γσ2




Since γ > 0, C̄(y) is convex in y, and the optimal solution is given by the first-order
condition C̄ ′(y∗) = 0, which gives y∗ as the right-hand side of (3.11). 





















= Σ + mm>
f(D) ≥ 0, ∀D ∈ <n.
which is equal to the left-hand side of (3.13).
Since Σ  0, then the moments (m,Σ) are strictly in the interior of the feasible
moment cone. Hence, strong duality of moment problems holds (Smith, 1995). The
dual of the moment problem is
M(y) = min
t,r,Y
t+ r>m + 〈Y,Σ + mm>〉




+ , ∀x ∈ <n
We can reformulate the dual as the following semi infinite linear program:
M(y) = min
t,r,Y
t+ r>m + 〈Y,Σ + mm>〉




> (E`x− E`y) , ∀x ∈ <n
∀(A0, A1, · · · , AL−1) ∈ 2[n0] × 2[n1] × 2[nL−1]
where  is the element-wise product operator, and eA` is an n`-dimensional binary
vector whose kth element is 1 if and only if k ∈ A`. For simplicity, we can write the
right-hand side as a>k x + b
>
k y for k ∈ [2N ], where N =
∑L−1
`=0 n`. The constraint now
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(r− ak)> t− b>k y
]
 0, ∀k. 

B.2 Optimal Inventory Solutions for Two-
Locations Systems
We have four cases for which the distributionally robust solution needs to be calculated:
pooling/no pooling (P/NP), and known/unknown correlation (C/NC). Note that we
restrict the search to identical solutions of the form (y, y).
1. No pooling, ρ unknown: This is the same setting as Scarf (1958), and the







CNP,NC = 2m(s0 − h) + 2hy + (p+ h− s0)(m− y +
√
σ2 + (m− y)2)
2. No pooling, ρ known: This is the same setting as Natarajan and Teo (2017),
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and the solutions are given through an SDP.
CNP,C := min
t0,r,u,v,y
2(s0 − h)m+ 2hy + (p+ h− s0)
(
t0 + 2rm
+ 2u(m2 + σ2) + v(m2 + ρσ2)
)
s.t.
 t0 + 2y
1
2














 t0 + y
1
2

















































3. With pooling, ρ unknown: This is simply an extension of our setting where
only marginal information (m,σ) is known, and cross-moment information (ρ) is
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unknown. The solutions are given through an SDP.
CP,NC := min
t0,r,u,y






























(r − s+ s0) 0 u
  0
t0 + (s− s0)y
1
2
(r − s+ s0) 12r
1
2





t0 + 2(p+ h− s0)y
1
2
(r − p− h+ s0) 12(r − p− h+ s0)
1
2
(r − p− h+ s0) u 0
1
2
(r − p− h+ s0) 0 u
  0
t0 + y(s− s0) + 2y(p+ h− s)
1
2
(r − p− h+ s) 1
2
(r − p− h+ s0)
1
2
(r − p− h+ s) u 0
1
2
(r − p− h+ s0) 0 u
  0
t0 + y(s− s0) + 2y(p+ h− s)
1
2
(r − p− h+ s0) 12(r − p− h+ s)
1
2
(r − p− h+ s0) u 0
1
2
(r − p− h+ s) 0 u
  0
y ≥ 0
4. With pooling, ρ known: This is the setting considered by our paper, and the
solutions yP,C , CP,C are given in closed-form in Proposition 3.4.2.
B.3 Example for Generating Nested Fulfillment
Structure with L < n
Example 2 Consider Figure B.1, where a nested fulfillment structure with L = 4 is
created from the dendrogram in Figure 3.7a. Here, the range of distances are partitioned
into three quantiles by the two lines drawn on the dendrogram. In Figure B.1a, the
lower line gives rise to three connected components: {{3}, {1}, {4, 5, 2}}. The nodes in
each connected component are considered to be a single cluster in level l = 1, and the
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(a) (b)
Figure B.1: Creating a nested fulfillment structure with L = 4 from a dendrogram.
UPGMA distances are recalculated for the new clusters. The upper line gives rise to
two connected components: {{3}, {1, 4, 5, 2}}, which form the two components at level
l = 2, resulting in Figure B.1b.
B.4 Details for Numerical Experiments
B.4.1 Constant Fulfillment Heuristic
For n = 5, the marginal distribution parameters for the four distributions (Normal,
Exponential, BetaPrime and Student-t) in the following way:
1. Normal: the means are identical with m = 300, and the standard deviation is
chosen at random from [100, 800].
2. Exponential: the mean of the exponential distribution is chosen at random from
[100,500]. The standard deviation is equal to the mean.
3. BetaPrime: the mean is fixed at m = 2. The parameters α and beta are chosen
as follows. β is chosen at random from [2, 3], and α = m · (β − 1).
4. Student-t: the parameter ν is chosen at random from [2, 3].
We generate 50 such instances of marginal distribution parameters. We generate a
random correlation matrix based on Numpacharoen and Atsawarungruangkit (2012).
Then, using the method of Gaussian copula, we generate 5000 correlated random de-
mand samples for each distribution, and report the sample average approximations.
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B.4.2 Nested Fulfillment Heuristic
The mean and covariance matrices are calculated based on the populations for each
fulfillment center. Given mean m and variance v for a demand distribution, we calcu-
late the marginal distribution parameters for four distributions (Normal, Exponential,
BetaPrime and Pareto) as follows:
1. Normal: Mean µ = m, Variance σ2 = v





3. BetaPrime: β = 2 + m·(m+1)
v
, α = m · (β − 1)








, σ = m · k · (1− k), θ = σ
k
.
We generate a random correlation matrix based on Numpacharoen and Atsawarungru-
angkit (2012) such that the correlation coefficients do not exceed .4 in magnitude. We
then use the Gaussian copula to generate 103 training samples of correlated random
vectors. The stochastic solutions are calculated based on a sample average approxima-
tion linear program using these training samples, and the robust solution is calculated
based on the partitioned statistics estimated from the training samples. The inventory
solutions are then evaluated through simulations based on 103 test samples generated
in a similar fashion to the training samples.
B.5 Asymmetry Information
Based on Natarajan et al. (2017), we incorporate into our robust models the parti-
tioned statistics information. Specifically, the mean and covariance of random vector
















The set of distributions that the random demand can take is defined as F̄≥0, which
specifies that the random demand has non-negative support, with mean m, and with
mean and covariance of the partitioned statistics given in (B.28). We follow the same
approach as in Theorem 4.3 in Natarajan et al. (2017) to derive the following upper
bound including the partitioned statistics information. We omit the proof to avoid
repetition.
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Proposition B.5.1 For the n-location newsvendor problem under inventory risk pool-
ing with a L-level nested fulfillment cost structure, we have supf∈F̄≥0 Ef [C(y, D̃)] ≤




































L−2diag(ηL−2) · · · E>0 diag(η0)
)>




The heuristic solution can be similarly obtained by setting y as a decision variable,
constrained by y ≥ 0.
B.6 Multiple Demand Channels
To simplify our discussion, we consider a two-level nested fulfillment cost structure for
the online demand (i.e., where cross-location fulfillment cost is constant), though the
technique can be generalized to an L-level structure. Let pb and po be the penalty
cost of unmet brick-and-mortar store demand and online demand, respectively. The
per-unit overage cost is h. We normalize the cost for meeting store demand to zero.
As before, the cost of in-location fulfillment of online demand is s0, and the cost of
cross-location fulfillment is s, where s > s0. For a customer region j ∈ [n], let d̃oj and
d̃bj be the stochastic online demand and the stochastic store demand, respectively. We
denote the vector of online demands as D̃o = (d̃oj) and the vector of store demands
as D̃b = (d̃bj). We let D̃ = (D̃





and covariance matrix Σ.
Store demand can only be met with inventory from the same location. However,
online demand can be fulfilled from inventory from any location. We assume that
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po + h > s, that pb + h > s, and that pb + s0 > po. Given our assumptions on the
cost parameters, it is optimal for each local store to first meet the store demands to
the maximum extent possible, then for excess inventory to be used to fulfill in-location
online demand, before cross-location fulfillment is used. To see why, note that since
pb + s0 > po, then it is cheaper to use an inventory unit to meet store demand than to
fulfill a local online demand. Moreover, the assumptions imply that pb+h+s0 > s, so it
is cheaper to use cross-location fulfillment on an online demand than to use in-location
fulfillment and not meet a store demand. Therefore, we can write the cost as


















































We observe that, due to the presence of store demand which is prioritized due to
its lower cost of fulfillment, the cost structure is more complicated than before. In
particular, the last term in the cost function has a composition of a function f(x) =




j . This requires a careful treatment in developing the
tractable SDP heuristic. We first simplify the cost function by reducing the number of
such terms using the relationship that if a ≥ 0, then (a−(b−c)+) = (a+c−b)+−(c−b)+.
Also using the fact that (c− b)+ = b− c+ (c− b)+, we can simplify the cost function
to




+ s0 · e>Do




























We define the constants γ := h + pb + so − s, η0 := s − s0, and η1 := h + po − s.
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(s0 − h) · e>mo + h · e> (y −ms) +Mo(y)
)











































+ η0 · x(0)>
(
D̃o + D̃b − y
)



















on our assumptions on the cost parameters, we have that γ = h+ pb + so− s > 0, and
γ − η1 = pb − po + s0 > 0. Therefore, zj is equal to 1 if and only if dbj − yj ≥ 0. Note
that unlike in the previous section where the newly introduced variables only interact
with other constants or the random demand, we have cross interactions between the
new variables from the term x(1) · z. Hence, we introduce a new n-dimensional vector
w = x(1) · z.
Consider the (3n + 1)-dimensional random vector x̃ :=
(
x̃(1)> x̃(0)> z̃> w̃
)>
,
which collects all the new binary variables into a single vector. We again have the
following transformation
















(Q1+n+j,j − x1+n+j · yj) + η0 ·
∑
j∈[n]




(Q1,j +Q1,n+j − x1 · yj −Q2n+1+j,j + x2n+1+j · yj)
The constraints are the same as before, but with the addition of a few other constraints
that follow from the fact that w̃j = x̃
(1) · z̃j for all j ∈ [n]. In particular, note that
R1,n+1+j = x1+2n+j, ∀j ∈ [n],
R1+n+i,1+2n+j = R1+2n+1,1+2n+j, ∀i ∈ [n], j ∈ [n].





and the right-hand side is Ef (w̃j). In the second constraint, the left-hand side is









since (x̃(1))2 = x̃(1). Due to the nonnegativity of demand, aside from the
constraint that Q ≥ 0, we also have that z ≤ x(0). This is because dbj − yj ≥ 0 impies
that dbj + d
o
j − yj ≥ 0, which is equivalent to the condition that z̃j ≤ x̃
(0)
j .
Proposition B.6.1 For the n-location newsvendor problem under inventory risk pool-
ing with online and store demand in each location, if the cross-location fulfillment costs

























































η1 · e>n η1 · e>n
η0 · In η0 · In
γ · In 0n,n
−η0 · In 0n,n










t0 ∈ <, g,h ∈ <n, t ∈ <2n, u ∈ <3n+1, H ∈ <n×n
Y ∈ <2n×2n, B,W,U ∈ <(3n+1)×(3n+1), V ∈ <(3n+1)×2n.
Proof. Suppose that (z(D),x(D),w(D)) are the optimal recourse variables
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Also define the constants



























































where we use: z(D)2 = z(D), x(D)w(D)> = z(D)x(D)x(D)>, z(D)x(D) = w(D),
z(D)w(D) = z(D)2x(D) = z(D)x(D) = w(D), and finally, w(D)w(D)> =






















x Yxs Yxo w X̄ X̂





1 z x> w>
z z w> w>
x w X̄ X̂
w w X̂ X̂
 ∈ BQP.
Note that the a linear relaxation of the BQP constraints is the following:
w ≤ x,
w ≤ z · e,
−w + x + z · e ≤ 1,
X̄ii = xi,
X̄ij ≤ xi,
−X̄ij + xi + xj ≤ 1,
X̂ii = wi,
X̂ij ≤ wi,
−X̂ij + wi + wj ≤ 1,
X̂ij ≤ xi,
−X̂ij + xi + wj ≤ 1.




Appendix to Chapter 4
C.1 Proofs
C.1.1 Proof of Proposition 4.4.1
The customer of type θ will choose to buy if and only if their expected utility from buying is
non-negative. The uncertainty involved in the customer’s decision is the valuation uncertainty
ε, which is assumed to be independent of their type θ. Also, the value that the return window
T π(θ) takes is either TS or TL which is independent of θ.
Let K denote the return disutility imposed on the customer. Thus, a customer will buy
if she observes a disutility that satisfies:
U(K) := Eε [max (V + ε− p, −K)] ≥ 0 (C.1)
We see that U(K) is decreasing in K, and is independent of θ. Thus, there exists a threshold
K̄ such the customer observing a return disutility of K will buy if and only if K ≤ K̄.
Note that K̄ can be found as the highest value of K that satisfies Equation C.1. Also, K̄
is finite, as if K̄ =∞, we have:
U(K̄) := Eε [max (V + ε− p, −∞)] = Eε max (V + ε− p) = V − p < 0










C.1.2 Proof of Propostion 4.4.2
The profit function is given by:
Π(y, π) = (s− c) · y + (p− p̃π − s) · Emin (y, ξπD) (C.3)
= (p− p̃π − c) · y − (p− p̃π − s) · E (y − ξπD)+ (C.4)




(y − ξπD) f(D)dD (C.5)
Given π, the first and second order differentials with respect to y are:
dΠ(y, π)
dy












It is clear that d
2Π(y,π)
dy2
≤ 0, and hence Π(y, π) is concave in y, and the first order conditions
yield the optimal y∗(π) given in the Proposition. 
C.1.3 Proof of Proposition 4.5.1









L , and hence,















































where the second equality follows by substituting the value of rLB, and the final inequality























We have shown that for any chosen rSB, we can find a value of rLB such that
ΠSB(y, πSB) ≤ ΠLB(y, πLB). Thus, max
y,πSB
ΠSB(y, πSB) ≤ ΠLB(ȳ, π̄LB) for some ȳ and π̄LB,
and we also have: ΠLB(ȳ, π̄LB) ≤ max
y,πLB
ΠLB(y, πLB).
Hence, we have ∆Π ≤ 0 when s′ = s, and hence the firm should offer the short-blanket
policy. By the continuity of ∆Π, this is also true for values of s′ close to s. 
Proof of ii): The difference in the optimal profits between the short-blanket and long-blanket






It is easy to see from Equation 4.19 that p̃SB is continuous and decreasing in s′, and hence
ΠSB(y, πSB) is increasing in s′. Since ΠLB is independent of s′, this implies that ∆Π is
increasing in s′. 
C.1.4 Proof of Proposition 4.5.2
We have:










p̃(r) = (p− s′ − r) ·
(









































(c− s) · dp̃dr
(p− s− p̃)2 · f(α)
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Given a return window T , the expected profit function only in terms of r is given by:
Π(r) = (s− c) · (ξα) + (p− s− p̃) · Emin (ξα, ξD) (C.8)
= (p− c− p̃) · ξ · α− (p− s− p̃) · ξ · E (α−D)+ (C.9)


































































































· Emin (ξα, ξD) (C.10)


































































· Emin (ξα, ξD)
]
(C.12)
The second equality follows from Equation C.10. Note that Π(K̄) = 0, as there is no demand.
Thus, we will assume that Π(r) cannot be monotone increasing, as it is then optimal to not
sell the product. Thus, Π(r) is either monotone decreasing, or there exists at least one interior
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(s− c)ξα · (K̄ − r∗) · dp̃dr
∣∣∣∣
r=r∗
p− s− p̃+ (K̄ − r)dp̃dr
∣∣∣∣
r=r∗
(s− c) · (ξα) + (p− s− p̃) · Emin (ξα, ξD) =





p− s− p̃+ (K̄ − r)dp̃dr
∣∣∣∣
r=r∗
(p− s− p̃) · Emin (α,D) = (s− c)α ·












(p− s− p̃) · Emin (α,D) = −(s− c)α ·
 p− s− p̃










· Emin (α,D) = −(s− c)α(





· Emin (ξα, ξD) = −(s− c)ξα (C.13)







· Emin (ξα, ξD) (C.14)





Π(r) is unimodal. From Equation C.12, it is clear that if Emin (ξα, ξD) is decreasing in r at





























































The first equality follows from Equation C.8, the second equality follows from differentiation,
the third equality again follows from C.8, and the fourth equality follows from Equation C.10.
Since Π(r) ≥ 0 and r ≤ K̄, if we have d(ξα)dr
∣∣∣∣∣
r∗
≤ 0, we are done. 





≤ 0. let ξ0, α0 denote the values of ξ and α when r = 0 respectively.





























· Emin (ξ0α0, ξ0D)
)
(C.16)
Whenever c− s ≥
(













· (ξ0α0 − Emin (ξ0α0, ξ0D))
≥ c− s
K̄
· (ξ0α0 − ξ0α0)
= 0








, the function Π(r) is unimodal with an inte-
rior solution r∗ > 0.


































≤ 0, and the optimal solution is r = 0. Otherwise, we will have dΠdr
∣∣∣
r=0
≥ 0, and an
interior point r∗ > 0 will be optimal. 
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C.1.5 Proof of Proposition 4.5.3
Any customer of type θ will choose the option that yields the maximum expected util-































Clearly, the choice between (TS , rS) and (TL, rL) only depends on the return disutility imposed












and the customer chooses (TL, rL) for θM,SL < θ ≤ θM,L. 
C.1.6 Proof of Proposition 4.5.4
Let:
r∗SB = arg max
rS∈[0,K̄]
Π(y, πSB)


















Let π∗,SB, π∗,LB and π∗,M denote the optimal policies respectively. The proof follows by
showing that both r∗SB and r
∗
LB can be implemented under π
M , and hence are feasible solu-
tions to the menu of policies.
Consider a feasible policy πM1 under the menu of policies such that rS = r
∗
SB and rL =




. We thus have: Ω
πM1





S , and each buying customer in both policies is offered the same return window
and return fee (TS , r
∗
SB). Hence, Π
SB(y) = Π(y, πM1 ) ≤ ΠM (y).
Similarly, consider another feasible policy πM2 under the menu of policies such that rS =
rL = r
∗
LB. In this case, we have: Ω
πM2





L . Since each buying customer in both policies is offered the same return window and
fee (TL, r
∗
LB), we have Π
LB(y) = Π(y, πM2 ) ≤ ΠM (y).
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C.1.7 Proof of Proposition 4.6.1
We begin the proof by noticing that, keeping ξπS and ξ
π
L constant, the expected profit Π(y, π)









































































Proof of i): For any θ ≤ K̄TS, if T ∗,F (θ) = T∅, then for any other θ′ < θ, T ∗,F (θ′) = T∅.
Consider an optimal policy π∗,F where T ∗,F (θ) = T∅ for some θ ≤ K̄TS , and T ∗,F (θ′) = TS
for some θ′ < θ. The proof for the case where T ∗,F (θ′) = TL follows similarly.
Consider an alternative policy π̂ that is identical to π∗,F except that T̂ (θ′) = T∅, and




S , and ξ














S , implying Π(y, π
∗,F ) ≤ Π(y, π̂), and thus π̂ is also optimal.
Proof of ii): For any θ ≤ K̄TL, if T ∗,F (θ) = TS, then for any other θ′ < θ, T ∗,F (θ′) = TS
or T ∗,F (θ′) = T∅.
Consider an optimal policy π∗,F where T ∗,F (θ) = TS for some θ ≤ K̄TL, and T ∗,F (θ′) = TL
for some θ′ < θ. There are three cases that ensue depending on the values of θ′ and θ.
Case 1: θ′ < θ ≤ K̄TS : Consider an alternative policy π̂ that is identical to π∗,F except
that T̂ (θ′) = TS . This ensures that ξ





























































Hence, Π(y, π∗,F ) ≤ Π(y, π̂), and thus π̂ is also optimal.
Case 2: θ′ ≤ K̄TS < θ. Consider an alternative policy π̂ that is identical to π∗,F except




S , and ξ
π∗,F = ξπ̂. It is also








S . Hence, Π(y, π
∗,F ) ≤ Π(y, π̂),
and thus π̂ is also optimal.
Case 3: K̄TS < θ
′ < θ. Consider an alternative policy π̂ that is identical to π∗,F except




S , and ξ
π∗,F = ξπ̂. It is also








S . Hence, Π(y, π
∗,F ) ≤ Π(y, π̂),
and thus π̂ is also optimal. 
Proof of iii): If θ ≤ K̄TS, T ∗,F (θ) 6= TL.
Let there exist an optimal policy π∗,F where T ∗,F (θ) = TL for some θ ≤ K̄TS . Consider




































The rest of the proof follow the same steps as the proof of Case 1 of Part ii). 
C.1.8 Proof of Lemma 4.6.1















p− V − θ
TS
− rπ(θ)















p− V − θ
TL
− rπ(θ)
) ∣∣ θ ∈ ΩL] (C.19)
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We have p̃π = 1ξπ ·
[
ξS ((p− s′)ψS −RSψS) + ξL ((p− s)ψL −RLψL)
]
. Considering each term,
we have:
(p− s′)ψS −RSψS


























p− V − θ
TS
− rπ(θ)
) ∣∣∣∣ θ ∈ ΩS] (C.20)
(p− s)ψL −RLψL






















(p− s− rπ(θ)) · G
(
p− V − θ
TL
− rπ(θ)
) ∣∣∣∣ θ ∈ ΩL] (C.21)
It is easy to see that for any θ, both (p− s− rπ(θ)) · G
(




(p− s′ − rπ(θ)) · G
(
p− V − θTL − r
π(θ)
)
are decreasing in rπ(θ). Since ΩS,π1 = ΩS,π2 and
ΩL,π1 = ΩL,π2 , this implies that p̃π1 ≤ p̃π2 , which completes the proof. 
C.1.9 Proof of Proposition 4.6.2
The proofs follow by constructing an optimal policy that possesses the properties in Propo-
sition 4.6.2 from another optimal policy that does not possess these properties. Proof of i):
Let π∗ be an optimal policy where there exists Ω̄ =
{




that Ω̄ ⊂ Ω. Consider policy π1 which is identical to π∗ except that r∗(θ) = K̄ − θT ∗(θ) for
all θ ∈ Ω̄. By Lemma 4.6.1, it follows that p̃π∗ ≥ p̃π1 and consequently Π(y, π∗) ≤ Π(y, π1),
which implies that π1 is also optimal.





θ : T ∗(θ) = TS , −
θ
TS







θ : T ∗(θ) = TL, −
θ
TL
























(p− s− rπ(θ)) · G
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(p− s− rπ(θ)) · G
(



























(p− s− r∗(θ)) · G
(



















(p− s− r∗(θ)) dθ
)
(C.25)
It is clear from (i) that for any θ ≤ K̄ · TS and θ ∈ Ωπ, two policies are possible:(




TL, rL = K̄ − θTL
)
. Since the rate of return is constant under both
policies (= G(p− V − K̄)), the contribution to p̃π∗ of both these policies are p− s′ − rS and
p− s− rL respectively. Due to Lemma 4.6.1, the policy that is chosen for θ is one that leads
to the lowest p̃π
∗
. Thus, (TS , rS) is chosen if and only if:
p− s′ − rS ≤ p− s− rL
−s′ − K̄ + θ
TS








Proof of iii): Note that for any θ > K̄ · TS and θ ∈ Ωπ, it must be the case that T ∗(θ) = TL.
Thus, a corollary of (ii) is that there is an optimal policy in which there exists a threshold
148







, K̄ · TS
)
Thus, it is sufficient to show that if for any θ2 > θ
SL, θ2 ∈ ΩL, then any other θ1 such that
θSL < θ1 < θ2 should also be in ΩL.
Let θ1 6∈ ΩL. This implies that θ1 6∈ Ω, as θ1 > θSL. Consider an alternate strategy π′
which is identical to π∗ except that θ2 6∈ ΩL, and θ1 ∈ ΩL. That is, − θ1TL − r
′(θ1) = −K̄ =
− θ2TL − r






Let Ω̂L = ΩL,π
∗ − {θ2}, and ΩL,π
′




















(p− s− r∗(θ)) · G
(




































, and hence Π(y, π′) ≥ Π(y, π∗), which
implies that π′ is also optimal. 
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C.2.3 Menu of Policies


































































C.2.4 Personalized Policies with General Refunds
The fraction of customers buying the product are:





















p− V − K̄
)
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Note that the rate of return is independent of θ, as all customers obtain the same utility
upon return (−K̄). The expected return fees collected by the firm RS and RL are given by:






∣∣ θ ≤ min(θ∗, θ∗1)]
= K̄ − 1
2TS
·min(θ∗, θ∗1)






∣∣ min(θ∗, θ∗1) < θ ≤ θ∗]
= K̄ − 1
2TL
· (θ∗ + min(θ∗, θ∗1))










ξSψS + (p− s−RL) ξLψL
]
=

















∣∣ θ ≤ min(θ∗, θ∗1)] ξS + 1TLE [θ ∣∣ min(θ∗, θ∗1) < θ ≤ θ∗] ξL
]
= G(p− V − K̄) ·
[











E [θ · 1 (θ ≤ min(θ∗, θ∗1))] +
1
TL
E [θ · 1 (min(θ∗, θ∗1) < θ ≤ θ∗)]
]
= G(p− V − K̄) ·
[














· E [θ · 1 (θ ≤ min(θ∗, θ∗1))] +
1
TL
E [θ · 1 (θ ≤ θ∗)]
]
= G(p− V − K̄) ·
[




























G(p− V − K̄) ·
(
p− s′ − K̄ + θ∗2TS
)
, if θ ≤ θ1
G(p− V − K̄) ·
(
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M Ali Ülkü and Ülkü Gürler. The impact of abusing return policies: A newsvendor
model with opportunistic consumers. Internat. J. Production Econom., 203:124–133,
2018.
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